



# BEYOND TRANSITION?

MEMORY AND IDENTITY NARRATIVES IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

EDITED BY: BARBARA TÖRNQUIST-PLEWA, NIKLAS BERNсанд & ELEONORA NARVSELIUS  
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES AT LUND UNIVERSITY 2015





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# Introduction

*Barbara Törnquist-Plewa, Niklas Bernsand &  
Eleonora Narvselius*

This volume collects selected contributions to the international conference *Beyond Transition? New Directions in Eastern and Central European Studies*, held in Lund on 2-4 October 2013. The conference emerged in cooperation between the Centre for European Studies at Lund University, the Uppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies and the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) at Södertörn University (Stockholm), with generous financial support from the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The event served as a follow-up conference to the 8th ICCEES World Congress, held in Stockholm in 2010.

The conference encouraged participants from various academic fields and with different subregional focuses to go beyond the study of the post-Soviet states and the former socialist countries in Eastern and Central Europe in relation to their trajectory from the old system. It suggested that it might be more rewarding to take into account patterns of convergence and divergence between European countries on both sides of the former Iron Curtain facing the pressures and possibilities of globalisation. Consequently, all the papers in this volume in their own way, more or less explicitly, deal with cases where problems of change and continuity transgress the old East-West border under the impact of larger political, socio-cultural and intellectual trends.

## Individual contributions

The pivotal concept of the conference – transition – is revisited in Kristian Petrov's contribution. This theoretical essay, "*Transition*" in *Hindsight: 1990s Transitology as an object of Intellectual History*, which opens the volume, compares the concept of transition suggested by post-communist transitology with the same term current in Soviet ideology until 1991. The author warns of the perils of the teleological strand of transitology that gained popularity after 1991. This views the starting point (totalitarian communism) and the end point (perfect democracy or market economy) of the post-communist transitions as an

abstraction emptied of ontological content. Hence, the value of transition as a practical tool for analysis of really existing conditions becomes questionable and, besides, it runs the risk of reproducing the bias which was typical of communist ideology.

In the article *Transitional Justice and the Politics of Memory in Europe: An East-West Comparative Exercise*, Csilla Kiss opposes the remaining tendency in Western practical politics and academic approaches to treat East European countries as very different from the rest of Europe despite the long time that has passed since they ceased to be part of the Communist Bloc. In her article, Kiss argues that there are many issues along which East European countries can be compared to their Western counterparts. Choosing the issue of transitional justice in general and the politics of memory in particular, and drawing on the examples of postwar and post-communist transitional justice procedures in Europe, she points out the similarities of various transitional justice procedures between cases in Western and Eastern Europe, with an emphasis on the use of transitional justice in shaping the politics of memory of the countries in question. She argues for the possibilities and uses of an East-West comparison across regions, as well as over time, and thus surpasses the old East-West division for future research.

A more specific example of post-Soviet transformations is offered by Vida Savoniakaitė in her outline of the changes and continuities in the study of regions in Lithuanian ethnology and anthropology. Savonakaitė traces both how economic and socio-cultural transformations provide new contexts for research on the countryside, and the contradictions in the research discourse itself caught between old and new paradigms and approaches.

Critical perspectives on well-established concepts used in studies of post-1989 East Central Europe are a hallmark of several contributions to the volume. Among them is Aleksandra Szczepan's paper *Post-memory, Post-dependence, Post-trauma: Negotiating Identity in Post-Communist Poland*. The argument runs that these three "post" concepts have been transferred from the Western memory, trauma and Holocaust studies and adapted to Polish realities without much reflection or sensitivity to the local realities. The author suggests that examination of the literary accounts created by the post-war generation of Polish Jews might allow peculiar qualities of memory work to be distinguished in the post-communist cultural spaces.

Marek Kucia's article *The Meanings of Auschwitz in Central Europe before and after 1989* accounts for what Auschwitz meant in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe before 1989 and what it came to mean in that country and three other Central European countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia – after the demise of communism and beyond. The article outlines the main historical facts about Auschwitz the camp revealed in Poland in 1990, which prompted major changes in the meanings of Auschwitz the symbol there and elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc. It presents the received view of the meanings

of Auschwitz in Poland wherein four major meanings – Polish, international, universal, and Jewish – are distinguished in reference to variously defined groups of victims. It also proposes a new perspective that distinguishes three forms of the symbolic meaning of Auschwitz – universal, international, and national – and analyses the changes of their contents, identifying the principal agents of change.

Matylda Figlerowicz's contribution is a comparative study of the artistic works produced under two different political regimes which, arguably, have much in common when it comes to both official representations of the past and counter-memory. The main focus of the essay is the concepts of abject and the fragmentary. These two aspects define the character of the analysed pieces of art created in Francoist Spain and communist Poland. The author argues that, in spite of the different ideologies, the experience of oppressive political systems created similar artistic responses. Among them are similar expressions of counter-memory that elevate, on the one hand, fragmentation of reality and, on the other hand, abjection as something deeply abhorred and repulsive, but domesticated as a part of daily life. Examination of these conceptual pivots of the art created under oppressive political regimes may help to reveal silences, exclusions and omission and, consequently, to promote more open and plural post-totalitarian narratives.

Jarosław Suchoples' and Ewa Maria Slaska's contribution to the volume shows that the process of the German coming to terms with the Nazi past ("*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*") is not yet finished, and has continued after the fall of the Communist Bloc and the unification of Germany in 1990. New, uncomfortable and previously unknown facts from the past are coming to the surface. Such was a resurfaced memory about a forced labour camp in Berlin that was organised, built, owned and led by the Church. The camp existed to the end of the war. For about 50 years nobody involved in it wanted to remember its existence. Only in July 2000 did the Evangelical Church officially admit that it was involved in its organisation and that this was an unforgivable act.

The paper delivered by Nartsiss Shukuralieva addresses the seldom addressed topic of constructions of collective memory in post-Soviet Central Asia. Combining approaches of memory studies and political studies, the paper examines how officially promoted narratives on the "Tulip Revolution" (2005) contribute to the political legitimacy of the ruling elites in Kyrgyzstan. It proves to be that, on the one hand, the revolution is commemorated as the moment of democratic re-determination of the role of the people, authority and the state. On the other hand, however, the memory of the revolution is used to satisfy the authoritarian ambitions of the ruling elite. The author assumes that the official narratives on the not so distant past should be seen as a flexible response to internal and international stimuli, rather than as a long-term state ideology.

Eleonora Narvselius and Niklas Bernsand contend that despite geographical proximity and comparable features of historical development since the fall of the Soviet system, the western Ukrainian cities of Lviv and Chernivtsi betray quite

different patterns of approaching the past. The cultures of memory in the two cities nevertheless have two common characteristics: the recurrent narrative about acceptance or denial of ethnic diversity, and the mode in which memory works among contemporary urbanites. The latter is guided not so much by path-dependent logic of collective memory, but rather by present-day expediency and power games of different mnemonic actors. Therefore, the most observable trend in cultures of memory in present-day Lviv and Chernivtsi is pillarisation, i.e. the basic agreement of both external and internal memory entrepreneurs and marketers that every population group is a custodian of its “own” heritage. However, the condition of heritage envisioned in the two cities seems to be rather an assimilationist “incorporation-to-the-core” model, where the core consists of various versions of Ukrainian national heritage.

Oleksii Polegkyi analyses divisions in Ukrainian public discourse on collective identity in post-Soviet Ukraine. For Polegkyi, battles over national identity in Ukraine after independence have been defined by participants’ attitude towards the political, historical and linguistic legacies of the former imperial centre. Two main positions have formed from this discourse: a postcolonial one stressing Ukrainian past victimisation and the present need to disengage with the old centre, and a postimperial one that emphasises a common heritage and the importance of furthering relations with Russia.

Peter Balogh’s conceptually interesting study focuses on Hungarian meta-geographical narratives, i.e. “ideas and visions of communal solidarity and identification that have a geopolitical agenda”. Balogh devotes particular attention to the growing significance of Neo-Turanism, the most influential of the narratives emphasising Hungarians’ links with Turkic Asia, partly at the expense of the idea of Finno-Ugric kinship. The rise of Hungarian Neo-Turanism, which on the political level is supported by the far-right Jobbik and to some extent by the ruling Fidesz party, is paralleled by the simultaneous rise of Neo-Ottomanism in Turkey and Neo-Eurasianism in Russia. The author sees the growing popularity of this meta-geographical narrative in the context of a wider Hungarian political and economic opening-up to Eurasian countries such as Russia, Turkey and China.

Last but not least, the editors wish to thank our colleagues Prof. Elena Namli from the Uppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies and Prof. Irina Sandomirskaja from the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) at Södertörn University for their fruitful cooperation, and especially to acknowledge the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia for making the conference possible with their generous financial support. Finally, the editors want to express their gratitude to Alexandru Budai, who acted as technical editor in the final stage of work with this volume.

# “Transition” in Hindsight: 1990s Transitology as an object of Intellectual History

*Kristian Petrov*

## Background

The fall of the Soviet Union also spelled the virtual death of Sovietology<sup>1</sup> (2014: Petrov). Instead of simply continuing to apply their older theories to the new realities emerging within the post-Soviet bloc, some Sovietologists, notably of a younger generation, identified an alternative option. This involved contributing to what within the social sciences at the time was evolving as a new inter-disciplinary research field, concerned with countries defined to be in a state of economic, political, legal, and social ‘transition’. By assimilating a new paradigm, the scholars could renew their position within the academic infrastructure in which new journals, conferences, textbooks, curricula and research centres started to capitalize on ‘transition’—the new catchword of the day. The ‘Kremlinology’ characteristic of much of traditional Sovietology, in which one had tended to compensate for data scarcity by extensive theorizing, often with a predilection for retrospective and ‘totalitarian’ perspectives, was thus traded off for explanatory models of a more empiricist kind, some of them having been applied to post-authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America some fifteen years earlier (see Linz and Stepan 1996: xv).

*Post-communist transitology* could be characterized as a more or less autonomous inter-disciplinary social science approach, albeit inspired by an anticipating *global* transitology of so-called *third wave* democratization (cf. Huntington 1991). The process of change in the post-communist world could,

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<sup>1</sup> A more developed version of this paper, with a wider and deeper scope of analysis, including references to primary sources, was published in the journal *Baltic Worlds*, during the Spring of 2014, with the title “The Concept of Transition in Transition: Comparing the Post-Communist Use of the Concept of Transition with that found in Soviet Ideology” (Petrov, 2014).

according to many of the new transitologists, instructively be compared with earlier cases of ‘transitions’ but was also seen to exhibit unique characteristics, suggesting a need for organizing new academic platforms and networks.

## Aim and scope

The aim of my current project is two-fold. Partly, the purpose is to critically analyze manifestations of 1990s, and to a lesser extent early 2000s, post-communist transitology, in its more teleological and radical forms. Furthermore, the intention is to critically compare the post-communist concept of transition to the concept of transition in historical materialism prevalent in Soviet ideology up until 1991. Due to the limited format in this paper, I have to omit much of the conceptual genealogy. But I would nevertheless like to emphasize contemporary transitology’s roots from Condorcet’s 18<sup>th</sup> century idea of social progress, Lamarck’s and Darwin’s 19<sup>th</sup> century teachings on natural evolution, through 1950s modernization theories, to the 1970s democratization concept in Dankwart Rustow, but also, and perhaps more unexpectedly, in Hegel’s ‘logic’ and Marx’s historical materialism, which becomes visible in both Soviet and post-Soviet uses of the transition concept (see Petrov 2014).

On the basis of the conceptualizations that are being reconstructed, I am trying to demonstrate a need for *historical* reflexivity.

## Teleological transitology

When applied to the post-Soviet bloc, the term transition has functioned as a part of an explanatory framework for conceptualizing, standardizing, and analyzing the changeover from autocratic communism to democratic capitalism (cf. Honsell 2004: 1). If the western scholar initially was able to present the authoritative theory about the *purpose* of the process, his Central-East European colleague was instrumental for its transmission and implementation (cf. Brown 2001: 457), besides providing a helping hand in the accumulation of empirical data.

Talking about (post-communist) transitology as a unitary phenomenon is, however, not unproblematic. Gans-Morse (2004: 334) has convincingly demonstrated that research on transition generally has not been carried out within one and the same paradigm, other than in the eyes of some critics. Accordingly, my analysis does not concern transitology in general but is reserved to those manifestations of ‘transitology’ which could be seen as teleological (and radically teleological at that). The essential feature of *teleological* transitology is that it

structures analysis from the viewpoint of a defined *end* of the transition process, which is seen as predictable and therefore virtually unstoppable.

During the last decade a substantial body of literature has emerged that is critical toward transitology's theoretical premises, notably its alleged Western bias and an unconditional commitment to democratization, as well as its privileging of structures and game-theoretic focus on the manoeuvres of elites (see Carothers 2002; Zherebkin 2009; cf. Kavaliauskas 2012). However, also my point that transition models retain continuities with the past has been made before. The argument that the seemingly neoliberal project of the post-Soviet transition from communism to capitalism was basically Bolshevism in reverse has perhaps most vehemently been made by Reddaway and Glinski (2001 cf. Cohen 2000: 23–30, 151–155; Burawoy and Verdery 1999: 4). Even so, the claim here that post-socialist transitions have parallels in previous Soviet transitions, is qualified differently. Instead of simply stressing resemblance in supposed ideological fanaticism or catastrophic outcomes, I try to trace the common *philosophical* roots and reconstruct the *structural* similarities between communist and post-communist transitology's theoretico-ideological claims, on a deeper conceptual level.

## Reassessing Post-Communist Transitology

The concept of transition has been used as a tool, not only to describe but also to guide (EBRD 1999; EBRD 2008; cf. Economist Intelligence Unit 2010) a particular, sometimes purposive, process, occurring during the so-called 'Transition Era' (Honsell 2004: 1), in certain kinds of countries that traditionally have not followed the liberal road of modernization. The concept of transition implies an expectation of democratization and marketization and can thus only be meaningfully applied to countries in which there is, or recently has been, a substantial mandate for Western modernization. A semantic characteristic of transition is that it in several discourses tends to be defined from the viewpoint of the objectives to be realized, which is a reason why it might be endowed with teleological connotations. If the endpoint signifies the fulfilment of a certain number of formalized criteria, the starting point represents an absence of these.

In some cases, perhaps not representative for the study of transition among political scientists in general, but nevertheless illustrative of a transitological approach taken to its extreme, the transition to democracy and capitalism has appeared as 'quite simple, even natural' and can in essence only be obstructed temporarily and then by external force (Mueller 1996: 104)—much in line with Fukuyama's (1989) seductive prediction of the end of history.

A more cautious and nuanced view on transition, with an emphasis on inherent uncertainties, contingent alternatives and variations in outcome, was, however, already expressed in the studies of the early phase of 'third wave'

democratization in the 1970s and 1980s (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 3), and has been passed on to many researchers who have studied transitions of a later phase, 'post-communism'.

Transitology does not only presuppose a movement between a preceding and a succeeding state, but also contains a global dimension. Even if transitions usually are not considered natural, the notion is not uncommon that they advantageously can be *compared* since they are posited to correspond to, or alternatively diverge from, a general transition *pattern*, for example the third 'wave'. Carothers (2002: 7) stresses that the social scientists' alleged transition paradigm holds a presumption that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy progresses in a particular sequence, which, one might add, also is valid for many transition studies within economics. First there is an *opening* (cracks within the dictatorial regime appear accompanied by limited attempts at liberalization). Then follows a *breakthrough* (the regime collapses and a new system emerges), which finally evolves into a *consolidation* or stabilization (democratic forms turn into democratic substance through parliamentary reforms and a strengthening of civil society and market institutions). Critics have pointed to a supposed inclination to jump into an analysis of the (teleologically defined) consolidation phase and to the model's alleged sequential and predictable character.

The collapse of communism constituted a resource of political and economic comparative possibilities previously unparalleled. The metaphysical approximations put forward in the classics of political economy could now be converted into operationalizable hypotheses, which could be tested directly against an experience continuously unrolling in front of the eyes of the transitologist. However, due to particular traditional factors, development in some countries of the post-Soviet bloc appeared to either be facilitated or obstructed. Nevertheless, it was the *lack* that many times remained a constant, while the prerequisites for transcending it may have varied. In the long run, the question was, in some cases, not so much about how much, as how *little*, of a consolidated democracy and market economy that country x had become (see McFaul 2005: 1).

## Eastern Europe and Western Intellectual History

Lack, shortage, or absence, as representational forms, are of interest to note, since the image of 'Eastern Europe,' with its roots in the secularist degradation of a supposedly static, despotic and oriental Byzantium during the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Mango 1984: 37f; Andrén, 2001: 35f), is often portrayed in relation to Western European advances, the equivalent of which great parts of Eastern Europe supposedly lack (cf. Andrén 2001: 44ff). The conquests are usually defined as knowledge of Roman law, civil society institutions, individualism, the Renaissance, the



Scientific Revolution, the early modern economic expansion and the Enlightenment. The prominent historian Philip Longworth (1992: 292–303) exemplifies this tendency in his thematic representation of Eastern Europe. He characterizes a number of institutions and traditions that are associated with Western Europe, and asks what the consequences of the absence of these are for development in Eastern Europe. Consequently, it is not surprising that ‘non-democracies [in transitological literature] have often been defined more in terms of what they are not than of what they are’ (Way 2008: 2).

In this way, teleological transitology encourages a counterfactual historiography. The desirable institutions ultimately appear to be thoroughly homogenous and, consequently, transplantable to other contexts. The perspective, which as a matter of fact is congruent with Adam Smith’s idea of an invisible hand, forces, by necessity, a production of alternative explanations to the fact that some of the countries under scrutiny do not develop with sufficient speed or even go astray: If only they would have had this or that tradition, or implemented this or that reform (or if they would not suffer so much from corruption), then it would have been possible to achieve a vibrant democracy and a prosperous market economy much faster (cf. Lavigne 2000: 476).

The teleological focus on *absence*, characteristic of thinking in terms of a transition checklist, has likely, I believe, delayed the impact of alternative theories, such as those about (post-authoritarian) hybrid regimes (see Diamond 2002; Ekman 2009). Several more or less authoritarian, or at least semi-authoritarian, post-Soviet countries have by some researchers possibly all too long been described as ‘transitional countries’, that is, democracies in the making (see Nichols 2002; Korosteleva 2003; McFaul 2005). Mono-linearity and the taking for granted of a closed-ended development have, I argue, encouraged *ad-hoc* hypotheses about temporary hindrances and opposing forces, thus concealing an alternative logic of the events. The very language of transition may therefore have amplified indications of democratic and market economy potentials and trends. The political scientist and international relations expert John Mueller contended in 1996 that ‘most of the postcommunist countries of central and eastern Europe [had] essentially completed their transition to democracy and capitalism [...]’. They were in fact, he continued, ‘already full-fledged democracies [...]’ (Mueller 1996: 102f). What was on the agenda now, he concluded, was not radical change but actual *consolidation* of already existing democracy and capitalism. Paradoxically, it has sometimes appeared as if the projected transition to democracy and a market economy was not only imminent on the horizon, but even achieved, at least hypothetically or anticipatorily (e.g. Åslund 1995: 3). The idea of a completed transition thus seems to be strengthened by its very prediction. In the words of the renowned American sociologist Edward A. Tiryakian (1994: 132), the post-1989 transition to liberal democracy, if one excludes China and

does not take into account variables of fundamentalism and nationalism, ‘is truly a miracle of epic historical proportion’.

## Communism or Neoliberalism?

Interestingly, the Soviet Union was ultimately a project of transition, socialism in itself being something provisional. The transitory character was cited by the early Bolsheviks in order to legitimize a repressive order ‘temporarily’ allowed to oppress capitalists, intellectuals, and other petty-bourgeois elements, that is, the so-called oppressors from the *ancien régime*, until the day that actual communism could be realized (Lenin 1918/1962: 89; cf. Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1919/1969: § 48). Likewise, several post-communist politicians, and also scholars with a neoliberal bias, seemed willing to defend virtually any social cost of development with reference to the omnipotent ‘Transition’. (Naturally, this should have been more common among those who essentially affirmed a particular political agenda only in the *name* of transitology.) The massive flight of capital, the plundering of natural resources and the nepotistic relocation of state property in Russia during the first half of the 1990s—which cannot be said to agree with market economy ideals—were legitimized as a part of the Transition with a capital T (Brown 2001: 456). This was done with a similar kind of teleological argumentation as in the Soviet case.

Certainly, an abundance of persuasive aphorisms were used not only by political advocates of shock therapy, but also by transitological economists in the early 1990s, which might well have appealed to a Lenin or a Stalin (when justifying revolution or collectivization). Phrases like ‘you don’t pull teeth slowly’ (quoted in Brabant, 1998: 102f) are congruent with the denotation of transition, that is, the irreversibly absolute and essentially abrupt passage from one condition, location or earlier stage of development to another.

Perhaps not coincidentally, the two prominent transitologists Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl (1994) once attempted to ‘canonize’ Niccolò Machiavelli as transitology’s forefather. First and foremost, they qualified Machiavelli by virtue of his modern perception of political outcomes as essentially artifactual and contingent, albeit uncertain, products of human action (Schmitter and Karl 1994: 174). Even though political change, according to Machiavelli, is 50% subject to unpredictable fortune, the latter can, to a certain extent, be manipulated by virile and adventurous statesmen. This formula expresses a kind of reconciliation between voluntarism and determinism we also find in modern transitology.

However, also Machiavelli's (1515/1908: 78, 86, 120ff) analytical split between what in retrospect could be seen as *raison d'état* politics and common sense ethics is instructive in the genealogy of post-communist, as well as communist, discourses on transition, which could be expressed in the formula: 'Whatever helps in the struggle is good; whatever hinders, is bad.'

The above maxim could certainly have been voiced by Machiavelli, but it was, in fact, actually written 400 years later by the Bolsheviks (Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, 1919/1969: § 23) to legitimize the brutality by which the Russian proletariat should establish its dictatorship. The neoliberal interpretation of the process of economic transition also presupposes an idea that moral ends can excuse immoral means. 'Hard' and 'undemocratic' measures in Russia during the 1990s were, according to the influential transition economist Anders Åslund (1995: 11f; 1993: 45f, 52), not only necessary practically in the process of reform implementation, but also historically legitimate since their immediate repercussions were supposedly fading away in comparison with the increasing *expectation* of future democratization. The lack of political freedoms and rights were, as presented by Åslund (1995: 314), motivated with reference to that they eventually would follow in the wake of the economic freedom currently being implemented. The faster the short-term transition in the present, the lower the long run social costs.

What could appear as undemocratic decision-making should according to Åslund (1995: 11f) be understood in the context of Russia's undemocratic past. A culture of democratic compromise, presumably in contrast to a real market economy, needs time to develop. Russia's traditions hence called for a more 'robust and radical approach' than what was needed in for example East Central Europe. In Russia's case it would, according to Åslund, have been 'lethal to hesitate or move slowly'.

## Problems of Anachronism

The concept of transition does not only co-constitute an explanatory framework which structures and standardizes empirical data. It has also turned into a historiographical representation, which encompasses a defined period after the fall of communism. The teleological implications, however, might bring about a risk whereby we tend to understand history backwards and reduce the complexity of development to a simplified narrative, with a defined beginning, turning point, climax, and sense morale, which essentially reflects the contemporary standards of our own culture-specific horizon.

Transition, denoting the historic changeover from autocratic communism to democratic capitalism, was during the 1990s one of the strategic keywords within post-communist research. The motion of transition is, at least in theory, and as

outlined by teleological transitologists, asymmetrical and progressive. As a historiographical device of post-communist studies, transition can either comprehend development after the fall of communism generally, which leads to our own present, or also include the Gorbachev era in this process (see Linz and Stepan 1996: 367). When scholars apply the concept retroactively on the preceding Gorbachev era, they might, however, adumbrate the fact that the horizon of expectation of *that* era was not primarily characterized by an irreversible movement forward (cf. Petrov 2013: 323). Political and cultural *retrospection*—the fixation with counterfactual alternatives and choices of destiny as well as the rehabilitation of ‘people’s enemies’ and the interest to publicly discuss previously forbidden or tabooed subjects (see Clark 1993)—indicated a common hope of the ability to *return* backwards and enter alternative, previously ignored or suppressed paths of development, which were assumed to have been crystallized in the domestic past. The concept of transition might in this context conceal that the *perestroika* matrix was essentially horizontal and symmetrical. It was only in 1990, if not 1991, that a change of system eventually became a part of the general agenda in Soviet Russia (cf. Maksimov 1992: 157). (The concept of transition (*perekhod*) had among the Soviet population hitherto had an entirely different meaning.) The idea that the Soviet Union should follow a Western model was thus not yet hegemonic. On the contrary, there were even prominent scholars in the West who believed that *Soviet perestroika* instead should be spread to the rest of the world (Gellner 1991: 237). The historiographical assimilation of *perestroika* into the 1990s logic of events is problematic since the former era was the scene of a staging of a political project that irrevocably has been exhausted. The *perestroika* project was launched in a context and a historiography in which ‘communism’, for example, still enjoyed some, albeit small, sense of international legitimacy, which it indisputably does not do today. The point is that if *perestroika* is understood as the first stage of *post-Soviet transition*, one must take into account that history is reconstructed backwards and that development is reduced to a formal, if not teleological, scheme.

What for several transitologists particularly makes Gorbachev’s actions impossible to explain with reference to theories about rational choice is that he seemed to *delay* development. His ‘shortcomings’, ‘flaws’, ‘half-heartedness’, and ‘naiveté’ (Åslund 1995: 34, 51), simply made him neglect the optimal alternatives that history had placed at his disposal. These optimal alternatives are, nonetheless, only relevant, I would say, in relation to a referential horizon created retroactively. If the final objective already during *perestroika* would have been spelled out as the kind of liberal market economy that the economic transitologists usually recommended during the 1990s, then it would be natural to think that what eventually actually happened *must* have happened. Teleology thus risks concealing possible alternatives. Accordingly, as in Åslund’s case, the fall of the Soviet Union appeared as ‘inevitable’.

## Concluding Remarks

If a particular conceptualization of transitional change is not informed within its wider historical context, there is a risk of reproducing a teleological bias which in extreme cases manifests itself as an inverted mirror of communism. Another problem with a teleologically conceptualized transition is that the standardized goal might achieve a quality of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The starting point, in a number of different countries, with particular pre-conditions respectively, has in many cases been reduced to a monolith and analytically positioned at the service of the objective. The starting point, together with the end point, thus becomes a generalized abstraction which is emptied of ontological content. The end—perfect democracy or market economy—as well as the outset—totalitarian communism—are constructed into ideal opposites. Although aware of the risks of generalization and simplification, Anders Åslund holds that the direction and end of the transition are best understood by means of a reconstruction of the ‘typical features’ and ‘key characteristics’ of the communist system, *per se* (Åslund 1995: 3). According to Archie Brown (2010: 105), however, an equally renowned social scientist, the Soviet Union more or less ceased to be ‘communist’, at least in any qualified sense (except when it came to official self-definition), already in 1989, particularly in relation to the relatively successfully democratization of freedom of speech (*glasnost*) and an experiment of Western parliamentarianism (Congress of People’s Deputies). If Brown is right, Åslund’s approach could be seen as symptomatic of a tendency in teleological transitology, namely to reconstruct the starting point negatively, so that the imagined outcome not only would be able to legitimize continuous development away from negativity, hence making it possible for the researcher to conveniently ‘tick off’ the items on the transition ‘checklist’, but also, in its turn, the end is justified itself, through the constitutive *lack* that is characteristic of the starting point.

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# Transitional Justice and the Politics of Memory in Europe: An East-West Comparative Exercise

*Csilla Kiss*

## Introduction

More than twenty years have passed since the transitions in the then communist countries of Eastern Europe: today most of them have consolidated their democracies and become members of the European Union. While at the time of the transition the actual democratizing process was in focus, and these countries were usually treated in a group discussed together and compared to one another, over two decades later it is interesting to examine whether they can be approached from a new angle, and whether the scope of comparisons might be broadened in order to gain a better understanding, as well as open further paths of comparative politics for the future. In the following I will attempt to offer such an avenue: first I will survey the way in which the East European region was treated earlier, then I will examine the possibility of carrying out a comparison across Europe, which can go beyond regions, not restricted to regional analyses.

## Eastern Europe, Central Europe, the East-West divide

Although today we are inclined to believe that the division of Europe was no more than the result of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain, in fact Eastern or East-Central Europe has always been regarded as a distinct entity, in some way Europe's (or "Europe proper's") "other". In his *Inventing Eastern Europe*, Larry Wolff describes a point of convergence between Balkanism and Orientalism: he calls it "an intellectual point of demi-Orientalization", as the descriptions of travelers in the eastern part of Europe resemble those in Asia (Wolff 1994: 7). Wolff regards the contemporary vision of Eastern Europe as the fruit of the Enlightenment (that is, of the 18th century), when Eastern Europe was envisioned as a semi-civilized region, reinforcing the West's conceit of its own civilization

(Bassin 1996). Western Europe regarded the region with a certain fear, or at least anxiety, as something that Europe could not isolate or disregard, but which the West found worrisome and troublesome. It was also romantic, as testified by travelogues and novels, but in general the region was looked at with suspicion, and this was also embodied in certain political decisions. For example, at Potsdam and Yalta “Eastern Europe could only be surrendered because it had been long ago imagined, discovered, claimed and set apart”, as Wolff argues.<sup>2</sup> With the Cold War division of Europe, in a certain sense, in the eyes of a number of West Europeans Eastern Europe simply took its rightful place in the Soviet sphere of interest; and this absorption of the region by Russia meant a certain stability, where these troublesome little countries were kept away from causing further trouble. In the 1960s and 1970s, textbooks and encyclopedias talked about an “Eastern civilization” that was consolidated and belonged together culturally: this was an expression of a de facto recognition of Soviet rule in the area. That historians and political scientists at universities as well as in conventions discussed the Soviet-dominated region under the label of “Slavic studies”, even though it included non-Slavic countries like Hungary, Romania or Albania, further reinforced this classification. At the end of the Cold War, the region was also regarded with some suspicion: John Mearsheimer (1990 15:1) suggested that in order to maintain stability it would be useful to continue keeping substantial Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe; the renowned British historian Eric Hobsbawm (1996: 495) worried about the “international void between Trieste and Vladivostok” after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Mainly as a result of this classification, regarded as painful and unjustified by many thinkers, writers and philosophers in the region, the concept of “Central Europe” was born. In fact, the notion had its antecedents in earlier geopolitical discussions and characterizations, which after different shifts culminated in the well-known and nowadays still worrisome concept of *Mittleuropa*, but Milan Kundera, Czesław Miłosz or Jenő Szűcs, among others, breathed new life into the concept<sup>1</sup>. Fighting the binary opposition between East and West, their arguments, drawing on historical and cultural phenomena, aimed to show that certain countries (that is Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, although the list varied) that allegedly belonged to a region called “Central Europe” were “Western” by their history and culture, and therefore their appropriation by the Soviet Union should be regarded as a loss by the West, rather than being written off so easily. They also argued that “communism” was not the natural outcome of the history of these countries or of the region as a whole (Kundera New York Review of Books

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<sup>2</sup> For a description and analysis of this process see for example Törnquist-Plewa (1999).

<sup>3</sup> See for example Kundera (1984); Szűcs (1983).

31:7)<sup>3</sup>. Following the regime change in the 1990s, the word “Central European” became dominant as the politically correct way of describing the former communist countries in Europe’s eastern half, but the status of the region did not undergo significant changes. Although being called “Central European” meant recognition as an aspiring democracy which might eventually gain membership in the European Union, countries in the region remained “second-hand Europeans”, “European” with a qualification, and they were handled together as “democratizing”, “transitional”, and post-communist”. Even after becoming full members of the EU, they continued to be referred to as “new members” and “post-communist” (Törnquist-Plewa 2005) which of course also grouped them together with the former Soviet republics that were equally classified as “post-communist”. On the one hand, as András Bárony, former undersecretary of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry pointed out in 2006 at a conference in Vienna, this is no more than a thinly veiled effort to treat the new member states as second-class countries and assume that whatever problems they might have were common and followed from their communist past. At the same time, such a grouping together also has existential reasons: “Slavic studies” specialists who made a living out of studying East European countries as a subfield of Sovietology are often reluctant to let Europeanists in, and try to salvage their uniqueness. On the other hand, for students of transitional politics certain comparisons within the post-communist region might also be inadmissible. As the famous debate in the *Slavic Review* alleged, while certain comparisons are desirable and fruitful, others are impractical<sup>3</sup>. Thus, for example, there is no practical use in comparing post-communist East European countries to the former republics of the Soviet Union (maybe with the exception of the Baltic States), since their histories and conditions are so different. Furthermore, to approach every problem of these countries as deriving from their communist past and the transition process might lead analysts and politicians astray. Certain problems, like that of national minorities, did not result from communism, and in some cases they have actually been solved better and faster than similar issues in Northern Ireland or the Basque country.

Nonetheless, it would be unreasonable to deny that East European countries often share similar social, economic, political and cultural structures (this was also the argument of the Central European paradigm). Yet while it sounds reasonable to compare them to each other in order to examine how they performed on “democratization” and economic “marketization”, and how they are dealing with their “Leninist legacies”, there is no reason to draw a clear sharp line, argue that this distinguishes them from the West, and suggest that we cannot find issues worthy of an East-West comparison.

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<sup>3</sup> See for example Karl/Schmitter (1994;1995); Bunce (1995).

At the same time, these countries in Eastern Europe were also part of a larger pool of comparative studies, insofar as they formed the latest segment of the so-called “third wave of democratization”. Political scientists tried to build models about this “third wave”, and as they did so this part of Europe was compared with Southern European and especially Latin American countries, at least when modes of transition were discussed. Such comparisons often went beyond scholarly exercises: for example, Hungarian politicians consulted their Spanish counterparts, political figures and experts about the lessons of carrying out a peaceful transition. Since the Spanish case became the model not only for transitology, especially for the *reforma pactada*, but also for a successful and peaceful way of democratization to emulate, this kind of comparison is far from surprising. Such scholarly and pragmatic examples prove that comparisons can step over regional boundaries, and it makes sense to keep in mind that the completion of democratization and the consolidation of democracy might also warrant a reconsideration of our comparative pool. Today, the East European post-communist democracies<sup>4</sup> have all joined the European Union, and therefore it is reasonable to suggest that in many respects they should and could be compared to other European states.

Therefore, in the following I will make an attempt at incorporating these countries into the European pool for the purpose of comparative studies, while at the same time retaining the significance of their democratization and of their authoritarian past as the basis for comparison. Within this topic I will focus on transitional justice in general, and memory politics in particular, and examine what kind of lessons can be drawn from such a comparison.

## Transitional justice

The notion of transitional justice grew fashionable following the fall of authoritarian regimes in East-Central Europe and Latin America, and the end of apartheid in South Africa, becoming a salient and widely debated issue after the fall of communist regimes, both in scholarship and in practical politics. Transitional justice denotes those procedures, legal or otherwise, which occur after regime change, civil war, or occupation, and addresses the question of what to do with former elites, collaborators, and perpetrators of human rights violations. In emerging democracies the issue became an integral part of public discourse and political debates. The interest in transitional justice intensified as a result of the

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<sup>4</sup> Here I will not enter the discussion that some of the post-communist countries may not all qualify in their current state as perfect democracies.

third wave, and systematic studies and theory-building were also due to developments during the democratization procedures of this era. However, transitional justice is not a modern phenomenon, but throughout history has been a part of the general stocktaking that occurred after long occupations or dictatorships (Elster 2004).

The primary goal of transitional justice appears to be elite change, as well as an attempt to respond to the demand of victims of the old regime for some kind of restitution. This typically entails not compensation directed towards the victims of the previous dictatorship, but some form of accountability of people who contributed to the maintenance of the previous regime, with real or symbolic punishment attached, although post-communist countries usually tried to have some form of compensation for expropriated property as well. Finally, transitional justice also tries to provide for a thorough investigation of the history and mechanism of the dictatorship, often seeking to repudiate some basic aspects of the past.

Post-communist transitional justice is usually discussed with reference to examples drawn from the third wave, especially Latin America, although the South African truth commissions are also frequently cited as a favored or desirable way of confronting the past (such institutions never took root in the region, with the partial exception of Germany). The memory of the Nuremberg trials has also been evoked in certain cases, where it served as a reference and a potential example to deal with the problem of the statute of limitations that in some countries, for example Hungary, prevented the prosecution of certain crimes. However, these parallels seem overstated - with a few exceptions, war crimes are not applicable to most of the cases transitional justice laws intended to cover in post-communist Europe. With respect to Latin America the comparison can only be carried out to a limited extent. While the nature of the dictatorship made the East European transitions comparable to one another (see the above cited debate in *Slavic Review*), since they underwent similar experiences, this has not necessarily been the case for East European and Latin American dictatorships. As Tina Rosenberg (1995) pointed out, while repression in Latin America was deep, in Eastern Europe it was broad. That is, in Latin America the perpetrators (army or police officers, death squads) could easily be identified, and so could those victims who were tortured, murdered, or “disappeared”. In Eastern Europe, however, following the Stalinist period a much larger number of people exerted their power over a much larger number of people, but through much less violence or direct pressure. More importantly, many people were on both sides at different times, and society was interwoven with many threads of everyday compromise and conformity (Rosenberg 1995). Furthermore, Latin American dictators did not require anything else from their subjects than their silence and obedience. The communist regime, on the other hand, expected people to signal their agreement with and acceptance of the official ideology, and thereby, even though only

through very innocuous means, made them complicit (see for example Havel's famous greengrocer<sup>5</sup>). Therefore, only to a certain, very limited extent can transitional justice procedures in the two regions be compared. Eastern Europe has also invented new types of procedures not employed in Latin America.

Transitional justice at the same time also plays a very significant role which, I would argue, is more important than the simple punishment of former wrongdoers, collaborators or secret service agents. This role is the use of transitional justice as the vehicle for the politics of memory: new ruling elites, as well as various social groups while carrying out elite change, also try to use transitional justice for promoting their own vision of the past, naming those they would like to hold responsible for the plight of the nation, and trying to justify political transformation and potential punishment through it. This is natural: a broad understanding of transitional justice would also include the memorialization of the former regimes, which may be expressed in renaming streets and other public places, removing statues and erecting new ones, opening museums and other places of remembrance, or rewriting history textbooks. But carrying out transitional justice in its narrower sense also inevitably entails the reconstruction of national history, the reframing of national memory, even myth creation in order to make the past more comfortable to live with and at the same time justify elite change and perhaps also a redistribution of material goods and financial assets.

This aspect of transitional justice suggests that although temporal simultaneity would support a comparison between post-communist and Latin American or South African transitional justice, the general spirit of East European efforts is more reminiscent of the national endeavor that ensued in many European countries after World War II. Transitional justice was applied and employed throughout Europe following World War II and the liberation of occupied countries and collaborating regimes, and remains a recurring demand in Spain, where it was not carried out during or after the transition. Recent East European transitional justice policies are reminiscent of these examples, and their usage is also comparable. Precisely due to the abovementioned difference between the nature of East European and Latin American dictatorships, this aspect of memory politics plays out differently in the two regions; however, East European practices are very similar to postwar Europe, where dealing with the memory of Nazi occupation or with collaborators, similar methods were employed in holding people accountable or punishing them, and often the question of memory emerged in a similar way. Although itself a right-wing regime, Nazism's totalitarian aspirations are comparable to that of communism in general and Stalinism in

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<sup>5</sup> Havel, "The Power of the Powerless", available at <http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/index.php?sec=6&id=2&kat&from=6&setln=2>

particular, and the way it could make ordinary people otherwise complicit to a smaller or larger extent is similar to the phenomenon described by Tina Rosenberg.

I therefore suggest carrying out comparative studies between transitional justice procedures in postwar Europe (both East and West) and in post-communist Europe: this would let us engage in an interesting comparative endeavor not only across regions (thus surpassing the East-West divide and thereby including the post-communist states in a European framework), but also across time, pointing out significant parallels between important historical periods. In fact, Jon Elster has already used such an approach. In his comprehensive study of transitional justice, *Closing the Books*, discussing significant issues of transitional justice, he drew on examples from post-World War II, post-communist and Latin American cases, which already suggests comparability.

At the same time, of course, we have to take into account some crucial differences when engaging in such comparisons. The most important of these is that with the notable exception of Romania and in part Yugoslavia (here the war followed regime change), communism, contrary to World War II, ended in a peaceful way, without any occupying power attempting to impose a system on defeated countries. Furthermore, the victors liberated from occupation often had more violent instruments in their hands, whether they were foreigners or local resisters. At the same time, theories and studies discussing the various occurrences of transitional justice point out that such procedures are often a function of the mode of transition: for example, negotiated transitions leave less room for accountability and various criminal or lustration procedures than defeat, and this also has to be taken into account. The international environment is also different: today European norms would not allow certain processes which were acceptable in the postwar environment, and the post-communist countries that strove for membership in the European Union had to keep such requirements in mind; a notable exception was the summary judgment and execution of the Ceaușescu couple in Romania in 1989. The length of the dictatorship is also an issue here: the collaborationist regimes during the war did not last for more than five years, and therefore were much less institutionalized and habituated by the population. In this respect Spain and Portugal might offer good comparisons, and it is not by chance that transition studies have often drawn parallels between the Spanish and Hungarian transitions. Thus there are significant differences when carrying out comparative studies. This does, though, give us an opportunity to examine the role of various factors guiding transitional justice beyond the geographical location, and thereby the east-west divide can be surpassed.

## Different aspects of transitional justice

Having made a case for this comparison, in the following I will survey several aspects of postwar and post-communist transitional justice, and offer some examples and considerations that could provide interesting cases for further study and a more detailed investigation.

As stated above, one of the principal goals of transitional justice that accompanies regime change is to erase the wartime or authoritarian years from history and to denounce collaborationist regimes. Almost the most obvious way of doing this is through legal means, questioning the previous order's legitimacy. General Charles de Gaulle and his supporters did so by referring to the Vichy regime as the "so-called French State", as they declared Vichy illegitimate: based on a somewhat obscure statute they also deemed the attempt to seek an armistice illegal. On October 13, 1944, the *Journal officiel, lois et décrets* announced the banning of the programs of Vichy, an act which, as the legislators of the *Libération* declared, doubtless reflected the popular will, since the doctrines of Vichy were "*importées dans le pays sur les tanks des envahisseurs*" (Paxton 1997). Comparable efforts were made in other postwar countries: the trial of former Protectorate ministers in Czechoslovakia served a similar purpose: in the light of Beneš's "theory of continuity" the trial aimed at demonstrating the illegality of the occupation and thus showing that the postwar regime was the legitimate successor of the First Republic (Frommer 2005: 281). The Austrian attitude towards the country's post-Anschluss history is similar: they claimed that following the Anschluss Austria ceased to exist and became no more than, as Hitler's first victim, a province of the Reich. This fit well into the postwar memory based on the concept of German guilt and responsibility: blaming Germany for most of the war crimes solved some international issues and also helped states to reconstruct their history on the basis of the "resistance myth" or "victimization", as well as facilitating the creation of "national unity" necessary for reconstruction (Judt 1992: 87). Even the Hungarian communists attempted to establish at least a spiritual continuity between the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919 and the emerging new postwar system, thereby trying to present the interwar regime of Admiral Miklós Horthy as an aberration in the country's linear progression towards a socialist state. More than four decades later, post-communist countries' legislatures also used similar measures to criminalize the past by declaring the communist regime entirely or in part illegal and reprehensible. On 1 February 1992, the Polish Sejm approved a resolution that proclaimed that the introduction of martial law had been illegal, and demanded that special committees investigate its consequences ("Sejm..." 1992). In July 1993, the Czech parliament also accepted a law about the criminalization of the communist regime, which held responsible the leadership and membership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party



in power between 1948 and 1989 for the destruction of traditional values, the economy, the European civilization of the country, as well as for the violation of human rights and civil liberties and for the terror against those holding different opinions. This “Law on the Illegality of and Resistance to the Communist Regime” tried to establish clear moral categories and thus promote an official view about the predecessor regime, characterized as “criminal, illegitimate and abhorrent”. At the same time, opposition to the regime was described as “legitimate, morally justified and honorable” (Rupnik 2002).

In certain postwar cases, especially in Eastern Europe, trials of war criminals also intended to bring the whole ruling class to the defendants’ dock and thereby give revolutionary legitimacy to the new system by pointing out that not only a few individuals, but a whole class bore responsibility for the plight of the nation. This was not the case in those Western countries where the goal was to re-establish the prewar order. In post-communist cases, however, the demand for a complete change of elite sometimes has similar revolutionary echoes.

Punishment styles are also comparable between postwar and post-communist regimes. Due to the differences between circumstances mentioned above in both the nature and the end of the regime, as well as in the international environment, criminal procedures in post-communist states were few and far between. Besides the extraordinary end of the Ceaușescu trial, there were very few attempts to put former leaders on trial. The Germans tried to prosecute Eric Honecker, but had to abandon this bid due to the bad health of the accused; the Poles repeatedly tried to charge General Jaruzelski, but on the only occasion when something similar to a trial took place he was acquitted. There were also a few trials of former East German border guards, and of former Hungarian policemen or soldiers who shot at demonstrators in 1956, but such criminal procedures were not as prevalent as in postwar countries, where for example Laval was sentenced to death and executed, and Emil Hácha only avoided serious punishment by his death (because of the controversies of his case and his wartime record, this must have come as a relief for many). However, it is interesting to note that certain parallels between the two periods did not remain unnoticed: Jaruzelski was repeatedly compared to Pétain, given both his actions and the justification offered for them. As Pétain’s defenders used his “sword and shield” argument, claiming that his collaboration kept nothing but France’s national interest in mind, Jaruzelski’s case also raised the dilemma of whether the introduction of martial law was a “higher necessity”, a “lesser evil”, as he claimed, in order to protect Poland from a potential Russian invasion, or the betrayal of Polish independence to protect communism against the will of the population, as many in the opposition felt.

More prevalent was the other popular form of transitional justice, called screening, or lustration, as named by the Czechs, who pursued this avenue in the most thorough and, some would say, aggressive way. This type of transitional justice mainly targets former secret service agents, although certain other

categories of people – for example those who held important, high-ranking positions during communism – might also be affected. The punishment for such acts or involvement varies: it might be restricted to the political sphere (prohibiting those involved to take on political positions), or might be broader and also ban such people from certain other jobs, but could also include milder punishments: if the people concerned refuse to resign their political position, their name and activities will be publicized.

This kind of “national disgrace” was widespread in many postwar countries as well, although sanctions were often more severe: those found guilty were usually deprived, for a given period, of their voting rights. In France and Belgium national degradation entailed an at least temporary loss of civil and political rights, similarly to post-communist Poland or the Czech Republic, where those positively lustrated also lost their passive voting rights, insofar as they were prohibited from running for office. In Belgium, national disgrace also included the loss of the right to exercise one’s profession, which was also the case in post-communist Czech Republic, as well as in many postwar East European countries, where various lists of former collaborators meant their banishment from most jobs (for example through the notorious “B-lists” in Hungary).

Attaching punishment to collaboration or criminalizing positions held during a dictatorship was not a popular idea with everyone: many former opposition figures recoiled from it. One of the leading and most influential Polish opposition figures, Adam Michnik, who was also one of the chief negotiators at the Round Table, claimed that it was difficult to conclude negotiations with a handshake then imprison your interlocutor. “If I did not tell Kiszczak at the Roundtable talk that he would be judged for martial law if I came to power, it would be wrong of me to demand it now” (Rosenberg: 236); he argued, referring to the Spanish example, another fruitful point of comparison for understanding East European states: “The only way to democracy is compromise; look at Spain”, he said approvingly in November 1989 (Jones 1991: 99-113). This on the one hand underlines the practical significance of cross-regional lessons, while on the other it also highlights differences: forfeiting transitional justice in Spain was most likely motivated by reasons different from those to which Michnik referred.

## The politics of memory

Finally, as I have indicated above, transitional justice is also a very important vehicle of the politics of memory, serving several key goals. Historical memory is constructed, first and foremost, with the aim of creating or strengthening collective identity and cohesiveness, (Funkenstein 1989: 5-26) while at the same time it also serves those in power to impose their views on society and thereby advance their own political purposes.

In this respect, the most important goal of the French *épuration*, as well as of the declaration about the illegality of the Armistice, was to create the illusion of a widespread resistance, where the majority of the country either actively participated in the resistance movement, or assisted its participants, but at least sympathized with them, while collaboration could be blamed on a few “rotten apples”. This “Vichy half-lie” (Hellman 1995: 461-485) definitely served the recreation of social cohesion in a deeply divided society where a large portion had welcomed and at least initially supported Pétain and his policies against the detested and hated Popular Front. Remembering and reminding society of pre-war or wartime conflicts would have meant publicly acknowledging the deep divisions of French society, where not everyone resisted or suffered during the occupation, and this acknowledgment was deemed to be detrimental for the reunification of the nation and the work of reconstruction. The official line tried to pull a veil over the indifference or ambiguity of the majority, just as happened in Austria, where the *Opferdoktrin* put the question of responsibility on the backburner. At the same time, contrary to the French, Austrians did not claim to be a “nation of resisters”, but one of victims, clinging to the first passage of the 1943 Moscow Declaration, which for political and strategic reasons described Austria as “the first free country to fall victim to Hitlerite aggression”. This *Opferdoktrin*, also included in the Austrian Declaration of Independence of 1955, designating Austria as “Hitler’s first victim”, was not challenged by Austrian politics or by the public until 1986, when it came to light that Kurt Waldheim, the ÖVP’s presidential candidate, had covered up his Nazi past and wartime activities (Lindström 2006).

Many post-communist countries used a mixture of what Henry Rousso called “the trap of ‘resistencialism’” (Rousso 1998) and victimology: according to this view, a segment of post-communist elites and societies insists that the communist system was altogether the creation of a foreign power (the Soviet Union), with the help of a small (and in general alien) minority, that undertook the role of Quislings in these societies, for various advantages in the political and economic sphere. This view treats the bulk of the population at worst as victims and at best as heroic resisters – whatever activity this latter word might cover. Consequently, it should be possible to identify and penalize the perpetrators of the regime and those who collaborated with them, while at the same time absolving the rest of the population from any responsibility. Thus transitional justice procedures often intended to prove this version of history by singling out certain categories of people as guilty of upholding the dictatorship or collaborating with it. As postwar France tried to cover up real divisions in society, similar cleavages needed to be dealt with in post-communist Europe: just as Vichy’s policies met a certain kind of approval, even enthusiasm, the communist rule was not exclusively the result of foreign imposition and occupation, but was also part of a significant leftist turn throughout Europe after the war. A substantial part of the post-communist elites is reluctant to admit the existence of such a trend, therefore they are eager to single out culprits

and, by blaming particular people, cover up existing social divisions and the support of a major section of society for the communist regime.

Settling accounts is also an examination of one's own conscience, which will inform one's attitudes. Tony Judt points out that many French intellectuals tried to compensate for what they thought mistaken in their behavior during the war: even those who took real risks survived the war in relative safety, while their career as writers was advancing; therefore they clamped down on fellow intellectuals guilty of collaboration or worse with double force (Judt 1992: 55-56). Something similar is also visible in post-communist countries, in the case not only of writers and intellectuals, but also of some formerly high-standing politicians who are quick to denounce the regime they used to serve in leading positions and pretend they did serious resistance work from the inside<sup>6</sup>. But even more numerous are those people who lived comfortably under communism and even advanced in their career, only to join the most intransigent anti-communists after the fact.

While the above parallels provide us with opportunities to compare various transitional justice procedures that have taken place in different European countries, as well as to investigate the use of transitional justice in these settings, implicit in this there are also further avenues for the future. I have already mentioned the crisis caused by Kurt Waldheim's presidency in Austria, when the ghosts of the past emerged and resulted in a social and political crisis, because no reckoning with the past had taken place after the war. In his seminal *The Vichy Syndrome*, Henry Rousso (1994) analyzes the consequences such whitewashing of the past and these efforts to create a more suitable and comfortable history and memory can cause in a society which missed out on the work of a serious reckoning with the past. Although the way Austria and France treated collaboration varied, in both cases there were serious missteps that eventually backfired. The timeframe also differs, as in the case of France the first signs of crisis appeared during the Algerian war, while in Austria it happened later. However, this offers promising investigations for the post-communist cases: more than twenty years after the transition it might be interesting to examine relationships between the form of transitional justice a given country carried out and its consequences in collective memory and political life. It would be especially interesting to examine how political crises and their handling can be attributed to the form of transitional justice carried out in a country, and the way it was utilized by political actors, or to the fact that no particular transitional justice was introduced. In this paper, besides making use of several postwar cases, which could also serve as building blocks of theory-creation, we could also fruitfully

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<sup>6</sup> The self-presentation of former Hungarian Politburo members Imre Pozsgay and Mátyás Szűrös as persecuted by communists due to their nationalist feelings is just one of the most absurd examples.

include and involve the case of Spain. Spain, also a part of the so-called “third wave”, was often compared to the Hungarian transition, and it is also the classic case where no kind of transitional justice took place. While many looked at the Spanish transition and reconciliation as a model to follow, today it is obvious that such an omission can put social and political divisions, as well as grievances and political memories, on the backburner only for a certain period of time. More important questions might temporarily overshadow the need for a reckoning with the past, but the past cannot be wished away for good.

## New divisions?

In the above I outlined a potential route for a comparative project that would investigate various forms of transitional justice in both post-communist and postwar Europe, thereby surpassing the traditional East-West divide. Besides integrating post-communist East European states into a larger comparative framework, such a study would also offer opportunities to gain a better understanding of the uses and intricacies of transitional justice in various settings. Thus the comparison could work and be beneficial in both directions, offering new insights that might be independent of the regime type that preceded the transition.

At the same time, memory politics may also create a new divide, or rather reinforce the one we might try to surpass, while it does not undermine the justification for carrying out cross-regional comparisons, including comparative studies over time. The significant divergences in memory politics between East and West can be clustered around several topics. The most important cleavage pertains to the similarities and differences between Nazism and communism, and thus to the potential comparability of the two. Current debates probing the “equally evil” or “which one is more evil?” questions reiterate some of the issues already touched upon in the German historians’ dispute. The arguments and conclusions of said debate are being utilized in contemporary Eastern Europe, and a comparative study could also investigate how the famous and notorious *Historikerstreit* influenced East European debates and how reckoning with the past on this more theoretical level took place in postwar and post-communist societies, while it might also be interesting to see how leftover postwar issues get mixed up with post-communist questions, confusing the politics of memory even further.

This, and the East European treatment of the communist and Nazi periods, which often differs from the treatment accorded these eras in the West, might raise the specter of a “two-speed memory” (Ferenczi 2007), that could once again divide East and West. However, such phenomena are better understood in a European comparative framework, where the experiences of both sides can be taken into account.

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# The Baltic States beyond the Transition: New Approaches to Regional Research

*Vida Savoniakaitė*

The societal transformation in the Baltic States revealed that the regional research that had previously been conducted and macro regions that had existed no longer showed any continuity in the new political structures, the social economy of the European Union, or the sociocultural space. In Eastern and Central Europe the culture of the historical ethnographic regions has for many decades been the subject of regional research. Cultural idiosyncrasies and commonalities of the ethnic groups have been sought in various scopes by investigating rural localities. With the change in society, new questions arise about how to investigate the definitions of the boundaries of ethnicity and identity. New scientific research has raised many theoretical questions, which are important from an interdisciplinary perspective, about the idiosyncrasies of regions and places and the changing spaces of the ethnographic regions. The developments of postmodernism, a democratising society, liberalism, and, later, neoliberalism have strongly affected research methodologies and prompted scholars to point their research in new directions.

Regional studies essentially reveal the spatial ties and the specific features of a particular place. According to Arjun Appadurai, the problem of a space is a “problem of a culturally defined locality which ethnologists talk about” (Appadurai 2003). Recognising localities is also difficult, just like recognising “multilocal” and “multivocal” voices. Speaking one way or another, a place is a synthesis of the attitudes towards it. “Polyphony” depends on the different social constructions of the regional and living space. First, from a Eurocentric perspective, “multilocality” means looking at places from the perspective of an “Other”. Second, in investigating “multilocality”, a comparative analysis of place is necessary. Third, “multilocality” shows the ties of a specific place with other places. And finally, a physical landscape can be multilocal in the sense that it expresses places, with multiple meanings, through the eyes of its different users

(Rodman 2003: 212). One place can be perceived in very different ways. The first step in learning about a certain space is to construct it socially.

Regional worlds “are constructed on the basis of experience”. A space frequently becomes a framework for creating or inducing a locality. It is very difficult to trace “original components” (Appadurai 2003). The landscape is perceived as the “framework” for studying the problems of a place, its creation, and its feeling (Gray 2003: 226). It is important to analyse new social constructs and the effects of the “other”. Specific localities involve one another in a broader geographic context. It is thought that geography can become only a metaphor for some place. It theoretically raises the question of whether a region can be an anthropological concept. On the other hand, in contemporary discourses many studies are devoted to an analysis of communities, which of course shows the locality’s cultural distinctions and diversity.

The assumption can be proposed that in the changing Baltic States, new mentality models are inspiring a change in the theoretical attitudes towards the investigation of the culture of the ethnographic regions. Regional studies have many commonalities in modern Europe (Savoniakaitė 2007: 22). Places are defined by the attitudes of the individuals, the language, the history of the social processes (Cohen 1982), the cultural heritage, and the cultural symbols. Ideas of the concept of “home” are common (Löfgren 2003: 144). An especially large quantity of poetical historical narratives about home has been analogously collected in Lithuanian research. The concept of “belonging” is especially distinguished in Lithuanian ethnographic regions (Savoniakaitė 2012). The conceptualisations of cultural diversity continue to be investigated in a way that provokes controversy. On the other hand, in the context of European research, the Eastern European investigations have shown exceptional approaches in research on regional and ethnic traditions. An analysis should be made of the question of whether the old mental geographic images of East and West still exist in scholars’ approaches, hindering the development of new research questions and comparative approaches, and showing a split between the new and old approaches.

The main goal of this paper is to define and examine new directions in regional studies in Lithuania and introduce their peculiarities and values for contemporary post-Soviet research. The paper expands the discussion about what development scales must be investigated in the connections with the old system of the post-Soviet and former Central and Eastern European socialist states. It explores aspects of what modern anthropological concepts of the region and what regional investigations are relevant in the post-socialist Lithuanian space. Using comparisons, I analyse the theoretical anthropological and ethnological discourses and the results of my 2002–2012 research.

## Traditional constructs of research inside ethnographic regions

Like many areas of public life following the “transition” after the fall of the Soviet Union, the academic language of the Baltic States inherited ideological and methodological features that are deeply rooted in Soviet research. The principles of historical materialism were widespread in the Soviet Baltic States, as they were in the rest of the former Soviet Union. Soviet ethnological research in Lithuania acquired ideological overtones, and almost rejected the analysis of the *Volkskunde* concept, since “national studies” were considered a bourgeois science. Ethnology was replaced by ethnography, which is defined as a branch of the science of history that investigates the material, spiritual, and societal cultural features of nations (usually the term “folk” or “people’s” was used). The ideology of historical materialism invited the investigation of folk material culture, working class customs, etc. For many Lithuanian scholars (Dundulienė 1978; Merkienė 1989; Milius 1993; Vyšniauskaitė 1977: 7–138), it was important to reveal the processes of rural cultural change (Savoniakaitė 2011: 129–130) and to describe the authenticity and distinctiveness of the region’s culture. Researchers investigated the distinctive features in a geographic area. It was important to reveal the development of cultural phenomena and the change in the historical features of cultural objects.

Historicism was connected with evolutionism, which required the adaptation of folk material and spiritual culture studies to the evolution of societal structure. Ethnographers analysed the historical-geographic areas and economic cultural types, which were understood as development stages determined by the production method (Čiubrinskas 2001: 104). In Soviet ethnography, historical-comparative, historical-typological, and other methods were broadly applied. It sought to determine ethnographic realia types and their ranges and explain what diffusion of the cultural phenomena existed. It is possible to see methodologies of diffusionism in the approaches used.

The research methodology was determined by the concepts used for atlases of the Baltic region (Maslova 1986a; Maslova 1986b); ethnographic experiences were collected at the equidistant geographic points that were selected. An effort was made to record the distinctive features of the objects of the disappearing culture, to discover the boundaries of the cultural range, and to see how those boundaries changed and how their contours levelled out. Ultimately, this meant not so much collection of material about existing things as recording of recollections about “folk traditions”. Nationality was shown with the goal of fostering the culture of its people. In the ethnological investigations of that time, commonality can be found with the scientific research conducted in other European countries. Atlases were produced in Poland, Finland, etc. Pranė

Dundulienė avoided consistent historicism and, unlike many Soviet ethnographers, studied the ethnic culture as the culture of the entire nation. Izidorius Butkevičius revealed the positive and negative effects of the public institutions that existed in the Lithuanian countryside in the second half of the 20th century (Merkienė 1999: 6–12; Merkienė 2001: 140–141); the investigations were similar to those conducted in Norway. Positivism and nationality were seen as naturally shaping the objective of the scientists to accumulate sufficient objective and reliable data to make it possible to create, adapt, and confirm scientific hypotheses and theories. The developed semiotic investigations were also connected with the region's specific data.

It is important to note that in the context of European science, the Soviet era and later research “after the transition” is distinguished by a huge focus on learning about the ethnographic regions. The Post-Soviet ethnology of the Baltic States displays various methodologies, comparative interpretations, scientific pluralism, and interdisciplinary analyses. The history and theory of the science, the ethnographic regions and locations, and the communities, kinship, family, rituals, gender, religiousness and beliefs, cultural signs, national minorities, ethnic culture, and globalisation processes are examined from a regional perspective.

One direction is a historical comparative analysis expanded very broadly by researchers drawing on post-modern methodological tendencies, interdisciplinary approaches, and cultural diffusion studies. Historical-comparative, comparative, and interdisciplinary comparative methods are used. Studies which examine the local nature of the ethnic culture and the local history and which are connected in one way or another with historical scientific influences remain important.

Methodologically, the structural analyses allow a place for post-modern comparative interpretations. The objects of investigation range from interpretation of old beliefs to that of modern folklore and art artefacts.

The second direction is the search for the “boundaries” of identity and their conception as well as the investigated self-awareness and otherness of the inhabitants. New methodological discourses have emerged: to look at one's self through one's own eyes and the eyes of others. In ethnographic field research and ethnological studies, an investigation was made as to how the present-day inhabitants of these regions identify themselves and what the exceptional features of the culture of the people living in Lithuania's ethnographic regions are. This delved into the self-identification of the local inhabitants, their view of family traditions and culture, domestic economics, lifestyle, and business. Studies have shown how well-known national, ethnic, “situational”, social and cultural identity components and alterity are described in post-“transitional” Lithuania (Savoniakaitė 2012). My research has confirmed that the evaluation of language, love of one's region, homeland, family roots, customs, and traditions differ among Lithuania's inhabitants. In the ethnographic regions, their identity conception is based on contemporary ethnic boundaries. People's opinions on these questions

are very diverse, like the historical beginnings of the definitions of their individual identity. Research has shown that not only discourses of scientific theories, but also the specific spaces of specific location, invite one to think about the old scientific methodologies and undertake new ones. Using a methodological approach, difficulties were encountered in studying the culture of Lithuania's modern ethnographic regions as the connections between "the people" and "the places" are changing. It was difficult to compare the results of the long-term cultural research conducted at equidistant locations, as was usual in historical atlases, because both internal and external factors mean that the society is rapidly changing in many aspects.

## Regions in the post-socialist space of Europe

In scientific terminology, the modern variation of the rural regions together with the ethnographic regions is aptly defined by the concept "post-productivist transition" (Ilbery 1998, quoted in Horáková and Boscoboinik 2008), or in other words, "a shift from agricultural to rural", and is one of the most important research fields in modern rural Europe. The development tendencies of rural localities in Europe have common features. The decline of agricultural needs and a production surplus, the payment of land subsidies in Europe, the disappearance of small farms, the growth and transformation of the manufacture of specialised production, ecological problems, and many other factors have led to changes. The processes have differed, and do still, in developed localities and on their periphery. But the general tendency of this process in Europe, i.e. a decline in the population due to the undeveloped infrastructure of the service sector, lower economic development, etc., has also affected Lithuania, where migration from small towns has reached a very high scale, the towns are emptying out, the demographics are changing, etc.

The disavowal in Europe of agriculture as a primary factor has called forth changes in the rural population and raised new requirements for rural space. According to Hana Horáková and Andrea Boscoboinik, three parallel processes have influenced the present-day changes in the rural space. Political, socioeconomic, demographic, and changing environmental factors have inspired changes in rural communities. These have been strongly affected by government subsidies. From an economic perspective, the structural transformation of the economy, which has since the 1980s been influenced by the developed countries of Western Europe, has caused the changes. The communities have changed and migration has increased. There were disorientated people inside the communities. New environmental protection problems are arising, while interest in food quality is growing. From a demographic perspective, rural communities are struggling with increasing migration from the countryside to the cities. Scientific and biotech

progress is fostering the spread of new technologies. New “cultural systems” are appearing in the rural space of Europe (Horáková, Boscoboinik 2008: 11). We might well agree with Hana Horáková and Andrea Boscoboinik in talking about a change in the lifestyle of modern rural people:

Modern rurality brings about changes in the lifestyles of rural communities, as well as different patterns and deepening specialization in the settlement system. The urban and rural have remained interlinked by an intensive migration system. Settlement preferences, as to the choice of the place of residence, are also being transformed. At present an increasing number of wealthy and influential people leave cities in order to enhance their standards of living and they move to rural areas. [...] Labour and capital are flexible and therefore they can be used in different economic activities. Modern rural areas are therefore heterogeneous, multifunctional spaces of production and consumption. The issue of rural areas could then be approached in terms of knowledge and expertise. [...] Hence, in order to be successful, rural development should be confined to rural local systems... (Horáková/Boscoboinik 2008: 11-13).

The integration of the European states is promoting cultural diversity in the Lithuanian countryside. According to the data from my research in 2002–2009, in Lithuanian communities, as in the aforementioned other European communities, the closed nature and feeling of distrust have increased. For example, the cultural differences of eastern and western Lithuania have been revealed. People in Samogitia and Lithuania Minor are less bold than those in Aukštaitija in expressing their opinions and less willing to disclose their identity. Small towns and villages have ageing populations, and some inhabitants have left to work in the bigger cities (Savoniakaitė 2012: 193). Very diverse cultural opposites are emerging.

The research strategies for modern ethnographic regions are being changed by the completely new social structures of the communities and the changing space and culture. In globalisation, according to Scott Lash and John Urry (1999: 28), the disparity of the fusion of time and space should increase between the centre and the periphery. Global cities are called “a wired village of non-contiguous communities”. It is becoming ever harder to define the culture of local communities. In society’s modernisation processes, ever more things do not belong to a specific territory. The “predominant” cultural symbols are changing. The cultural objects are losing their symbolic content. “Their material content is becoming empty” and the value of material objects as symbols is changing; symbols such as mass media products, rather than material objects, are being produced.

The most diverse cultural opposites appeared with the migration flows to the cities. They have caused cultural transformations, while increasingly pushing out the models and objects of traditional culture. The phenomena of the ethnic culture

are in many cases shaped by the cultural policy. Agents shape the distinctive features of the culture through the press and cultural events. According to the data from my research, town communities organise celebrations (Savoniakaitė 2012), elevating certain features of the locality's culture, while at the same time usually intertwining new elements from an "invented tradition".

Globalisation is affecting the regional, national, and international population flows. The concept of "conflict areas", i.e. places where social conflicts occur, where important components of language and policy, myth, space, and virtuality exist for a society, is known in theoretical thought. A place is created by people, who are in a way called upon to create distinctive cultures. They fight for and construct a world so that it does not lose continuity. "Open" places depend on the market and capital. The material expression of a "conflict" area assimilates the dominant culture (Castells 2000).

The new micro and macro regions are connected with the development of locality centres and economic development goals<sup>7</sup>. The state development policy of Lithuania's ethnographic regions is connected with the prospects of economic development, possible business ties, geographic boundaries that are being newly redrawn, etc. Many aspects of agrarian economic policy are connected with European structural funds intended for the development of a regional policy.

The ethnographic regions and periphery or Lithuania as a separate unit continue to be studied in Lithuania. In the ethnographic regions, rural localities or the larger cities and their environs are being investigated. Macro regions such as the former Baltic Republics that were investigated in the Soviet Union receive little attention from scholars, certain commonalities are analysed, and similar tendencies in the methodological development of research problems are compared (Alsupe 1981; Karlsonė 2007).

On the other hand, specific features of certain cases of Lithuanian local communities must be stressed. In early-21st-century Lithuania, the differences between the people living in the cities and the countryside, i.e. those in the centres and those on the periphery, increased significantly. An ethnologist in Lithuania's small towns and villages can still find early-20th-century traditional culture objects and listen to historical memories of the culture's customs. People remember and repeat the objects of the culture which are known as the "invented tradition". In many cases it is possible to say that the investigation of the traditional culture of an ethnographic region becomes the research of the memories of the people and of their various narratives.

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<sup>7</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/glossary/jeremie\\_lt.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/glossary/jeremie_lt.cfm)

## New regional patterns in Lithuania: anthropological and ethnological approaches

In the integration of the European states, which promotes cultural diversity, one of the more meaningful methodological approaches is to look at a region's culture through the community and the individual. It is not enough to look for the culture's authenticity or distinctive features using such approaches as historicism and diffusionism – a comprehensive comparative analytical analysis is needed. It is impossible to talk about a culture's distinctiveness as comprising only the specific cultural features of a geographic unit due to the ethnic diversity of the communities and society, to migration, or other discussed features characteristic of many European communities. The people's views and judgments<sup>8</sup>, which reveal the factors shaping the culture, are needed to reveal the culture's diversity.

Cognition of the place, the opinions of the people (subjects), and the connections between “Us” and “Them” that arise due to cultural differences are important in modern anthropology (Moore 1999: 19). Transnational spaces alter the concept of “local” and the language of science and society, which is seen in the emergence of concepts of “citizen of the world” and “living together with differences”.

Vered Amit and Nigel Rapport (2012) assert that a community can be defined by social, symbolic, and political boundaries. They argue that “the paradigms between continuity and discontinuity” are important (2012: 29). The individuals themselves sometimes select these boundaries. Cosmopolitanism, according to Amit and Rapport, promotes a culture's rational assessment and protection. In “Cosmopolitan Living” *Anyone* appeared as a *Luftmensch* or global guest who might lodge an individual quest for personal truth or authenticity in the time and the dimensions of his or own unique life. In “Cosmopolitan Learning”, *Anyone* passed through the pedagogic company of certain significant others, in liberal institutions, who might be expected to pass on (“diffuse”) the means by which *Anyone* might best come into his or her own. In “Cosmopolitan Planning” *Anyone* appeared in a global company, a liberal society which might seek to regulate a world of cultural traditions and community belongings by way of rational deliverances concerning the universal human condition. The spectrum actually constitutes a circle, for its most general point – the universal human condition –

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<sup>8</sup>Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss were the first to bring the concept of “social space” to sociological theory. This was a continuation of the intellectual discourse of the ideas of Herbert Spencer and Lewis Henry Morgan. They perceive locality as a principle which helps structuralise social ties (Kuper 2003: 247–248). Space is perceived through the “values of the facts of the social and personal experiences”. The notion of “living space” is used to define space. New discourses arise such as “local feeling” and “local constructions of the places” (Rodman 2003: 206–207).



returns us to the capabilities and liabilities of *Anyone*. Individuality is the human generality. The space of cosmopolitanism is to know this rationally and to secure it morally (ibid: 172).

According to many researchers, it is important for cosmopolitans to liberate themselves from the chains of ethnicity and from other classifications and essential identities, to occupy a universal state, and to manifest openness, i.e. to challenge ordinary societal spaces. Amit and Rapport (2012: 173) stress strong and important connections between the individual and the social framework of cultural identity, in which framework “difference” becomes completely politicised.

On the other hand, it is probably necessary to distinguish the Eastern and Western cultural differences characteristic of the Baltic States. The framework of the social identity of the communities definitely depends on the ethnic composition of these communities. In the eastern states, where the lives of the people on the periphery are settled and closed, the “difference” of the communities is considered to be internal to the people themselves as a naturally understandable phenomenon; it is not completely politicised.

It is vitally important to stress that the rhetoric and symbolism of a cultural community “owes as much to the intentionality of individuals, to *Anyone*, as does its negation”. Both sociality and individualism depend on the individual (Amit, Rapport 2012: 187). This theoretical provision corresponds entirely with the results of my community investigations in Lithuania and its periphery.

In examining the identity and culture of the people of a place and region and at the same time an entire nation, it is important to comprehensively investigate and reveal the environment shaping them. In order to reveal the identity of Lithuania’s people, first of all the local culture was analysed in accordance with the people’s notions of the regional identity and the main components that define it, which in their opinion distinguish the region’s inhabitants from those in Lithuania’s other regions (Savoniakaitė 2012). Interviewees able to look at the presented questions from various perspectives were selected. An effort was made to learn the views of the elderly, middle-aged, and young, while conversations were held with people with various education levels and various social statuses. Inhabitants of various nationalities were asked to explain their views on personal relationships, on the influence of religion on local cultural traditions and customs, and on local politics, and to reveal the extent of the assimilation and integration processes in the local communities. Such an investigation is not only an examination of the local and regional culture, but also reveals the processes, priorities, and effects of modern integration and communications. All of this shows the fate of the traditional way of life and values of the communities in the villages and small towns. This is a separate history of the nation’s cultural priorities.

In “post-transitional” globalisation, people redefine the boundaries of their identity in connection with the locality and region. The “homeland” and newly

constructed historical family traditions remain precious to the people (Savoniakaitė 2012: 191). On the basis of the 2002–2009 research into the identity and “belonging” of the people in Lithuania’s ethnographic regions, I assumed that Lithuania’s modern inhabitants are also distinguished by their “home”, “homeland”, –“oneself land”, language, customs, religion, and family that are already celebrated in historical texts. People expressed their opinions from this perspective and it was possible to judge to what extent these opinions were common and to what extent individual.

The differences of localities more or less affected by migration are revealed. The Aukštaitians, Suvalkians, and Samogitians willingly described their regional identity, the Dzūkians less so, while the people encountered in Lithuania Minor, the Samogitians and Šišians (Lith. *Šišioniškiai*) did not show much regional identity. Ethnic identity is more frequently shown in communities where people of more ethnic groups live. After comparing all research results, the conclusion could be drawn that the elements of regional identity dearest to people are “homeland” and “oneself land”. Interviewees from Samogitia, Lithuania Minor, and Dzūkija expressed great pride in their homeland. National identity is connected with ethnicity, religion, and cultural history. The people’s values were oriented to the historical culture. The notions of tradition of the people in western Lithuania are more connected with family life, and very little is taken from the local inhabitants compared with the investigations in eastern Lithuania. These modern features of regional identity in Lithuania show the eastern and western differences in Lithuania, i.e. the effects of historical memories and political economic realia for modern society and at the same time sociality. On the other hand, it is possible to evaluate the specific features of post-socialist societies: the features of a free nation with strong historic memories. It is possible to partially connect the love of Lithuanians for their land and region with the bitter experience of historical losses and with values passed down in families, social politics, and a farming mentality. The study of macro regions like the entire territory of the Baltic States was a consequence of a scientific policy, which requires large resources. Such methodological research approaches are no longer meaningful for revealing questions of cultural diversity.

Thomas H. Eriksen, speaking about fundamentalism and ambivalence in modern societies, sometimes called “post-traditional societies”, in which there are different majority and minority situations, states that loyalty to traditions is chosen, sometimes by coercion. In these societies, the tradition of national minorities must be defended by the social structures (Eriksen 2002: 151). Ethnic minorities frequently choose some of the majority’s traditions and forget their own ethnic traditions.

The opinion predominates in Lithuanian ethnology that the material objects, customs, known phenomena of the cultural heritage, folklore, beliefs, etc. that were created prior to the first half of the 20th century are traditional. In modern

texts and ethnographic narratives, time limits are probably not found and perhaps should not be sought, i.e. sometimes this limit is dictated by the idea that a tradition is disappearing, even though it is being handed down in the families, and sometimes the new cultural expressions are called traditions. These so-called “traditions” may or not be connected with ethnicity.

In investigating the Lithuanian folk attitude, J. Balys (1966:8) wrote that “many have noticed the conservativeness of Lithuanians or their affection for old and ordinary things and their unwillingness to give into new things or to make severe changes”.

Tradition, family, homeland, and land are usually concepts that cannot be disassociated. It is in these picturesque narratives that the essence of the ethnic tradition, its secret, and its depth in a way lurk. The expressions of an ethnic or traditional culture are distinctive in a small closed place or space. Gradually, territory loses its primary importance and globalisation leaves marks:

Mažesnis miestelis labiau laiko tradicijas. Vyresni žmonės daugiau vertina tas tradicijas [A smaller town upholds traditions more. Older people value those traditions more] (Nomedas iš Kaltinėnų).

Kai būna Kapų šventė, susieina į gimtinę prie ąžuolo, pašvenčia. Ta vieta yra brangi, labai brangi. Tėvukai persikėlė – verkė. Nukeldavo žmones, sodą išnaikino. Kas ten dėjosi! [When there is a Festival of the Dead, they gather at the oak in their homeland and celebrate. That place is dear, very dear. The parents had moved away and wept. They used to relocate the people and destroy the grove. What has happened there!] (Moteris evangelikė iš Kunigiškių).

Senolio įkvėpti visi pusbroliai per Vasario 16 susirenka prie kryžiaus, pastatyto senolio žemėje. Pabendrauja, padainuoja ir tuo įprasmina šeimos tradiciją švęsti ir gerbti tautos Nepriklausomybės šventę [All of the cousins, inspired by their grandfather, gathered on 16 February around the cross erected on the grandfather's land. They talked and sang and thus created a family tradition to celebrate and honour the Independence Day Celebration] (Antanas).

In people's narratives, it is possible to grasp the processes, analysed in theoretical discourses, of the “invented traditions” or of their revival. In Samogitia, people speak of and recall disappearing traditions, but also accentuate celebrations being celebrated once again (Savoniakaitė 2012: 11 map). The traditions of a specific ethnographic region or locality are handed down in families in a beautiful manner, and this concept of local tradition is frequently transferred to new geographic spaces. The diversity of the cultural and art symbols and stereotypes distinguish and unite certain spaces, places, and regions.

The studies of the ethnographic regions, conducted in a specific territory by selecting localities equally distant from one another, has some methodological

commonalities with the research of the language and, to a lesser extent, folklore. The distinctive features of a language's dialects and sometimes folklore texts in Lithuanian rural localities (Savoniakaitė 2012) have maintained the closest ties with the place. Thus it is possible to very precisely determine the culture's outer boundaries and to investigate the more important geographic, historical, and cultural distinctive features. This principle does not always yield the expected results in a pluralistic society. It becomes more important to talk about the boundaries of the population's identity in various contexts. The distinctive cultural features also depend on the population's choices.

## Conclusions

In regional studies of the Baltic States beyond the transition, aspects of the region's historical distinctions, investigations in villages and small towns, and the research into the significance of the agrarian culture are connected with the methodologies of the old Soviet system and those of the former Central and Eastern European socialist states. The new methodologies were used for the regional studies in Lithuania without rejecting historicity when it was needed in order to better grasp the history of the phenomena. The split into new and old approaches is seen in discourses, in which only culture and the specific features of certain objects or phenomena are assessed, without regard for how much they are acceptable to the community and what is really important in the lives of the people.

Modern, completely new regional spaces have replaced the macro regions that existed in the socialist historical geographic space. The ethnographic regions have acquired new features, while culture has been imprecisely investigated as a completely separate object. It is not enough to look for a culture's distinctive features using a historicist or diffusionist approach; it is essential to use a comprehensive comparative analysis. The diversity of a culture's phenomena needs to be seen through its people and social policies. In order to reveal a culture's diversity, it is useful to ascertain the attitudes of the individuals towards the cultural identity. As a consequence, it is meaningful to study separate localities rather than macro regions. The specific eastern and western features need to be taken into consideration, i.e. the uneven development of all of the regions as well as the cultural and social policies.

It is important to reveal a pluralistic society's distinctions and attitude towards culture. The opinions of the community and its individuals, who freely decide to belong or not to belong to the community, must be investigated. It is precisely these community investigations which convince us that cultural diversity needs to be experienced through individuals, who express their attitude towards the culture and the community's culture, who select some identity features while

ignoring others, and replace them in certain situations. On the other hand, in Eastern Europe it is necessary to consider the historical geographic range, the former macro regional effects, and the consequences that are still being felt today.

Lithuania's case is interesting due to its opposing elements, i.e. the clash of the new mental models with the old Soviet ones. Many new theoretical methodological models for the investigation of regional space are acceptable for both anthropologists and ethnologists, i.e. attitudes towards identity boundaries, comparative special features of the social structures, cultural policy, and research of cultural tradition. The distinctive definitions of people's identity, the historical memory, and the attitudes towards cultural traditions show the idiosyncrasies of the spaces and places.

The research fields of ethnologists and anthropologists differ in their attitude towards the investigation of the ethnographic region itself; ethnologists expand the investigation. The comparative discourses of the new ethnological research in Lithuania encompass a spectrum of broader problems or more widely open classic questions in the study of ethnology. The entirely new research problems that are appearing, such as identity, cultural policy, new social structures, media, etc., as well as new methodology, are changing ethnographic field research, while the definitions of the scientific concepts are also changing.

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# Postmemory, Post-dependence, Post-trauma: Negotiating Jewish Identity in Post-Communist Poland<sup>9</sup>

*Aleksandra Szczepan*

In studies concerning identity practices in contemporary, post-communist Poland, three issues seem to be crucial: the memory strategies they involve, the previous state of dependency towards which they define themselves, and their relationship with the historical traumas they have to overcome. These are labeled by three catchy terms: postmemory, post-dependence, and post-trauma; these perspectives – similar to other “posts”, e.g. postmodernism or postsecularism – are characterized by several common features: specific belatedness, temporal shift, the practice of quoting and mediation, defining the present always in relation to a troubling past, oscillating between continuity and rupture. Secondly, all of them are a sort of loan-notion from Western memory, trauma and Holocaust studies, hastily adapted to Polish realities. Even post-dependence discourse – which is to be understood as a set of signifying and identity practices that have been undertaken after the situation of dependence came to an end – was introduced to the vocabulary of Polish humanities as a specific remedy and substitute for the postcolonial perspective, which turned out to be quite resistant to being convincingly applied to the Polish cultural situation.

As I will try to show, adapting categories from the Western theoretical vocabulary or creating new ones in order to examine Polish culture and identity strategies may be fully legitimate only if we discern the basic differences this local perspective engages, and recognize the entanglement of several factors it always results in. To prove my point, I will examine a phenomenon in which these three perspectives – postmemory, post-trauma and post-dependence – creatively intertwine: the identity strategies of representatives of the second generation of Holocaust survivors; that is, Polish writers who started rendering their Jewish

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identity problematic in their works after 1989. I will start, however, with a brief theoretical reconnaissance.

Postmemory, a term coined by Marianne Hirsch that is crucial for my analysis, was a manifestation of a broader trend in the relatively young field of Holocaust studies, which tried to capture the phenomenon of memory of the so-called second generation of Holocaust survivors, or the generation of those who come “after,” haunted by the war memories of their parents (cf Berger 1997; Sicher 1998; McGlothlin 2006; Grimwood 2007). For postmemory is the experience of those who grew up in the shadow of stories taking place before their birth, shaped by traumatic events that could not be fully understood or reconstructed by them. This inheritance of memories, supposedly proven by a great number of autobiographical books in American literature written by the children of survivors, from the very beginning had a rather uncertain status. This was expressed by the language of researchers concerned with this kind of memory: “absent,” “late,” “inherited,” “prosthetic,” “ash memory,” “painful inheritance,”<sup>10</sup> mixed with a pinch of the uncanny: after all, how can memory, a structure which is a priori intentional (in the phenomenological sense) be a medium of experiences that have not been experienced? For the first time, Hirsch used the notion of postmemory to describe her own personal experience as a child of Holocaust survivors, in order to express primarily the *quality* of the relationship with one’s parents’ stories, from which one has been excluded (ibid: 4). Right after its very first formulation, the concept started to live its own life, being applied to all forms of memory – both individual and collective – much beyond family relations, achieving the status of a form of cultural memory. Hirsch herself made some clarifications and redefinitions in her most recent book, in which she describes postmemory as “the relationship that the ‘generation after’ bears to the personal, collective and cultural trauma of those who came before – to experiences they ‘remember’ only by means of the stories, images and behaviors among which they grew up.” (ibid: 5). Therefore, postmemory is clearly different from the memory of actual witnesses or participants of certain events, and its relationship with the past is mediated not by means of remembering, but by the input of imagination, projection and creation. What is especially significant is that postmemory has a powerful potential of an identity strategy: its artistic incarnations (both in literature and visual arts) are, in the works of the second generation, always related to the search for identity and working through mourning, to which they are often denied the right.

Furthermore, it is worth underlining that postmemory, construed both as a form of memory and as cultural formation, is always connected to trauma: “it is a

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<sup>10</sup> Terms by Fine E, Lury C, Landsberg A, Fresco N, Schwab G; quoted in Hirsch (2012: 3).

*consequence* of traumatic recall but (unlike post-traumatic stress disorder) at a generational remove” (ibid: 6). As I will show later, the posttraumatic condition in the case of Jews who spent their childhood in communist Poland is doubly charged: the trauma of the Holocaust in the shadow of which they grew up (very often concealed by their parents and recognized by them only thanks to accidental allusions) is intensified by their personal trauma caused by living in concealment and facing acts of anti-Semitism.

As a form of cultural memory and posttraumatic identity, postmemory must also be examined as rooted in a specific historical moment and directly related to socio-political changes. This leads me to the last element of this “post” triad: post-dependence. This category, often conceived as a remedy for inefficiency of postcolonial discourse applied to the political, social and cultural situation of Poland, both after the partitions of 1795–1918 and after the times of communism (Chmielewska 2013: 559–574), was coined to dub meaningful cultural practices emerging after the ceasing of dependency but still showing its signs (Nycz 2011: 8). As such, the situation of post-dependency might be interpreted as strongly connected to working through trauma and coming to terms with an often troubling and emotionally charged past. At the same time, it opens various possibilities for identity and emancipatory practices, especially for minority groups who have only now regained the right to speak for themselves, but in constant negotiation with the dominant politics of memory and practices of self-identification, that are often rooted in the dialectic of victimhood.

In Polish literature, the political transformation of 1989 also brought out an archive fever and a memory turn. However, as I will try to show, an analysis of material seemingly analogous to that known from Western studies – recently published autobiographical narratives of Polish writers of Jewish origin, battling with the trauma that marked their childhood – brings up a number of issues, which significantly distinguish this local Jewish-Polish postmemory from that described originally by Hirsch. For the children of the survivors living on the western side of the Iron Curtain, the year 1989 opened the territorial borders and for the first time allowed them to see the mythical places from their parents’ narratives about pre-war times. However, for the descendants of Jews who lived as children in the People’s Republic of Poland it had a slightly different, post-dependent dimension. The historic breakthrough was the very precondition for such narratives to be created at all. As an example, let me quote Michał Głowiński’s description of his situation at the time he published *Black Seasons* (1998): “I came out from the cellar. I ceased to fear. I can finally talk about myself publicly” (“*Polskie gadanie*” 2005).

The year 1989 brought to the public issues that had been hitherto deliberately omitted. First of all, the anti-Semitism promoted by the communist authorities, and the fact that after the Second World War “the Jewish question” was an indispensable element of the politics of the party and anti-Semitism, was a useful

tool in political and ideological debates – the most evident example was the events of March 1968. Secondly, resulting from this situation, the forced emigration of the overwhelming majority of people of Jewish origin, who after the war returned to Poland or found themselves on its territory as a result of the changes introduced at the Yalta Conference, and the problematic question of the attitude of Poles towards Jews during the Second World War and in the early post-war period (cf. Gross 2006). Finally, the Polonization of the experience of the Holocaust, epitomized by acts of memory politics at the memorial site of the former Auschwitz death camp (Kucia 2005; Zubrzicki 2006) as well as the expulsion from the canon of Polish testimonial literature of the works of authors writing in Yiddish and Hebrew<sup>11</sup>. An emblematic event for this tendency was the debate, a prelude to the events of March '68, on the "Nazi concentration camps" entry in the Great Universal Encyclopedia edited by the State Scientific Publishers. Formerly, the entry was divided into two sections – "concentration camps" and "death camps" – and in the case of the latter the fact that Jewish victims constituted the majority was underlined. As a result of anti-Semitic bashing the entry was changed (and an addendum sent to subscribers) and the division deleted.

After 1989, the articulation of these issues could for the first time be freed of Aesopian speech and allusions. Literature responded in a lively way to the political change: besides new works of writers for whom the Holocaust was an important topic even before 1989 (Henryk Grynberg), books began to appear by authors who had not previously been working in this context – both those with no autobiographical background (Marek Bińczyk, Jarosław M. Rymkiewicz) and those by Jewish writers who had survived the Holocaust as children the (so-called generation 1.5: Michał Głowinski, Wilhelm Dichter<sup>12</sup>). Finally, the "generation of postmemory" emerged; four of its representatives: Ewa Kuryluk, Agata Tuszyńska, Bożena Keff and Magdalena Tulli<sup>13</sup> – although each in a slightly different role – will be the protagonists of this article.

Based on these writers' narratives, I will examine how in the Polish context there is a specific belatedness in the practices of working through the inherited memory of the children of Holocaust survivors, and how the formation of their Jewish identity was made impossible by anti-Semitism, epitomized by the events of March 1968, that played a role in their generational trauma<sup>14</sup>. (Joanna

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<sup>11</sup> E.g. Icchak Kacenelson, Emanuel Ringelblum, Chaim Kaplan. Cf. A. Ubertowska, op. cit., p. 21.

<sup>12</sup> Hirsch (2012: 15). Przemysław Czapliński (2010: 359) calls these books "literature of belated confession".

<sup>13</sup> Kuryluk *Goldi* (2004) – hereafter "G" and page number; Kuryluk *Frascati. Apoteoza topografii* (2009) – hereafter "F" and page number; Tuszyńska, *Rodzinna historia lęku* (2005); Keff, *Utwór o Matce i Ojczyźnie* (2008); Tulli, *Włoskie szpilki* [Italian Stiletto] (2011).

<sup>14</sup> In this manner, March '68 is also described by Polish Jews born after the war who are interviewed by Joanna Wiszniewicz (2009).

Wiszniewicz Czarne 2009) As a result of the anti-Semitic riots that broke out in March 1968, which were stirred up by communist authorities in order to put down the student protests as well as to remove undesirable members from the Party, 15,000 Polish citizens of Jewish origin were forced to emigrate from the country. The children of those who decided to stay, having regained their voice after the fall of communism, are now trying to deal with inherited trauma, reinforced by their own experience of permanent denial and exclusion from the national-patriotic community. My four protagonists have several features in common: all of them were born to Holocaust survivors in the first decades after the war and spent their childhood in communist Poland; for each of them their autobiographical book is a kind of declaration; for each a source of traumatic knowledge is the relationship with their mother; finally, for each a key moment for identification was coming into contact with Polish anti-Semitism. Ewa Kuryluk, in her autobiographical books *Goldi* (2004) and *Frascati* (2009), for the first time (except earlier casual remarks) openly addresses her Jewish origin and reconstructs the way to solving the mystery of her mother's war-time past. The role of a Jewish woman's identity (struggling) manifesto is played by *The Piece on the Mother and Motherland* (2008) written by Bożena Keff. *Italian Stiletos* (2011) by Magdalena Tulli is her first prose work which so strongly embraces autobiographical themes, describing her coping with the inherited burden (the "cursed casket," "a collation" as she puts it; Tulli: 64, 76) of Jewish origin. Finally, Agata Tuszyńska's autobiographical saga, *The Family History of Fear* (2005), is a record of the author's path from the discovery and a denial of Jewish identity imposed by her mother's confession to a happy ending in the form of acceptance of being a Jewess and making this fact an element of self-identification.

These four cases of postmemory narratives, with their openly affirmative character, might be considered strong identity declarations, variants of this "coming out of the cellar," as Michał Głowiński put it, that was possible after 1989. The Jewish "coming out" would, therefore, be a public disclosure statement, a performative act of revealing – or constructing – identity. Eve Kosovsky Sedgwick, considering variants of "coming out," stresses that the case of Jewish identity – in contrast to the situation of, for example, homosexual people – involves to a large extent self-awareness of what being a Jew actually means, and is solidly established in the private history of family experiences and tradition (Kosovsky Sedgwick 1990: 75 in Stratton 2000: 14). Disputing this claim, Jon Stratton indicates that this type of definition of Jewish identity is inseparably linked to the modernist division into the private and the public, and a vision of society in which being a Jew remains a sphere behind closed doors, when in the public space Jews become citizens, eliminating any uniqueness. As Stratton tries to show, Jewish identity also needs to be seen as constructed and ditching any simple essentialist classifications. However, no matter how we define this transition, coming out always has the potential of a positive statement; it is a

performative act, which establishes a new status quo, a new subject position within the network of identification links. This also corresponds to the aforementioned formative and emancipatory potential of postmemory as an identity practice. But, as it turns out, coming out in the Polish context is complicated due to at least three issues.

In the first place, therefore, we should look at this state of secrecy preceding entering the public sphere. The Polish literary critic Artur Sandauer (1982), creating a portrait of Polish writers of Jewish origin in the twentieth century, described their condition as marranism, referring to the situation of *marranos* – Jews who, in order to avoid deportation from Spain after 1492, converted to Christianity, while still remaining faithful to their own traditions, however concealed. In the case of Polish writers the condition of marranos concerns those who prefer not to “share” the truth of their origin, using mimicry to adapt to the mainstream. Marranism, which was a driving force of modern assimilation, after the Second World War took on a new connotation. Now fear becomes an impulse not to share their identity, echoing the attitudes of Poles toward Jews during the war, as well as immediately after it. For instance, the mother in *Italian Stiletos* gives birth to a child “for the sake of conspiracy” (26); the bleach-blonde mother in *Goldi and Frascati* is also constantly hiding; the mother hides her origin from Tuszyńska until she is 19 years old. Paradoxically, as historians show, the dominant variant of Polish anti-Semitism after the Second World War was precisely the one against the assimilated Jews, who only “pretended” that they were Poles (Kersten 1992: 147). The communist government’s policies played a decisive role here: recruiting citizens of Jewish origin into the Party, at the same time they suggested changing their names to Polish-sounding ones. “Dyed foxes – says a Polish girl in one of Tulli’s stories – wretched, disguised” (132). Therefore, here coming out does not so much mean disclosure – for society seems to know who they are beforehand.

This state of secrecy is strictly correlated to the exclusion from family history and the stubborn silence of parents (namely mothers) about their past. Ewa Kuryluk’s mother, Maria Grabowska (originally Miriam Kohany), who survived hiding from the Gestapo in Lviv thanks to her future husband’s help, until very late does not talk about her origins and war story. Moreover, she asks her daughter for two things: “not to spread our history nor to seek traces” (F237). These two imperatives shape the posttraumatic identity of the daughter: they stigmatize her with a hidden “secret,” which if revealed might revoke her right to be a member of consolidated society, and deprives her of her own history and temporal and spatial roots. The mother’s obsession with being recognized, along with the simultaneous, continuous denial of her own past and taking a lie as a foundation for her identity, affects her children (Ewa and her younger brother, Piotr), who feel endangered even in the space they know best – home at Frascati Street. In the postwar years, and especially during “this dreadful spring” (F 113), the mother is more scared

than during the Nazi occupation, and compares Poles, who may discover who the disguised Miriam Kohany really is, to the Gestapo (F114). “You will not recognize ‘szmalcownik’<sup>15</sup> by his pajamas [...], but he will recognize you” (F196) – she says after her stay at the mental hospital. This feeling of being beset continues after the fall of communism: “What is the percentage of wrecks who didn’t take reparations out of fear?” (F 302) – the mother asks rhetorically. A similar situation characterizes the life of Usia – the autobiographical protagonist of a narrative poem by Bożena Keff. Usia describes herself as a captive of trauma, summoned to be a mute witness to her mother’s misfortune. The mother, “a tyrant of emptiness” (10), escaped from Lviv during the war and left her family. After half a century she finds out that her relatives were shot in suburban woods. Keff depicts the experience of a survivor’s child in terms of disease and corporeality. History, documented in archives and film, in individual experience shows itself in the disguise of physiology: “I burp with a cadaver and then again with emptiness” (9) – says the narrator. At the same time the access to this experience is forbidden to her: “You have Nothing to do with Nothing” (42) – says the mother; Usia concludes: “there are no words with her [the mother], there are no words to her, nothing reaches her / and this is what the daughter blames her for all the time” (10). Contemporary marranos abide in constant hiding with no chance to integrate the history that they could identify with, and their traumatic postmemory is woven from gaps and concealments.

Secondly, the identity that is the subject of this coming out does not have a positive definition. In his analysis, Sandauer notes that after the war, in an ethnically cleansed society, being a Jew starts to mean the same as being a stranger, other, and anti-Semitism now manifests itself in placing cryptonyms and pseudonyms on these who are not Polish. “The word ‘Jewish’ in the People’s Republic of Poland disappeared altogether,” says Michał Głowiński in the previously cited interview (“*Polskie gadanie*” 2005). – “[...] When someone wanted to say of someone else that he is a Jew, they would use alternative words: ‘of obvious origin,’ ‘you know who.’” Two major Polish literary magazines (*Współczesność*, 1963, no. 15, *Poezja*, 1969, no. 8) summarized or reprinted a hostile towards the writers of Jewish origin pamphlet by the prominent Polish poet Tadeusz Gajcy from the period of the war called *We do not need anymore*, and the lack of object in this sentence is crucial: it is more than easy to decrypt it.

In Ewa Kuryluk’s work, this is expressed by a mysterious “word starting with the letter J,” where J stands for Jew, which is used by a tutor at a nursery school to separate Ewa from the other children (F 28), or by three dots: “I asked: Mum, are

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<sup>15</sup> “Szmalcownik” is a Polish slang term used during World War II that denoted a person blackmailing Jews who were hiding, or blackmailing Poles who protected Jews during the Nazi occupation.

you...?;" "Emigration?" – asks the narrator in *Goldi* – "we, sir, are not affected. We are not... I use ellipsis, we do not use invectives in Frascati" (G 100, 67). Tulli does likewise: "All decent people should say they are..." (132). Being a Jew is an empty word, a blank space, a halted sentence, an identity devoid of properties, defined only negatively: as a stranger, not-Pole, other.<sup>16</sup> This dotted-out word works as an emblem of Jewish identity, stigmatizes the children of the Jews who survived, imitating as an echo the band with the yellow star. Yet recognition always comes from the outside, the word starting with the letter J indicates the fact, but means nothing, does not give any basis for identification, nor does it permit one to form any kind of relation based on similarity. The paradox of post-war marranism is that the hidden Jewish identity loses any substantial properties; it is defined only by stigmatization from outside. This stigmatization, referred to by means of words such as "foreign," "other," "this," and since 11 March 1968 with the vague term "Zionist," is based on pure negativity, without offering a foundation for the creation of any image of oneself except that of a painful sense of unexplainable otherness. In one of Tulli's short stories, a tutor asks the class to explain this "something antisocial that was in this girl" (118), and soon it turns out that this is an impossible task: the strangeness dwelling in this child is so acutely obvious and natural that it becomes completely unexplainable. A post-war marrano, she does not know that she is one, and does not know that she is hiding something – although everybody around her knows this. "It was anti-Semitism and the Holocaust that imposed Jewishness upon my mother" – says Kuryluk in an interview.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, the Jewish identity of the daughter is shaped by the exclusion from family history – she must unravel the secret of her own mother's origin on her own, even ignoring her prohibitions. This is accompanied by attempts to find identification "outside" home, corrupted by untold trauma, and to engage in the national-patriotic community. This, however, proves a failure when, during a Solidarity movement demonstration in New York, Ewa is "recognized" and excluded from the group of protesters. Similarly to the heroine of Bożena Keff's narrative poem, besides the intergenerational relationship with her mother, the confrontation with the specifically Polish scenery is a crucial identity-forming factor. Usia "is committed, as much as she can" (31) to the Solidarity movement; however, she is quickly spotted and isolated, because "there is no entry to this

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<sup>16</sup> Surprisingly, this way of defining Jewish identity might also be recognized in the contemporary radio drama *Families which are not here anymore: Anonymous Polish Jews* (Polish Radio Program 1, 02.02.2013, by W. Klemm and M. Pabian): protagonists who meet at a psychoanalyst's office describe their situation: "For twelve years I have been..., I mean, I will be since I plan to deal with it this year" (my emphasis).

<sup>17</sup> Ewa Kuryluk. *Jestem Australijką*: <http://www.jewish.org.pl/index.php/pl/opinie-komentarze-mainmenu-62/3963-jestem-australijk.html> (accessed: May 2013).



history, for dogs and Jews” (34). The protagonist is left at the border between the private and the public, “she cannot leave home, nor can she stay there” (33) and her gestures are interpreted perversely in the language that the anti-Semitic society forbids her to use: “Once she started crying on the street, she didn’t make it to the gate to hide / people are thinking: *poor woman, surely communists detained her husband*” (33). Polish anti-Semitism, however, becomes in Keff’s work a trigger for a reconciliation between mother and daughter, who find a negative, yet tangible level of identification. After spending an evening in front of the television and watching news reporting on the new statue of Roman Dmowski, the 1930s right-wing politician famous for his anti-Semitism, the mother for the first time recognizes the similarity between her own situation and that of her daughter. Despite the unconvincing happy ending of this inter-generational struggle for memory, Keff’s work aptly illustrates the difficult process of the formation of posttraumatic identity, with no possible reference to either private or collective narratives. Even if an attempt at coming to terms with the past and the present can finally be made, it leaves a bitter taste of the repetitive nature of history.

Tuszyńska describes how in March 1968 her mother once again began to be afraid, and her sense of her family’s safety had previously come from the fact that “they were not called Jews. And at least there was no public acquiescence for it” (381). The question of fear and shame is the third key point in defining local Jewish-Polish postmemory. For Tuszyńska, who did not experience the March events, it is vital to find any pattern that she could use to build her suddenly acquired Jewish identity; *The Family History of Fear*, a saga spanning over several generations back, is supposed to be a sort of autobiographical work, creating positive points of reference, and the publication of the book an overcoming of “both fear and shame, and the inability to tell the truth” (407). An ongoing counterpoint to these efforts, however, remains the shadow of the Holocaust, which itself undermines the ability to build a positive narrative. This affective factor of post-dependent form of identity formation may be accurately illustrated by an example from the early years of post-communist Poland. At the beginning of the 1990s, the newly formed weekly for Polish Jews *Midrasz* encouraged Jews to come out of hiding and offered help: “Perhaps you feel shame because of your Jewish origin? Perhaps you’re afraid? Does it happen that you conceal it?” They did not have to face these problem alone – promised the advertisement. For those who were struggling with their Jewish identity there was now a phone line. The ad ended with the words: “We promise discretion” (Shore 2013: 146). At the same time, almost half of the subscribers to the magazine did not wish to get envelopes in their mailboxes with the visible magazine’s logo. One might, at best, admit to being a Jew – as an admission to guilt, and this is a painful and shameful process. Jewish-Polish postmemory is burdened by a fear of recognition and the heritage that is lacking heroism: the “cursed casket,” as Magdalena Tulli put it, of the Holocaust trauma, received from parents, is an inheritance that one wants to

“avoid at all cost” (74); and the only thing which is inherited and shared by the survivors’ children is shame.

Jewish coming out is, then, a deeply ambiguous and difficult process. “The word Jew is tensile,” says Głowiński, and Jewish identity, historically marked by negative connotations, has multiple references. Free from simple identification clichés, it has an unclear status in respect of the private/public category. The most important feature of this local version of postmemory is its formative potential, which may be understood as a way of emancipatory identity formation, although doubly charged: with the exclusion from the family history and the stigmatization in the public space. The postmemory coming-outs in post-dependent Poland are, therefore, highly individual practices that are not based on a strong ideology, critical, in some way tragic, continuously undermining their own status quo; they rather consist in a series of subjectifications that are based on a simple formation of meaning. Hence, this is the particular emancipatory potential of Jewish-Polish postmemory: excluded from the common processes of national identification, these narratives form weak subjectivities that oscillate on the margins of official histories, revealing their distortions and abuse.

Thus, in the case of the Polish second generation, working through the trauma of the Shoah and creating the posttraumatic identity are always contained within the indispensable context of phenomena resulting from political and social changes. Moreover, a distinctive factor of those practices is their specific geographic characterization: working through the trauma takes place on the territory where the events that caused that trauma actually happened. The experience of contemporary Polish Jews lacks something that is typical of the experience of descendants of Jews who emigrated to the West after the Second World War – the spatial distance from both the sites of torment and the places where their parents’ life before the war took place. For the Polish second generation, as Magdalena Tulli persuasively described it, it suffices to move from any point A to any point B, and “various perturbing geographical names always come up to [...] mind in the same gloomy, stubborn, and intrusive fashion,” names invisible for passengers “who are equipped with better histories” (66).

Finally, the case of Jewish-Polish postmemory shows the ambiguous nature of post-dependence which never brings full redemption: being “post” in relation to something does not eliminate its dangers, but rather oscillates between the emancipatory drive to overcome previous constraints and the critical reflection on their remains in present cultural, social and political life.

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# The meanings of Auschwitz in Central Europe before and after 1989<sup>18</sup>

*Marek Kucia*

## Introduction

On 4 June 1989, representatives of the Solidarity movement won all freely contested seats in the Polish parliament (*Sejm*), thus marking the beginning of transition from communism to democracy and political, economic and cultural transformation in Poland and the then Soviet bloc. At that time, the taken-for-granted knowledge of Auschwitz in those countries was that this concentration and death camp, which Nazi Germany established and operated in what had been Poland before the Second World War and what has been Poland since after the war, had taken the lives of at least 4 million people—citizens of Poland, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other countries (*Oświęcim: hitlerowski obóz masowej zagłady* [1977] 1981)<sup>19</sup>. At that time in the West, the number of Auschwitz victims was believed to have been approximately 1 million, nearly all of them Jews from various countries (Wellers 1983)<sup>20</sup>. While in communist Poland and other Soviet bloc countries Auschwitz was a symbol of the martyrdom of the Polish nation and other nations at the hands of Nazi Germany during the Second World War (Huener 2003; Kucia 2005; Wóycicka 2009), in Israel, (West)

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<sup>19</sup> The number of 4 million victims, based upon the estimated capacity of killing facilities in the Auschwitz camp complex, and the categorisation of victims according to states were first given by the Extraordinary Soviet Committee for the Investigation of Crimes of the German-Fascist Aggressors in a communiqué published in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the newspaper of the Red Army, on 8 May 1945 (Piper 1992: 53).

<sup>20</sup> The number of 1 million was mainly based upon the documents regarding the Jewish deportations to Auschwitz.

Germany, the USA and other Western countries it was a symbol, for many *the* symbol, of the Holocaust—the annihilation of Jews (Levy and Sznajder 2002; Novik 1999; Segev 1993; Olick and Levy 1997).

In 1990–1992, following the international criticism of the misrepresentation of the number and nationality of Auschwitz victims by Poland and its Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, Franciszek Piper, then head of the historical division of the museum, gave a series of media interviews and published articles and a book which presented the results of his research rejecting the so far taken-for-granted knowledge of Auschwitz victims and confirming, in essence, the beliefs held in the West (Piper 1991, 1992). Since their publication, Piper’s findings have become the core of the new historiography of Auschwitz and a foundation of and factor in transformations of the symbolic meanings of Auschwitz in Poland and, later, elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc.

The key historical facts about Auschwitz the camp may be outlined as follows (cf. Długoborski and Piper 2000). Auschwitz, the largest and most notorious Nazi German concentration and death camp, served two major functions. First, for the entire duration of its existence, from the spring of 1940 until January 1945, it was a concentration camp for people from all around Europe whom the Nazis considered dangerous for their rule. The people who were deported and imprisoned in the camp in that capacity were primarily nationals of (pre-war) Poland—almost exclusively non-Jewish, mostly of Polish ethnicity and Roman-Catholic religion. There were also deportees and prisoners from other areas of Europe ruled by the Nazis: the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia”, France, Yugoslavia, the conquered areas of the Soviet Union (prisoners of war and civilians) as well as Germans and Austrians, and others. Following Piper’s estimates, the total number of these non-Jewish deportees to Auschwitz was about 200,000, including 140–150,000 Poles, 23,000 Gypsies (Sinti and Roma), 15,000 Soviet prisoners of war, and 25,000 others (Piper 1991: table 1). About 125,000 of them lost live in the camp, including 70–75,000 Poles, 21,000 Gypsies, nearly all 15,000 Soviet POWs, and 10–15,000 others (Piper 1991: tables 1 and 2). This last figure included 8–9,000 Czechs (Poloncarz 2010).

The function that was chronologically the second became the most important—Auschwitz was the major centre of annihilation of European Jews. The first known transports of Jews destined for mass murder began arriving in the camp in February 1942. They continued until November 1944. In total, about 1.1 million Jews were deported to Auschwitz from various European countries ruled by or allied with the Nazis. About 1 million of them perished in the camp, which makes Auschwitz the largest site of the Holocaust and the largest site of genocide in the history of humankind. The numbers of Jewish deportees to Auschwitz from various countries, as estimated by Piper (1991: table 4), were as follows: Hungary (in its wartime boundaries) – 438,000; Poland – 300,000; France – 69,000; the Netherlands – 60,000; Greece – 55,000; the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia

(the ghetto-camp in Theresienstadt) – 46,000; Slovakia (in its wartime boundaries) – 27,000; Belgium – 25,000, the Third Reich – 23,000; Yugoslavia – 10,000; Italy – 7,500; Norway – 690; other camps and sites – 34,000.

This article deals with the meanings of Auschwitz in Poland and three other contemporary Central European countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. Poland has been chosen for seven reasons. First, the Auschwitz camp was established and operated by Nazi Germany on “Polish soil”—the territory of the pre-war Republic of Poland annexed by the Third Reich, following Poland’s defeat shortly upon the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939. Second, after the war the site and relics of the Auschwitz camp found themselves, and remain in restored Poland. Third, the citizens of Poland, both Jews and non-Jews, have long been believed to constitute and, as follows from Piper’s research shows, indeed did constitute the largest category of the deportees to Auschwitz<sup>21</sup>. They were probably also the largest category among those who lost their lives at the camp, considering the pre-war European boundaries<sup>22</sup>. Fourth, shortly after the war Poland founded and has since managed the memorial and museum of Auschwitz. Fifth, the transformations of meanings of Auschwitz in Poland from 1945 to the present may be regarded as paradigmatic for other countries of the then and former Soviet bloc. Sixth, these transformations, their various periods and aspects, have been studied extensively by, inter alia, Jonathan Huener (2003), Sławomir Kapralski (2013), Michael C. Steinlauf (1997), Jonathan Webber (1993), Zofia Wóycicka (2009), James E. Young (1993), Geneviève Zubrzycki (2006), and the author of this article (Kucia 2005; forthcoming). Seventh, this scholarship constitutes a frame of reference for the study of meanings of Auschwitz from other Central European perspectives, notably the Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak, although these have received hardly any scholarly attention. Several scholars have discussed Holocaust memory in various Central and East European countries, referring to Auschwitz (e.g. authors in Karlsson and Zander 2003, 2004, 2006; authors in Himka and Michlic 2013; Sniegon 2014). There have, however, not been specific studies of the memory or meanings of Auschwitz from perspectives other than the Polish one.

The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia have been chosen for this article alongside Poland for five reasons. First, the majority of the deportees to and

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<sup>21</sup> The members of the following categories of deportees elaborated by Piper were the citizens of pre-war Poland: the vast majority of 300,000 Jews deported from the ghettos in the occupied country, all 140–150,000 (non-Jewish) Poles, several thousands Jewish deportees from Belgium and France, and an undetermined number of Gypsies and Soviet POWs, which in total makes more than 450,000.

<sup>22</sup> Although the 438,000 Jews from wartime Hungary were the largest group of deportees by country, a large number of them had been citizens of Czechoslovakia or Romania before the war.

victims of Auschwitz, both in total and their largest Jewish group, came from the contemporary areas of these four countries. Second, although the predecessors of the countries studied—Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland—had different histories both before and during the Second World War, after the war these nations all experienced communism and were parts of the Soviet bloc, which influenced considerably their memories of Auschwitz (cf. Piper 1992). Third, communist-ruled Czechoslovakia and Hungary were the first to create and open their national exhibitions in the museum of Auschwitz. Fourth, Poland, Czechoslovakia, then the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and Hungary were in the avant-garde of post-communist transition after 1989. Fifth, contemporary Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were the first to open new national exhibitions, following the revision of Auschwitz’s historiography and changes to its symbolic meanings in Poland in the 1990s.

This article analyses the meanings of Auschwitz in Central Europe through their manifestations on the site of this former camp: the general exhibition and national exhibitions in the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, and monuments and memorial plaques. It also takes into consideration the most important pieces of legislation and literature on Auschwitz. The underlying assumption is that the site of Auschwitz and its representations there are a lens that focuses and reflects the various contemporary meanings of the former camp. The general exhibition, monuments, and plaques, as they have been the responsibility of Poland and its Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, reflect primarily a Polish perspective, although they have also been under external influences. The national exhibitions, created by agencies of various countries, mainly reflect the perspectives of the countries concerned, although the Polish government, the state museum of the camp, and external agents have also had an influence on these exhibitions.

The theoretical approach that this article is based upon combines two currents in social memory studies. It draws upon classical sociology and its contemporary developments—Émile Durkheim’s (1982 [1895]) concept of a “social fact” as applied to Auschwitz elsewhere by the author of this article (Kucia 2005), whereby three mutually related layers of contemporary Auschwitz as a social fact are distinguished: (a) material (camp’s site and relics, and commemorative objects), (b) institutional (museum, commemorations, publications, education), and (c) social consciousness (people’s perceptions). It also uses Maurice Halbwachs’s (1992) notion of “collective memory” as developed by Jeffrey K. Olick (1998) and applied to Auschwitz by Sławomir Kaprański (2013), whereby the memory of Auschwitz is memories held by particular groups.

The article first outlines the received view of the meanings of Auschwitz in Poland, as expressed by the authors who have studied the subject. Then, in order to account for the meanings of Auschwitz in Central Europe, that is in Poland as well as in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, the article proposes a new



perspective that redefines, to a large degree, the analytical categories developed in the received view.

*The meanings of Auschwitz in Poland: The received view*

All scholars dealing with the meanings of Auschwitz in Poland—Huener (2003), Kapralski (2013), Kucia (2005), Steinlauf (1997), Webber (1993), Wóycicka (2009), Zubrzycki (2006), and others—have indicated that Poles regarded Auschwitz, or “Oświęcim” as they usually referred to it in Polish, as a national symbol—the symbol of the martyrdom of the Polish nation at the hands of the Germans during the Second World War. This “martyrological idiom” (Huener 2003: xiv) was epitomised in the Polish parliament’s “Act on the remembrance of the martyrdom of the Polish Nation and other Nations in Oświęcim” (Act 1947), which after minor amendments remains valid to this day. But Huener, Kapralski, Kucia, Steinlauf, and Wóycicka also showed that this *Polish* meaning of Auschwitz was not the only one in Poland, nor, as those authors and also Zubrzycki proved, was it uniform. It has had its national (ethnic or state) and religious, Roman Catholic varieties. Alongside these Polish meanings, some of the scholars also identified one, two, or three other major kinds of meanings that Auschwitz had in Poland after the war: *international*—Auschwitz as the site and symbol of suffering and death of people from various countries and of various nationalities (Huener, Kapralski, Kucia, Wóycicka); *universal*—Auschwitz as the site and symbol of human suffering, mass murder, crime against humanity and genocide, a symbol for peace and against war, a site of reconciliation, and a symbol of universal evil (Kucia); and *Jewish*—Auschwitz as the site and symbol of the Holocaust—the annihilation of Jews (Huener, Kapralski, Kucia, Steinlauf, Wóycicka). It is also worth noting that some other meanings of Auschwitz related to the various groups of victims of the camp have also manifested themselves in Poland, notably *Soviet* (since the late 1940s) and also *Russian* and *Romani (Gypsy)* (since the mid-1990s).

The scholars differed the most regarding the Jewish meaning of Auschwitz in Poland. Webber, discussing the different meanings that Auschwitz has to different people, and Zubrzycki, analysing the conflict between the Jewish “Auschwitz” and the Polish “Oświęcim”, believed that Poles did not perceive Auschwitz as a Jewish site and symbol. Huener, who stressed the prominence of the “Polish-national martyrological idiom”, following Steinlauf wrote about the “marginalisation of the Shoah” at Auschwitz in the post-war years (Huener 2003: 59–144, 228). However, he indicated some—though few—manifestations of the Jewish meaning on the site of the former camp. Similarly, Wóycicka analysed the early post-war attempts at commemorating the annihilation of Jews at Auschwitz and wrote about the subsequent “tabooisation of the Holocaust” (Wóycicka, 2009: 275). Kucia, agreeing with Huener and Steinlauf that the annihilation of Jews at Auschwitz was marginalised in post-war Poland, described an early indigenous “Jewish symbolism”, albeit one that faded away after 1948 and became almost nonexistent

after 1968 (Kucia 2005: 181–200). He also analysed the rise of “Jewish symbolism” in Poland since the mid-1980s and its domination in the 1990s.

The analytical categories outlined above, which rendered the meanings of Auschwitz in reference to variously defined kinds of victims of the camp (Poles, Jews, nationals of various countries, humanity), have been used by some authors to account for the historical developments of those meanings. Thus, Steinlauf (1997) viewed Auschwitz in the context of the changing Polish memory (remembering and forgetting) of the Holocaust: from “memory’s wounds” (1944–1948), through “memory repressed” (1948–1968), “memory expelled” (1968–1970), “memory reconstructed” (1970–1989), to “memory regained?” (1989–1995). Huener, in his study of the history of the Auschwitz site from 1945 to 1979, distinguished four periods: (1) “from liberation to memorialisation (1945–1947)”, (2) “Cold-War” (1947–1954), (3) “the restoration of a commemorative idiom” and “internationalisation” (1954 and beyond), and (4) “the growing visibility and significance of Polish Roman Catholic commemoration at Auschwitz (the 1970s)” (Huener 2003: 186). Kucia (forthcoming) proposed that the developments of the meanings of Auschwitz from 1945 to the present had gone through five periods in which different meanings gained prominence: (1) Polish national (1945–1948), (2) international(ist) (from the late 1940s until the early 1970s), (3) Polish religious (from the early 1970s until the mid-1980s), (4) Jewish, clashing with Polish religious and national (from the mid-1980s until the late 1990s), and (5) Jewish, permeating others (since 2000).

The analytical and historical approaches and their categories outlined above constitute the received view of the meanings of Auschwitz in Poland. Yet in order to also account for the transformations of the Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak meanings of the former camp after 1989, one needs to develop a new perspective.

## The meanings of Auschwitz in Central Europe: A new perspective

The new perspective proposes to distinguish three symbolic dimensions of Auschwitz: universal, international, and national. The understanding of these categories varies more or less from the ones used in the received view. In the new perspective, they are conceived of as forms or structures that have been filled with various contents or meanings that have changed over time. The new perspective proposes that the meanings of these categories established after the war and prevalent during communism gave way to new ones after 1989. This change of meanings was facilitated by the demise of communism and transition to democracy in Poland and other countries of the Soviet bloc. However, the major factor of the change consisted in the recognition of the fact that Auschwitz had

been primarily a site, indeed the major site, of the Holocaust—the annihilation of Jews.

### *The universal dimension*

The universal dimension of Auschwitz refers to the meanings of the general concepts that have been associated with that camp. Since the first news of what was happening there reached the outside world, Auschwitz has meant human suffering and death. Since the early post-war years it has come to mean mass murder, extermination, annihilation, crime against humanity, genocide, and ultimate evil. It has become a warning of “Never again!” It has stood as a symbol for peace and against war. It has been a symbol and site of reconciliation.

Before 1989 the general concepts associated with Auschwitz had an abstract meaning in Poland and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. Although they referred to the experiences of concrete people, the very nature of those concepts resulted in their detachment from the concrete. This process was facilitated through the deliberate ignorance of the fact that the vast majority of people were deported to Auschwitz and annihilated there because they were considered Jewish.

The essence of the abstract universal meaning of Auschwitz consisted in the use of the words “people”, “masses” or “millions” in reference to the deportees to and victims of the camp, without specifying who they were. The main manifestations included: (a) the phrase “Ludzie ludziom zgotowali ten los” (People dealt this fate to people) used by the writer Zofia Nałkowska as the motto for her collection of her short stories *Medaliony (Medallions)* (1946)<sup>23</sup> and often repeated in reference to Auschwitz after her, (b) the inscription “Było ich cztery miliony” (They were four million) found on the wall by the Urn of Ashes at the start of the main exhibition, in Room 1 of Block 4 in the museum (1955–1989), (c) the exhibit of human hair shown in that block without a caption explaining who the hair belonged to, and (d) the multilingual inscriptions on the plaques at the monument in the former Birkenau camp (1967–1990) that read “Four million people suffered and died here at the hands of the Nazi murderers between the years 1940 and 1945”<sup>24</sup>. The former concentration and death camp of Auschwitz that epitomised the suffering and death of millions of people was a useful tool of propaganda against all evils and in the name of lofty ideals in Poland and

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<sup>23</sup> Nałkowska’s stories describe the experiences of people in Poland, Jews and non-Jews, who suffered Nazi persecutions in Poland.

<sup>24</sup> This inscription was made in 19 languages: (1) Polish, (2) English, (3) Bulgarian, (4) Gypsy, (5) Czech, (6) Danish, (7) French, (8) Greek, (9) Hebrew, (10) Yiddish, (11) Spanish, (12) Flemish, (13) Serbo-Croatian, (14) German, (15) Norwegian, (16) Russian, (17) Romanian, (18) Hungarian, and (19) Italian.

elsewhere in Eastern Europe where millions of people lost their lives during the Second World War.

After 1989, as the fact that Auschwitz was primarily about the Holocaust was recognised in Poland and other countries of the collapsing Soviet bloc, so-far abstract, almost empty, concepts gained a content, without ceasing to be general. The people who were mass-murdered at the camp were mainly Jews. There were also other victims: (non-Jewish) Poles, Sinti and Roma (Gypsies), Soviet prisoners of war, and others. However, it was the annihilation of the Jews that made Auschwitz a site and symbol of crime against humanity and genocide. Because so many people with a distinguishable identity, primarily identified as Jews, were murdered at Auschwitz, it has become a warning of “Never again!” a symbol against the war and for peace, and a site of reconciliation between nations. The victims were recognised as mainly Jews from various countries but also Poles, Gypsies, Soviet prisoners of war, and others—concrete individuals and not faceless crowds or unidentifiable masses—the message of “Never again!” has therefore also become concrete. This change in the meaning of the universal dimension of Auschwitz was manifested best in the text of the new multilingual inscriptions on the plaques at the Birkenau monument that were placed in 1994. The text reads: “For ever let this place be/ a cry of despair / and a warning to humanity, / where the Nazis murdered / about one and a half / million / men, women, and children, / mainly Jews / from various countries / of Europe / Auschwitz-Birkenau / 1940–45”<sup>25</sup>.

### *The international dimension*

The international dimension of Auschwitz, as understood in the new perspective proposed in this article, concerns what various agents—governments and other national agencies as well as national and international non-governmental organisations of former prisoners and those concerned with the former camp—have considered as binding or uniting the Auschwitz deportees, prisoners, and victims across and beyond the state boundaries. It was also what the agents have found to unite the survivors and their peoples after the war.

During the first decades after the war, from an East European perspective as well as a broader communist one, the most important binding force of the people at Auschwitz was defined as the wartime resistance and struggle against fascism. In the 1950s and ‘60s it was also the post-war ideological and political struggle for

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<sup>25</sup> In 1994 20 plaques were placed with inscriptions in the following languages: (1) Belarusian, (2) Czech, (3) German, (4) French, (5) Greek, (6) Hebrew, (7) Croatian, (8) Italian, (9) Yiddish, (10) Hungarian, (11) Dutch, (12) Norwegian, (13) Polish, (14) Russian, (15) Romani (Gypsy), (16) Romanian, (17) Slovak, (18) Serbian, (19) Ukrainian, and (20) English. In 2002 a plaque in Judeo-Spanish (Ladino) was added. One in Slovene followed in 2008.

the political and territorial and status quo against capitalism, Anglo-American imperialism, and West German revanchism. Lastly, during the entire period of communism it was internationalist brotherhood of peoples, friendship among fellow socialist nations, and the alliance with the Soviet Union.

The wartime resistance and struggle against fascism epitomised by the political prisoners of Auschwitz was the meaning of the international perspective that found the foremost manifestation in the International Monument to the Victims of Fascism—the main monument of Auschwitz that has stood in the former Birkenau camp since its dedication in 1967. The monument was initiated by the International Auschwitz Committee—an organisation of former (mostly political) prisoners then based in Vienna, with branches in Poland and other countries. The centrepiece of the main motif of the monument—a triangle symbolising prisoners situated in the middle of a square slab of black marble divided into four parts forming a cross—was (and still is) perhaps the most visible manifestation of that meaning.

The outlook of the centrepiece of the monument that was designed by an international team of artists and selected by an international jury is, however, due to the communist authorities of Poland<sup>26</sup> (Young 1993). Beneath the main motif of the monument, there was (and still is) another manifestation of the old international meaning as well as of the old universal meaning. It is an inscription in Polish: “To the heroes of Oświęcim, who here suffered death / in the struggle against Hitlerite genocide / for freedom and human dignity / for peace and the brotherhood of nations / in homage to their martyrdom and heroism [...] [T]he Council of State / of the People’s Republic of Poland / awards them / the Order of Grunwald Cross, first class / 16 April 1967”<sup>27</sup>.

The Cold-War international(ist) meanings of ideological and political struggle against capitalism and Anglo-American imperialism were manifested in particular in the general exhibition at the Auschwitz-Birkenau museum in 1950–54. The fight against West German revanchism, that is, the non-recognition of the post-war Western boundary of Poland on the Oder and Neisse and the fact that former German eastern territories became parts of post-war Poland by the Allies’ decision, were frequent topics in the speeches by the prime minister of Poland

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<sup>26</sup> James E. Young (1993: 139–141) claims that the centrepiece of the main motif was placed on the monument “at the last minute” before dedication, replacing “three abstract figures [...] two parents and a child”, symbolizing Jews, that were “moved [...] to the ground”. No matter whether or not and when this change was made, the central motif of the monument is different to what its final model was (see the photographs in Young 1993: 138–139, 140).

<sup>27</sup> Own translation of “Bohaterom Oświęcimia, którzy ponieśli tu śmierć / walcząc przeciwko hitlerowskiemu ludobójstwu / o wolność i godność człowieka / o pokój i braterstwo narodów / w hołdzie dla ich męczeństwa i bohaterstwa / nadaje / Order Krzyża Grunwaldu I Klasy / Rada Państwa / Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej / 16 kwietnia 1967”.

Józef Cyrankiewicz (a former Auschwitz political prisoner) delivered on the site of the camp between 1947 and 1970<sup>28</sup>. The brotherhood of nations, friendship among the socialist states, and the alliance with the Soviet Union, whose invincible Red Army liberated the Auschwitz camp, were topics which featured in the propaganda speeches on the site of the former camp from the late 1940s until the late 1980s.

The collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe made all the old international(ist) themes that had not faded away before an irrelevance. After Poland and other countries of the former Soviet bloc had recognised the Holocaust at Auschwitz, it was the annihilation of Jews from various European countries that became the new meaning of the international symbolic dimension of the former camp. This meaning was manifested best in the text of the new multilingual inscriptions on the plaques at the Birkenau monument, which stressed that the victims of Auschwitz were “mainly Jews / from various countries / of Europe”. The text was agreed upon by the then International Council of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum—an advisory body appointed by the Polish government and comprising experts, Jewish and non-Jewish, from abroad and Poland.

The new meaning of the international perspective on Auschwitz was reinforced by the leaders of Poland and other countries attending the commemorations of the liberation of Auschwitz held on 27 January, especially the 50<sup>th</sup> and 60<sup>th</sup> anniversaries in 1995 and 2005 respectively. It was also strengthened through the United Nations, as in 2005 the General Assembly declared 27 January the International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust. On those and other occasions, the new meaning linked with the new universal meaning: Auschwitz as the site of the Holocaust—the genocide of the Jews of Europe—has now been considered a warning against future possible genocides. The new international and universal meanings have also impacted the national dimension of Auschwitz.

### *The national dimension*

The national symbolic dimension of Auschwitz refers to how states and their agencies have defined the identity of the camp’s deportees, prisoners, victims, and survivors.

Before 1989 the states of the then Soviet bloc—the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and others—defined the Auschwitz deportees, prisoners, victims, and survivors primarily and often solely as citizens of the states which succeeded the ones that had existed prior to or during the Second World

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<sup>28</sup> This instrumentalisation was no longer necessary after (West) Germany’s chancellor Willy Brandt and Poland’s Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz had signed the Treaty of Warsaw in 1970 and the German parliament (Bundestag) had ratified it in 1972. In the treaty, West Germany de facto recognised the post-war Western border of Poland and the territorial status quo.

War. The belonging of these people to the racial categories of “Jews” or “Gypsies”, as defined by Nazi Germany, was considered insignificant or did not matter. The Jews at Auschwitz were Czechoslovakians, Hungarians, Poles, and others, in the civic sense. Citizenship was largely determined by the location of deportation sites on the post-war political map. As the boundaries of states in Eastern Europe changed to a large degree, this approach resulted in cases of reconstruction and construction of identities, some of which had never existed in the context of Auschwitz. Thus, the Jews deported from Ruthenia or northern Transylvania in wartime Hungary were categorised as Soviet citizens or Romanians, respectively.

Historically, the national approach to Auschwitz was first employed and its civic meaning was established on 8 May 1945 in the communiqué of the Soviet committee that investigated the site of the camp shortly upon its liberation by the Red Army (see footnote 1). The communiqué referred to the victims of Auschwitz as “citizens of the USSR, Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Holland, Belgium, and other countries” (quote in Piper 1992: 53). This communiqué, which conveyed the national approach to the victims of the Second World War characteristic of the time (Levi and Sznajder 2002), shaped the national approach to Auschwitz not only in the Soviet Union, but soon also in Poland and other countries of Eastern Europe which fell under Soviet domination after the war. Due to its relationship with communism, this national approach in Eastern Europe persisted until 1989–1991.

In Poland, the national approach to Auschwitz was epitomised in the “Act of 2 July 1947 on the commemoration of the martyrdom of the Polish Nation and other Nations in Oświęcim” (Act 1947). The word “nation” was used there primarily in the civic sense, although in Polish it is also and by far more frequently used in the ethnic meaning<sup>29</sup>.

The civic, almost state meaning of Auschwitz manifested itself through the use of national flags of Poland and other countries in the general exhibition in the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum in Oświęcim and during commemorations on the former camp’s site. The prime examples were 24 flags of various states<sup>30</sup> displayed in the “Hall of Nations”, that is Room 2 in Block 4 (the block housing

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<sup>29</sup> The ethnic meaning of “nation” seems to be common in Poland. It is historically grounded and reflected in sociolinguistic research data that show that religious (Catholic) traditions, ethnic origin (blood ties) and language are seen as the most important markers of Polish national identity. See Törnquist-Plewa (2000: 198).

<sup>30</sup> These were the flags of: (1) Poland, (2) Austria, (3) Belgium, (4) Bulgaria, (5) Denmark, (6) Czechoslovakia, (7) the United Arab Republic [Egypt], (8) France, (9) Greece, (10) Spain, (11) the Netherlands, (12) Israel, (13) Yugoslavia, (14) the German Democratic Republic, (15) the Federal Republic of Germany, (16) Norway, (17) Romania, (18) the USA, (19) Switzerland, (20) Turkey, (21) Hungary, (22) Great Britain, (23) Italy, and (24) the USSR.

the main part of the general exhibition) from 1955 until the mid-1980s and various national flags flown in the former Birkenau camp during the commemorations of the anniversaries of the liberation of the camp from 1955 until 1995.

The national dimension of Auschwitz had a special manifestation in most of the 14 permanent national exhibitions opened in the blocks of the former main camp between 1960 and 1985. Thirteen of them were prepared by and concerned various countries. Only one—“The Martyrology and Struggle of the Jews”—transcended the established national dimension of Auschwitz<sup>31</sup>. The national exhibitions were optional and additional offers to visitors of the main, general exhibition at the Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum. The idea of them, originated in 1946 by former prisoners, was revived in the late 1950s at the initiative of the International Auschwitz Committee. The Committee “felt that information about the Nazi occupation should be encouraged in countries whose citizens died in Auschwitz, by showing the connections between the history of the occupation in a given country and the history of Auschwitz, and showing the fate of the citizens of a given country, as well as the story of the resistance movement” (National Exhibitions 2013). Eventually, the following countries opened exhibitions: Czechoslovakia (1960), Hungary (1960), the USSR (1961), the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (1961), Yugoslavia (1963), Belgium (1965), Denmark (1968), Bulgaria (1977), Austria (1978), France (1979), the Netherlands (1980), Italy (1980), and Poland (1985). Some of these exhibitions—Bulgaria’s, Denmark’s, and the GDR’s—did not fit the intentions of the national approach expressed by the International Auschwitz Committee as there were no deportations from those countries to the camp. Two countries that could tell their national stories of the camp—Greece and Norway—were not represented. Among the countries that established their exhibitions, Czechoslovakia and Hungary did it first, thus utilising the then national approach to Auschwitz. Poland, whose exhibition opened the last, had reinforced the old national meaning just a few years before it became irrelevant.

The national exhibitions were designed and created by various agencies of the countries, following the approval by the Polish government working through its ministry of culture and the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum. Until 1989, after which the exhibitions underwent substantial changes, most of the countries modernised or replaced their exhibitions. Some did so several times.

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<sup>31</sup> The first version of this exhibition, prepared by the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw, opened in the shameful year of 1968, when an anti-Semitic campaign staged by the communist authorities of Poland reached its peak. This exhibition was soon closed. The new Jewish exhibition, created by the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, opened in 1977 but remained inaccessible to visitors at most times (see Huener 2003).



Unfortunately, due to insufficient documentation, it is impossible to trace these developments.

After 1989, the fact that Auschwitz was the main site of the Holocaust and that Jews constituted the vast majority of its victims, which was widely known outside the Soviet bloc, was also recognised in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other post-communist countries. The national approach to Auschwitz, however, was not abandoned but changed its content. Its new meaning consisted in conceiving of Auschwitz as a symbol of the annihilation of Jewish and non-Jewish nationals of various states. This new meaning is best seen in the new national exhibitions that either replaced most of the old ones or were created anew.

The change in the national exhibitions did not occur immediately after 1989. It was a long process that consisted of closing the old exhibitions, designing and receiving approval for the new ones, and constructing them. The process culminated with the opening of the new exhibitions only in the 2000s and beyond.

In 1989, a year of momentous change in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Polish ministry of culture, advised by the Task Force for the Future of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum just established by the minister, ordered the closure of three exhibitions—Bulgaria’s, Denmark’s, and the GDR’s—as not relevant to the history of Auschwitz. Then, between 1990 and 2013 the old exhibitions of other countries, except for Poland, were temporarily closed for major modernisation or full replacement. Decisions on the exhibitions were taken by the countries concerned, usually following advice by the International Council of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum and later the International Auschwitz Council—bodies appointed by Poland’s government that superseded the Task Force.

The first of the new national exhibitions opened only in 2001. However, it was not a replacement for any previously existing exhibition. It concerned “The Destruction of the European Roma”—a major victim group of Auschwitz that has been the most neglected so far. The first newly designed country exhibitions were opened by Slovakia and the Czech Republic in 2002, and Hungary in 2004. A year later, the new exhibitions of France and the Netherlands opened. In 2006, Belgium opened its new exhibition. In 2013, the two latest new exhibitions opened—Russia’s, replacing the old one of the USSR, and “Shoah”, prepared by Israel’s Yad Vashem, on the site of the old Jewish exhibition. Thus, in late 2013, there were in total nine new national exhibitions and one old one—Poland’s. This exhibition, however, has been modified many times since its opening. In 2013, work on a new one was in progress. Three other old exhibitions—Austria’s, Italy’s, and Yugoslavia’s—were closed and also due to be replaced, the last by a joint exhibition of Yugoslavia’s successor states.

The four current exhibitions of Central European countries—those of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia’s—present a post-1989 variety of the national approach to Auschwitz that, conceiving of the deportees to and

victims of the camp in civic terms, takes into account the fact that the vast majority of them were Jewish. The exhibitions vary as far as the content of that approach is concerned<sup>32</sup>, which largely results from the different historical experiences of those countries. The fact that the Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak exhibitions are new, whereas the Polish one is pre-1989, also contributes to differences.

The Polish exhibition, opened in 1985 and modified many times, is entitled “The Struggle and Martyrdom of the Polish Nation 1939–1945”. It was prepared by the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum. Its scope, as indicated in the title, goes far beyond the history of the Auschwitz camp. The topics that take up the most space are the invasion and occupation of Poland by “Hitlerite Germany”, the “German crimes” against the “Polish population”, and the struggle of Poles (in the civic sense) in various fronts of the Second World War, in the underground, and in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and the Warsaw Rising. Added after 1989 are the Soviet invasion and occupation of the east of the country and persecutions of the Polish citizens by the Soviets and (ethnic) Poles by Ukrainian nationalists.

The Polish exhibition is the most conservative of the four. Even in its title, it draws upon the Polish parliament’s “Act on the remembrance of the martyrdom of the Polish Nation and other Nations in Oświęcim”—the epitome of the old national approach. The most conservative aspect is the use of the phrase “Polish population” in the old parts of the exhibition, leaving the impression that only ethnic Poles are meant, while Jewish Poles or Polish Jews are omitted. The references to the “Jewish population” in the context of ghettos and death camps strengthen this impression. The part of the exhibition concerning Auschwitz, modified after 1990, calls the camp “the biggest national place of manslaughter and a cemetery of Jews, Poles, and Gypsies”, which reiterates the Nazi categorisation wherein “Jews” and “Poles” were disparate. However, the exhibit “Polacy w KL Auschwitz” [“Poles at Auschwitz”] refers to “at least 450,000 Polish citizens brought into the camp”, mainly “about 150,000 [non-Jewish] Poles” and “at least 300,000 Polish Jews”, of whom “more than two thirds did not survive”. This new national approach is reinforced in the conclusion: “thus the crime committed on Poles in KL Auschwitz makes it the biggest execution place in the history of the Polish nation”<sup>33</sup>. Although the fate of the Jews who were

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<sup>32</sup> The exhibitions also employ different museological approaches and artistic forms.

<sup>33</sup> In civic terms, the death camp of Treblinka, where approximately 800–920,000 Jews, mostly Polish citizens, perished, should be considered “the biggest execution place in the history of the Polish nation”. The total loss of Poland’s population during the Second World War is estimated at 5.6–5.8 million (almost 16% of the entire estimated pre-war population), including 2.7–2.9 million Jews (77–88% of their estimated pre-war number) and 2.92 million non-Jews, mostly ethnic Poles (9% of their estimated pre-war number) – 2.77 million of them at the hands of the Germans and 150,000 at the hands of the Soviets (Materski and Szarota 2009: 9).

citizens of Poland during the Second World War and, particularly, in Auschwitz is now explicitly referred to in the Polish exhibition, one may argue that the distinctiveness of the Holocaust in Poland and the annihilation of Polish Jews at Auschwitz in particular could be elaborated further.

The Czech and Slovak exhibitions opened in 2002 on the site of the former Czechoslovak one are prime examples of modern historical exhibitions.

The exhibition of the Czech Republic is entitled “Prisoners from the Czech Lands at Auschwitz”. It was prepared by the Terezín Memorial—the Czech institution whose aim is to preserve the memory of the victims of Nazi persecution during the Second World War and which has dealt with the Holocaust since the early 1990s (Frankl 2013; Sniegon 2014). The exhibition begins with an outline of the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the establishment of the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia”, and the history of anti-German resistance. Its main part presents the fate of three categories of “prisoners from the Czech Lands at Auschwitz”, which was the main deportation site from the “Protectorate”—(ethnic) Czechs, mostly members of the resistance; Czech and other Jews deported through the ghetto-camp of Theresienstadt; and “most of the indigenous Roma population of Bohemia and Moravia”. This contemporary civic national approach is reinforced through numerous exhibits, including the national flag and an inscription: “For the citizens of the Czech Republic[, the] Auschwitz concentration camp conjures up the most cogent symbol of repression during the years of the Nazi occupation, a place steeped in the suffering and death of tens of thousands of victims from the Czech lands”.

The exhibition of Slovakia entitled “The Tragedy of Slovak Jews” was prepared by the Museum of the Slovak National Uprising in Banská Bystrica—the institution that has dealt with the Holocaust in Slovakia since 1992 (Długoborski 2002; Paulovičová 2013; Sniegon 2014). It is the most articulate of the four about the annihilation of Jews, focusing on Auschwitz, which was the principal deportation site of the Slovak Jewry. The exhibition also deals with the annihilation of the Slovak Roma. The main narrative of the exhibition is set in the historical context of the establishment and dissolution of interwar Czechoslovakia, the establishment of fascist Slovakia, the history of Slovak Jews, the development of anti-Jewish policies, and the history of anti-Nazi and anti-fascist resistance with its climax—the Slovak National Uprising. The exhibition deals with the fate of the Jews of wartime Slovakia, making references to the persecution and eventual annihilation of the Jews of southern and south-eastern Slovakia that were part of wartime Hungary. It is a national exhibition created by a contemporary democratic state on its non-democratic predecessor that was complicit in the annihilation of its Jewish inhabitants. This civic dimension is supplemented by new universal accents, such as a quotation from Elie Wiesel—“Forgetting them means letting them die again”—and the call “Never more Holocaust”.

The exhibition of Hungary, opened in 2004, “The Citizen Betrayed: To the Memory of Hungarian Holocaust”, prepared by the Hungarian National Museum in Budapest (Hanebrink 2013), surpasses all in that it confesses the betrayal of the country’s Jewish citizens. It is the most radical variety of the new civic national approach. The exhibition combines artistic vision, modern technology, and historical documents, including photographs from the *Auschwitz Album* of the arrival and selection of a transport of Jews from (wartime) Hungary in Birkenau. The narrative of the exhibition is not linear, but thematic. The themes include the situation of Jews before and after the Nazi German occupation of Horthy’s Hungary, ghettos, and deportations, including those to Auschwitz—the foremost destination. The Hungarian exhibition, like the Slovak one, was created by a contemporary democratic state on its non-democratic predecessor and the fate of its Jewish citizens. It accounts for the Holocaust that occurred within and beyond present-day Hungary, in what was Hungary during the Second World War, thus confessing the betrayal of all its Jewish citizens, also those who had been nationals of other countries (Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia) before the war. The Hungarian exhibition is not only the most articulate of the three about the betrayal of the Jewish citizens by their state, but it also the strongest in its expression of the civic meaning of nation.

## Conclusions

Three dimensions of Auschwitz the symbol—universal, international, and national—have had the same form since (at least) after the war, but had different content before and after 1989 or, more precisely, before and after the recognition in the early 1990s of the fact that the vast majority of the deportees to and victims of Auschwitz the camp were Jews from various European countries, mostly from Central Europe. The meaning of the universal dimension of Auschwitz as a symbol of human suffering, death, mass murder, extermination, annihilation, crime against humanity, genocide, ultimate evil, peace, and reconciliation changed from the old, abstract and nearly empty concepts without a reference to who the victims were to new ones, wherein the content of the general terms derives from and refers to the fact of the Holocaust—the annihilation of Jews at the camp. The old communist international(ist) meaning of Auschwitz as a symbol against fascism, post-war West Germany and Western imperialism and for the Soviet Union disappeared, and the new international meaning of Auschwitz as a symbol or even the symbol of the mass murder of Jews from various European countries emerged. The old national meaning of Auschwitz as a symbol of “the martyrdom of the Polish nation and other nations” but not Jews was superseded by the new national meaning of Auschwitz as a symbol of the annihilation of Jewish and non-Jewish nationals of various states.

The monuments and exhibitions, that belong, respectively, to the material and institutional layers of Auschwitz as a social fact, and are both products and objects of mnemonic practices of various social groups, have absorbed and expressed the various meanings that were given to Auschwitz by such mnemonic agents as former prisoners and their organisations, governments, international organisations, and others. Among them, it is the national governments that through their agencies have shaped the meanings of the former camp the most. And in the future too, it is national governments that are likely to remain the key mnemonic agents.

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# Remeasuring the Distance between Spain and Poland: Similarities and Divergences of Art and Literature Created during Franco's Regime in Spain and Communism in Poland<sup>34</sup>

*Matylda Figlerowicz*

The differences between Eastern and Western Europe tend to be taken for granted when analyzing the history of the 20th century. This is also the case of Poland and Spain, two countries situated on the opposite sides of the continent and whose recent history is usually seen as equally distant. The ideologies of the regimes that marked life in the two countries in the past century – Francoism in Spain and communism in Poland – seem to be completely divergent. This attitude, which marks the way of studying history and cultural production of the two countries, adds to the habitual tendency to separate Eastern and Western Europe.

In this article, I would like to propose a comparative study of the artistic and literary output produced during the respective regimes. I believe that an analysis of chosen works by Polish, Catalan and Spanish artists and writers can constitute a verification of the typical way of thinking about the relations of the two regimes. It shows how, in spite of the different ideologies, the experience of an oppressive political system created similar social phenomena and artistic responses. This study is based mainly on the analysis of two elements appearing in the works analyzed: the fragmentary and the abject. I would also like to relate these two concepts to the problem of memory, its abuse and its preservation. In this way, I hope to see the parallels between these creations that tend to be disregarded. I believe that such an analysis is also crucial in order to perceive and understand

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certain contemporary phenomena, social and political, present in both countries, which show the same duality of similarities and disparities.

Nonetheless, before I pass to the analysis of specific examples of literary and artistic works, I would like to approach the polarized vision of the two regimes that dominates in the most widespread image of their relations. In general, this stems from the basic opposition between them, that is, the dominant ideology – it is considered that the Spanish National Catholicism was an example of the extreme right, while the Polish communism would represent the extreme left. Seen in this way, the regimes might indeed seem very distant. This is also how the regimes themselves presented each other in the official discourse – in Poland, Franco's regime was described as an example of oppression, while Francoism claimed to protect Spain from communism. However, the analysis of the socio-political conditions of the two countries under the oppressive rules makes this picture a lot more complicated.

To start with, surprisingly, many of the groups discriminated against or persecuted in both regimes turn out to be the same. One of them was doubtlessly women, who, despite the differences in the discourse, were a highly disfavored group in the context of both dictatorships. In Francoist Spain, the unjust treatment of women seems more obvious from the outset. Franco's regime was openly based on a patriarchal tradition, strongly linked with Catholicism, where women were conferred an inferior position. Moreover, this situation was reflected in the legislation, whereby women had their rights strongly limited – for most legal actions, or even in order to travel abroad, they needed the approval of a man, usually their father or husband. Their social life and education were strongly marked by indoctrination in order for them to comply with the model of daughter, wife and mother that had been forged within the patriarchal tradition. The recommendations of the *Sección Femenina*, that is, the section for women of the fascist party *Falange Española*, can serve as a good example. Keen to instill in women a complete subordination and passivity, it tried to make them perfectly obedient and inert – and thus easy to govern. They were taught about their lack of capacities (for instance, as Pilar Primo de Rivera, one of the most important leaders of *Sección Femenina*, stated: “Las mujeres nunca descubren nada; les falta el talento creador reservado por Dios para inteligencias varoniles”<sup>35</sup>) and about their serving role, within society and in family relations (also in terms of sexuality – as we may read, they were instructed that: “Si [el marido] sugiere la unión, accede humildemente, teniendo siempre en cuenta que su satisfacción es más

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<sup>35</sup> “Women never discover anything; they lack the creative talent that God reserved for the masculine intelligence.” [All quotations translated by the author of the text.] Tereixa Constenla, “Con un pequeño gemido, basta”, *El País*, 10 de mayo de 2009, [http://elpais.com/diario/2009/05/10/cultura/1241906403\\_850215.html](http://elpais.com/diario/2009/05/10/cultura/1241906403_850215.html) [consulted on: 13/05/2013].

importante que la de una mujer. Cuando alcance el momento culminante, un pequeño gemido por tu parte es suficiente para indicar cualquier goce que haya podido experimentar<sup>36</sup>). Faced with socio-political and educational limitations, it was extremely difficult for women to engage in creative activity. However, there are substantial examples of works by women: for instance, in this paper I will comment on novels by Mercè Rodoreda and Ana María Matute, writers from Catalonia – the former writing in Catalan and the latter in Spanish – crucial for the literature of their times<sup>37</sup>. In Poland, the situation of women was rather paradoxical: theoretically communism sought to bring equality, and thus it claimed to promote the emancipation of women. This included actions like opening for women some of the jobs that they were previously legally forbidden to practice – such as working in mines or processing noxious metals – and in general women were encouraged to pursue a professional career (Czajkowska 2012: 127-129). However, there are more factors that should be remembered: that for the same work, women were paid less than men; they were often fired if they got married or pregnant<sup>38</sup>; they gained access to physical work, but not to high posts, especially not in politics. Working was not really a choice for them, but a necessity – even if they had a partner who worked, one salary was usually not enough, and, moreover, they were still expected to be in charge of all the housework (ibid: 112-135). Another action undertaken in order to improve women’s chances for an equal social position was the new law on abortion from 1956, which also permitted abortion in cases of insufficiency of economic means.<sup>39</sup> This law, however, was in practice very often impossible to put to work because of its lack of precision and the great number of bureaucratic obstacles (ibid: 162-164). All in all, the women’s position did not improve significantly, which can also be seen in their scarce

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<sup>36</sup> “If [the husband] suggest a union, consent humbly, always bearing in mind that his satisfaction is more important than that of a woman. When he reaches the culminant moment, a small moan on your part is sufficient to indicate any possible pleasure you might have experienced.” (ibid).

<sup>37</sup> There were recently some important attempts to reclaim the position of women in culture during Francoism. Within visual art, we could recall the exhibition *Genealogías feministas en el arte español: 1960-2010* (Feminist Genealogies in Spanish Art: 1960-2010), held from June 2012 to January 2013 at the Museum of Contemporary Art of Castilla and León; the exhibition’s aim was to redeem forgotten women’s art, which frequently does not have its place in the artistic canon.

<sup>38</sup> Sometimes they had to pass obligatory gynecological examinations before being admitted to work to see if they were not pregnant; these obstacles were also accompanied by difficulties in taking care of their children, as there were not enough places in the nursery schools – some women, for instance, were forced to take their children with them to their workplace or to give them away to orphanages. (ibid: 122-135).

<sup>39</sup> Previously, according to the law from before the Second World War, abortion was possible only in case of rape, severe heart dysfunction or tuberculosis with caseous necrosis. From the beginning of communism, contraceptives were difficult to obtain and there was a huge problem of illegal abortions, which were very frequently a threat to women’s lives as they were performed by unqualified people and in unhygienic conditions. (ibidem: 136-149).

presence among the famous artists and writers of the time. It is also worth noticing that the artistic output of the communist era – especially, though not only, official art and literature – was strongly marked by misogyny. That is, woman did appear in representations, but usually either as unconscious subjects that needed men’s guidance in order to contribute to the new socio-political order, or as the abject Other of the masculine subject (Toniak 2009: 83-93). Thus, even though the official art and literature in Francoism would most likely present woman as absorbed in household chores, and in the Polish communist propaganda she would rather be shown as driving a tractor, her actual situation was quite similarly limited; as Ewa Toniak accurately pointed out:

Analizując zawartość pism kobiecych, szczególnie ich ilustracje—nośnik najważniejszych treści wizualnej propagandy—przekonamy się, że chętnie powtarzany slogan ‘każda kucharka powinna nauczyć się sztuki rządzenia’ oznacza tyle, że ‘wyzwolenie społeczne kobiet’ i sztuka rządzenia nadal dotyczyły oswojonej przez wieki przestrzeni kuchni<sup>40</sup>.

Another example of a group persecuted in both regimes was the gay community. In this case, once again in Spain we can talk about open oppression. Not only was homosexuality criticized in the official discourse for going against the tradition and the Catholic Church’s values cherished by the regime, but also the law directly criminalised it. In 1954 the law called *Ley de vagos y maleantes* (*Law on the idle and miscreants*) was transformed by the regime in order to include homosexuals. According to it, they were considered dangerous to society, and the law permitted imprisoning them in special camps and subjecting them to obligatory therapies, which were to “cure” their sexual orientation (Valiente 2002: 777) – and which included physical and psychological torture. In Poland, homosexuals were not persecuted officially by law, but by actions of the secret service and the police<sup>41</sup>. The secret service’s best-known operation aimed at them was called *Akcja Hiacynt* (*Operation Hyacinth*), and took place in the years 1985-1987. However, invigilation was, in all probability, present throughout the whole regime (ibid: 271-273). It consisted mainly in the compilation of personal information about the invigilated homosexuals and threats of interrogations made by the secret service. The aim was to, thanks to the use of the gathered information, have the possibility

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<sup>40</sup> “Analyzing the contents of the women’s magazines, especially their illustrations – a carrier of the most important components of the visual propaganda – we will realize that the eagerly repeated slogan ‘each [woman]-cook should learn the art of governing’ means simply that the ‘social liberation of women’ and the art of governing still referred to the domesticated through centuries space of the kitchen.” (ibid: 121).

<sup>41</sup> To this political oppression also added the cultural situation and social conventions, which were marked by the strong position of Catholicism in the society. Fiedotow (2012: 241).

to blackmail the invigilated into becoming informers of the secret service or to make them refrain from political activity. In both regimes it was therefore not only impossible to create official gay communities, but also the personal life of those not identifying with the heteronormative standards was largely interfered with. Therefore, the gay community was another silenced and repressed group, in case of each of the regimes by different means, but in a similar intent to control society and suppress the different voices, deadened by the clear and loud official discourse.

Another aspect important when it comes to the disadvantaged groups is social divisions. In theory, both regimes claimed to be eager to found their actions on justice and social harmony. The class problem was one of the main points of the communist discourse: supposedly, the working class was promoted, and through this means the regime was aspiring to achieve complete social coherence. This last aim was analogous to some of the Francoist intents, where the state claimed to be constructing a classless society – for instance, as the Catalan intellectualist and art historian Alexandro Cirici observed, “el mito fundamental con el cual el arte tenía que dar a la clase media una sensación de protagonismo histórico, era el mito de la negación de las clases sociales”<sup>42</sup>. This is also why certain actions in both regimes prove to be similar, like the creation of housing where the social classes would mix. However, in both regimes the social integration and coherence was only a fiction – as Norman Davies observes in the case of Poland: “claims that Poland has a classless society are belied by the most obvious evidence. The new ‘Red bourgeoisie’, the ‘New Class’ [...] enjoys incomes and social benefits far beyond the reach of the working man” (Davies 1984: 647). Thus, a system is created where those who do not support the regime are discriminated against and deprived some of their rights, denied the possibility to hold the most important public positions, and are generally living in worse economic and social conditions.

On the other hand, however, some of the types of discrimination differ depending on the regime. In Poland, the Catholic Church was also persecuted and, for instance, those who attended religious services or baptized their children were prone to have problems in their professional career. Nevertheless, in relation to the discriminations described before, it should be noted that the Church, at the same time as being discriminated against, was also discriminatory, as it presented the patriarchal and homophobic way of thinking which also dominated in the policies of the dictatorship<sup>43</sup>. As for Francoist Spain, the discrimination also concerned the

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<sup>42</sup> “The foundational myth thanks to which the art had to give to the middle class a sense of historical prominence was the myth of the negation of the social classes.” Cirici (1977: 15).

<sup>43</sup> It is worth reflecting on the impact that this duality has on the present society. It could be argued that the difficulties in introducing social changes in today’s Poland – like changes that would bring equality to the situation of women and the LGBT community – are related to it. This is because the

historic and linguistic communities, especially the Catalan and the Basque, which were deprived of such rights as using their own language in public situations, including even being forced to change names and surnames into Spanish versions.

In all these cases, the significant influence of the discrimination during the regimes is still visible nowadays. In the Polish case, we can observe that there is yet a lot to be done in terms of discrimination against women and the LGBT community. While in Spain these issues in general are more advanced at both legal and social levels, it can be seen, for instance, that a hostility persists towards the communities searching for more autonomy or independence, as if the Francoist motto about “Una, Grande y Libre” (“One, Great and Free”) Spain still had its echoes in the contemporary society.

In general, therefore, it can be stated that the socio-political situation in both regimes has been marked by a great deal of discrimination of many kinds and at various levels. Moreover, the discrimination in Francoist Spain and communist Poland turns out to have many points in common. As a result, the social relations in both systems were based to a great extent on violence and oppression, on control and prohibitions. In relation to this, the conditions of everyday life also prove to be alike in both cases. The limitations, which spread from the lack of liberty of speech to the shortage of basic products, were shared by the inhabitants of both countries – or rather at least by those who did not make up part of the privileged groups of both regimes.

Likewise, in both cases the official art and literature constituted part of the repression and violence that the state directed at the society. It was an element of the discourse of the regime, and it can be seen as an instrumental use of artistic and literary output in order to give a clear, propagandist message. The requirement of the clarity of the message made the official art of both regimes acquire a similar formal structure: in both cases, visual art had the obligation to be figurative, while literature was expected to be a clear narrative, always privileging the ideological message over artistic experiments (Możejko (2001: 14-43); Cirici (1977 11-12); Hernández (1995: 34-41)). The differences in ideology did lead to some crucial differences when it comes to the topics represented – for instance, the Spanish propaganda was centered on notions such as tradition, nation, family and religion, while communist art had to, above all, portray the working class. Nonetheless, the propaganda role made visual art and literature acquire a similar function: the creation of a narrative about the past and the present according to the discourse of

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communist era accustomed a great amount of people to the Church being against oppression, thus strengthening the links between the religious authorities and the society, and incrementing the influence of traditional rules in the socio-political life.

the oppressive power. In consequence, this artistic output can be seen as a violation of memory, its abuse, which excludes all these who were not accepted within the regime.

I would like to focus my attention on works of art and literature that did not follow these official outlines but offered another kind of memory, also using different formal solutions. Below, I would like to study above all the motifs of the fragmentary and the abject, which prove to be of great importance in the analyzed artistic and literary examples. In this way, I hope to hear the silenced voices, which are not represented as clear messages, distancing themselves from the language of the propaganda. This could allow the memory that went against the official, abusive narrative to be traced.

To begin with, regarding the notion of the fragment, it can be referred to representations that do not offer the full view or a completely transparent message. I am interested in how fragmentation functions at different levels of the works – both as a subject of representation and as a formal strategy of creation. I would like to analyze how the studied images and texts can show the violence and the oppression without creating a unified discourse, rather offering a series of hints and possible solutions.

In relation to the visual arts, it can be observed that fragmented bodies and objects are a common subject of representation for artists of both regimes. The works by two textile artists, Josep Grau-Garriga and Magdalena Abakanowicz, may serve as a good example of this tendency. Many of their works could be chosen to illustrate it, as will also be the case with regard to other artists and writers studied in this text; nonetheless, my intention is to mention only some representative works that could show the general tendencies and characteristics. To begin with, the installation *Retaule dels penjats* (*Altarpiece of the Hanged*) made by Grau-Garriga consists of a metal scaffolding to which figures are attached: made of coarse textile materials, they are representations of mutilated human beings – quartered bodies, deprived of heads and limbs, are hanging helplessly from the cold frames of the scaffolding. The title calls the work an “altarpiece”<sup>44</sup> – it can thus be seen as a travesty of a typical religious altar where the saints evoke their legends and the tradition that has grown upon them. The vision that replaces this religious narrative is a rather macabre image of tortured, anonymous bodies that do not tell more stories than the experience of their present suffering. It is not, however, a suffering typical of Christianity, where it is wrapped in a narrative that leads to a happy, or rather glorious, ending. The anonymity of the fragmented bodies, deprived even of faces that could serve as an

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<sup>44</sup> Moreover, it was designed for and exhibited in the Sant Cugat monastery, which makes this religious context even more clearly visible.

identifying trace, are captured in this powerful image that does not bring hope, but only recalls the pain. The work *Plecy (Backs)* by Abakanowicz is also formed by a series of fragmented human figures. These multiple remnants of human bodies spread through the floor, the inclined backs exposed to the view of the public, making an impression of submission and defenselessness. Abakanowicz's figures are also created of a rough material, which makes the backs seem marked by long wounds or bruises – an image that evokes the common representations of slavery or torture. The spatial organization of the work is essential – the spectator can approach the figures very closely, and looking at them becomes a part of the piece, their back being orientated in the same direction as those of the figures, their body being included spatially to the mutilated multitude. The work of art therefore evokes the inevitability of the presented torture, of making part of this silenced society, without, however, offering any kind of explicit message, other than the personal impression of the spectator.

On the other hand, apart from bodies, objects also become fragmented. This is the case in the works of another famous Catalan artist, Antoni Tàpies, who for instance frequently created works based on everyday objects such as clothing, plates or wardrobes. These elements always bear signs of usage and of the passage of time – broken, torn and stained, they evoke the possible experiences of the people who owned and used them (e.g. *Pila de diaris – Pile of Newspapers*, *Armari – Wardrobe*, *Cadira i roba – Chair and Clothes*). Their lack of entirety and of clear possibilities for determining the factors that led to their destruction may evoke a sentiment of anxiety before this immense number of possible troubling stories. It also alludes to the fragility of things, a trait which obsessed the Polish visual artist and theatre director Tadeusz Kantor. He created a series of *emballages* which generally consisted in wrapping up objects, people<sup>45</sup> or sometimes more abstract things, like in *Ambalaze konceptualne (Conceptual wrappings)*: a work which presented packaging, for example, for the Achilles' heel or the Eye of Providence. The artist himself commented on these works, stating:

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<sup>45</sup> For example in works of art like *Lekcja anatomii Rembrandta – Rembrandt's Anatomy Lesson* or *Małe operacje kosmetyczne – Little Cosmetic Interventions*.



Ambalaze... / Gdy / coś chce się przekazać, / coś bardzo ważnego / i istotnego, / i własnego. / Ambalaze. / Gdy / coś chce się uchronić, / zabezpieczyć, / aby przetrwało. / Utrwalić, / uciec przed czasem. / Ambalaze. / Gdy / coś chce się ukryć / głęboko. / Ambalaze. / Odizolować, / zabezpieczyć / przed ingerencją, / ignorancją / i wulgarnością. / Ambalaze. / Ambalaze. / Ambalaze<sup>46</sup>.

The actions of Kantor can therefore be seen as an attempt to put together the fragments that can still be saved and hide them under the wrapping in order to preserve them. Summing up, in all these examples of artworks it was evident how fragmentation permitted the fragility and the suffering to be shown, as well as the need to save whatever is possible, even if these are only mutilated bodies or scraps of materials marked by human activity.

Moving on to the analysis of the fragmentary within literature, we could, first of all, see the fragmentary narrative as a way of recalling memories, of telling the necessarily incomplete story of one's life. An example of this strategy is the novel *La plaça del Diamant* by Mercè Rodoreda. It is constructed as an oral narration of the main character, who is relating her life experience, which includes living through the Spanish Civil War and Francoism. Her discourse is formed according to the ways in which the memory functions: there are inevitable gaps and imprecisions, and some of the memories are exposed more than others, as the importance given to them depends on the emotions that accompanied the experience and on the feelings that are present at the moment of recollection.<sup>47</sup> The subjective perspective that is created is that of a woman suffering a discrimination that is never named. However, her narrative also hints at another kind of experience through the contacts of the main character with other people, thus creating a mosaic of different life events and different points of view, each of them presented through fragments, glances, scraps of conversations, not full lineal stories. A similar use of the fragment is also visible in the trilogy *Los mercaderes* (*The Merchants*) by Ana María Matute, especially in its last part, *La trampa* (*The Trap*). In this novel, the writer presents a series of fragments of memories, stories and conversations recalled by different characters, mingled together and

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<sup>46</sup> "Wrappings... / When / you want to hand something down, / something very important / and essential, / and own. / Wrappings. / When / you want to save something, / secure it, / for it to persist. / Conserve, / escape from the time. / Wrappings. / When / you want to hide something / deep. / Wrappings. / Isolate, / protect / from intervention / ignorance / and vulgarity. / Wrappings. / Wrappings." Quoted in Pleśniarowicz (2005: 304).

<sup>47</sup> Moreover, there are other important elements introduced by the oral character of the speech – for instance, it also reflects the situation of Catalan, a language banned from official situations and restrained to private, oral use; at the same time, the excellence of the language used shows the dignity of the language that the political power wants to question. See Arnau i Faidella: 1992: 90); Łuczak (2005: 162-165); Łuczak (2011: 69).

intercalated. This use of fragments shows at the same time the diversity of perspectives and of different stories that add together into the tragic image of the experience of war and an oppressive regime, which up till the end can never be told. Moreover, it is interesting how Matute forms a memory of the Spanish Civil War and of Francoism without them being explicitly present – these events constitute a kind of *hors du champ* of the texts: one that is necessary to understand them, but which never appears in the center of the picture. Another way of exploring the uses of the fragment is offered in the prose by Tadeusz Konwicki, for instance in his novel *Mala apokalipsa (A Minor Apocalypse)*. Even the title signals something reduced, a “small”, “minor” end of the world, which can be seen as one of countless little apocalypses which would add up to something definitive and grand. The novel presents one day of a character who is convinced to perform self-immolation in order to protest against the regime. A fragment of a day, which is only a little piece of his life, and offers just a glimpse of his personality – and of the entire system and the society – through fragmentary conversations, recollections, and reflexions that fill the depicted hours.

The examples of art and literature analyzed here show the power that the fragment has as a means of artistic expression. A clear narration, aspiring to be a complete version of a story, tends to bring an exclusion of certain experiences. The fragmentary, that is a necessarily subjective, unclosed vision, offers the public the possibility of a constant actualization of the message. It creates a dynamic kind of memory, one that does not give answers but rather brings up questions that need to be reflected upon. It proves to be a potent strategy when it comes to reclaiming the rights of the discriminated groups – not creating a straightforward narrative that would simplify the problem (and would not get past the censors) but instead introducing the reader or the spectator to the complexity of the problematic and leaving them to their own judgment.

The second notion that I find crucial to the artistic and literary creation of Francoist Spain and communist Poland is the abject. This is a concept that is very frequently described theoretically. I would like to mention only a few aspects of this, which were depicted by Julia Kristeva. To begin with, the abject introduces the complex dialectic between what one sees as one’s own and as foreign, other. As Kristeva states:

De cet élément, signe de leur désir, 'je' n'en veux pas, 'je' ne veux rien savoir, 'je' ne l'assimile pas, 'je' l'expulse. Mais puisque cette nourriture n'est pas un 'autre' pour 'moi' qui ne suis que dans leur désir, je m'expulse, je me crache, je m'abjecte dans le même mouvement par lequel 'je' prétends me poser<sup>48</sup>.

Therefore, abjection, even though it is a way of rejecting something, by the force of the reaction also relates closely the subject with the object of their disgust, thus being at the same time constitutive and destructive for the "I". Moreover, as described by Kristeva, it also has an important social dimension. As the author observes: "L'abjection, elle, est immorale, ténébreuse, louvoyante et louche: une terreur qui dissimule, une haine qui sourit, une passion pour un corps lorsqu'elle le troque au lieu de l'embraser, un endetté qui vous vend, un ami qui vous poignarde..."<sup>49</sup>. Thus, the abjection is based mainly on the hypocritical, treacherous character of the rejected thing. This dimension is significant when considering the context of the regimes, where the grand words from the official discourse and the values that were preached were extremely distanced from the actual situation of life in the oppressive system.

Bodily liquids and excretions were described as examples of what human beings find abject. These secretions have a marked presence within the analyzed visual art created under the two regimes. First of all, we could trace the appearance of excrement in the works. They are represented, for instance, in Tàpies's paintings such as *Cos de matèria i taques taronges* (*A Body from Matter and Orange Stains*). This image shows part of a human body, with the feet already out of the pictorial field and the head invisible below a thick layer of paint covering the upper part of the canvas. The whole picture is kept in a subdued gamut of ochers and greys, with a stain of stronger brown color, which alludes to the excrement evacuated from the represented body. The colors and the image, the body fading into them, with the excretions distinguished from the background, gives a general impression of filthiness and sliminess. Within Polish art, an example could be Kantor's work *Plótno i gołąb* (*Canvas and a Pigeon*) from the series *Wszystko wisi na włosku* (*Everything is Hanging by a Hair*), in which we can see a pigeon sitting on the top of the canvas and its excrement dribbling down the surface of the painting, otherwise empty. What is crucial is the contrast of the

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<sup>48</sup> "This element, the sign of my desire, 'I' do not want it, 'I' do not want to know anything about it, 'I' do not assimilate it, 'I' expulse it. But because this aliment is not an 'other' for 'me', which I am only in my desire for it, I expulse myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself by the same movement through which 'I' try to establish myself". Kristeva (1980: 10-11):

<sup>49</sup> "Abjection, it is immoral, gloomy, evasive and shady: a terror which dissimulates, a hatred that smiles, a passion for a body which trades it instead of kissing it, someone indebted that sells you, a friend that stabs you..." (ibid: 12).

cleanliness of the canvas and the pigeon's excretions, which, even though they occupy only a small part of the surface, dominate visually and decide on the whole character of the representation. The pigeon itself is a bird linked with the cities, with the dirtiness of the streets and the buildings, and the constant threat of getting dirty for those who pass through the streets. Both of these pieces of art, therefore, expose what is dirty and disgusting, but at the same time strongly linked with everyday life. The images capture the attention of the public through their repulsive character, and even though they provoke rejection, they at least force one to react.

Another kind of bodily liquid described as abject and often present in the visual arts studied is blood. I would like to focus my attention on two works where it is an important motif. The first of them is *Tots els colors del verd* (*All the Colors of Green*) by Grau-Garriga. This is an assemblage where a dark green umbrella is fixed in the middle of a background composed of different shades of green and grey. The tip of the umbrella, however, is covered by a red stain, creating a strong contrast with the other colors of the painting. The bloody stain evokes some kind of violence, which is not determined more precisely, but which interferes with the color gamut mentioned in the title. However, the title of the painting is at the same time a quotation from the song by Raimon, that is, the first line of *El País Basc*, a protest song about the Basque Country. The use of these words as a title suggests an interpretation linked to this country, renowned for its green landscape, exceptional within the Iberian Peninsula, and for its frequent precipitation – the umbrella can be considered an allusion to this feature. It visualizes the contrast between the violent repression of the Franco's regime on this territory and its fame for the green, idyllic landscape. This interpretation can also be linked to a sign partially visible in the background of the image, which seems to allude to the name of the ETA organization, drawn into a spiral of violence by the regime's oppression. Thus, blood seems to be mixed with such an ordinary phenomenon as rain, inevitably marking the lives of all the inhabitants of the Basque Country. At the same time, green being symbolically a color of hope, the image can also suggest that violence – which, moreover, seems inexplicable in the context of the everyday object such as an umbrella – is something that disturbs the hopes for a better future. Another example of a similar representation of blood in visual arts is the different versions of the assemblage *Chleb*<sup>50</sup> (*Bread*) by Władysław Hasior. The central part of these works of art is always a loaf of bread, in which a sharp object is stuck, usually a knife. The cut made in the bread is marked by a red stain, which resembles trickling blood. Mixing the image of blood with food seems

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<sup>50</sup> Depending on the specific version, the title may vary, sometimes appearing, for example, as *Chleb polski* (Polish Bread) or *Chleb życia* (The Bread of Life).

abject, as it combines what is usually let inside by a human being with what tends to be rejected whenever it becomes visible. Bread in the Polish imaginary – as in many other countries – is also a symbol of everyday food and everyday life in general. This is why the violence aimed at it seems to be directed at the entire basic, common life. Thus, we can see that Hasiór and Grau-Garriga in their reference to blood are using everyday objects, in this way relating the abjection and the violence to the most common everyday situations – similarly to the case of Tàpies and Kantor, who also depicted the abject in reference to common circumstances. In this way, the artists manage to hint at the idea of everyday life as turned into something abject.

The abject also has its marked presence in the literature of the two regimes studied. It plays an important role in the already mentioned novel *La plaça del Diamant* by Rodoreda. It is most visible in the motif of pigeons – these birds, bred by the husband of the main character, begin to take over the whole house, symbolically alluding to many of the character's distresses, like the loss of control over her own life. The pigeons are a cause of strong disgust in the main character; she can smell and hear them in an obsessive manner. However, we can also see an important identification with them – she is called Colometa by her husband, a nickname deriving from the Catalan word for female pigeon, *coloma*; moreover, already on the verge of despair, she lives a moment of feeling like a flying pigeon. This duality coincides with the dynamics of the abject described by Kristeva, with the concurrent rejection and identification, disgust and acceptance. As another example we can take the novel *Cinco horas con Mario* (*Five Hours with Mario*) by Miguel Delibes. This novel is almost entirely an interior monologue of a woman grieving for her dead husband – apart from a short beginning and ending presented by a third-person narrator. The monologue, however, has traits of a failed dialogue, that is, all the thoughts of the main character are directed to her husband, as if he were still able to hear and respond. The reader is, thus, presented with an imagined conversation with a dead body, a vision strongly marked by the abject through the presence of a corpse – as Georges Bataille wrote: “el cadáver, que sucede al hombre vivo, ya no es nada; por ello no es nada tangible lo que objetivamente nos da náuseas; nuestro sentimiento es el de un vacío, y lo experimentamos desfalleciendo”<sup>51</sup>. The corpse, apart from causing disgust, indicates the senselessness of the belated conversation and the impossibility of communication. Within Polish literature, an example of the use of the abject can be found in Marek Hłasko's writing. First of all, we can observe that the writer himself describes the language he uses as disgusting – a language of the official

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<sup>51</sup> “The corpse, which succeeds the man alive, is already nothing; this is why there is nothing tangible that objectively gives us nauseas; our sentiment is a one of vacuum, and we experiment it while passing out.” Bataille (2000: 62).

communist propaganda, at the same time abhorred and internalized by him. As he states in his autobiographical novel *Piękni dwudziestolenni* (*The Beautiful Twenty-Year Olds*), “pisząc to wszystko pragnę zachować język tamtych czasów: ową dziwną mieszaninę slangu, komunikatów urzędowych, języka używanego na wiecach partyjnych i na ulicy”<sup>52</sup>. On the other hand, abjection also appears in his texts in other contexts, like in the short story “Robotnicy” (“Workers”) from the collection *Pierwszy krok w chmurach* (*The First Step in the Clouds*). This tells the story of workers building a new bridge; the whole text is centered on their hate towards the construction they are creating and towards the whole place where they are forced to stay in order to finish it. In the end, when after the completed work they are finally going away from the loathed place, they feel a sudden longing for it, and a melancholy for leaving it. In this way we see that what they hated most turned into somehow dear to them. It is also important that their physical work and the construction they are building is strongly linked with the communist regime and its discourse, which was based on the idea of constructing a new reality through hard, physical work. The three literary examples mentioned are, therefore, a complex vision of the cruelty and the oppression of the regime – though deeply abhorred and rejected, it becomes something of one’s very own, part of everyday life. In other words, the experience of the everyday existence in the regime produces disgust, but at the same time it has to be somehow domesticated, made one’s own in order to keep on living.

Summing up, the analysis presented above demonstrates that the fragmentary and the abject are of a great importance in the analyzed visual art and literature of both regimes. They can be considered very powerful strategies of construction of the works of art as they introduce complex, unobvious relations and meanings. It is also important that these notions and techniques give the public an active role in the creation of the possible senses of the pieces. On the one hand, this is because they create powerful images that can arouse many different responses, but can hardly result in indifference. On the other hand, both the fragmentary and the abject artistic visions mean that effort is necessary from the public in order to propose possible ways of completing the picture.

This is an important trait when it comes to the creation of memory – the participation of the public makes it constantly actualized, and thus dynamic and possibly subversive. This way of creating memory escapes from the discourse of the oppressive regimes; it chooses a totally different strategy, which allows it to step outside of the propagandistic language. Therefore, it does not create a new version of the official art, which would solely change the message – it rather

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<sup>52</sup> “Writing this, I want to keep the language of that times: this strange mix of slang, official communications, the language used at Party meetings and on the streets.” Hłasko (1988: 47).

changes completely the whole site of the battle, creating a different way of communication with the public and of constructing memory.

With regard to the creation of memory of the Spanish and Polish regimes, the fragmentary and the abject are also important in reference to the discriminated groups mentioned at the beginning of the article. This is because memories founded on more complete and transparent representations tend to exclude certain experiences that do not fit into the fixed narrative. The fragment and the abject, permitting the creation of more open and plural narratives, make it possible to include more points of view and experiences – here once again the active role of the public plays a substantial role.

I also believe that the analysis of such works of art created during the regimes is important for today's social and political situation. This is because it recalls the oppression inflicted by the official discourse, thus bringing to light the silenced voices which sometimes still need reclaiming within the contemporary societies. Therefore, the understanding of today's socio-political conflicts can be easier when seen in reference to the past of the regimes – a past which is still not that far away and has its marked presence in many contemporary socio-political mechanisms. At the same time, a comparative study of the artistic output in the two regimes makes it possible to see certain traits that could pass unnoticed in the analysis of visual art and literature created in only one context. This shows the importance of the shared human experience of violence and oppression, which does not depend simply on the kind of ideology that is dominant. It is also interesting to see how the two regimes, despite the apparent differences, shared many elements, because this recognition can be useful in terms of working at common European policies when it comes to approaching the crimes of the regimes and the socio-political problems they have caused that still remain unsolved.

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# Church and Slaves: Questions on memory about the church controlled forced labour camp in Berlin and its commemoration. A case study.

*Jaroslav Suchoples & Ewa Maria Slaska*

## Introduction

Legal systems in many countries are familiar with the definition of a crime of insignificant social danger. According to the Latin phrase *nullum crimen sine periculo sociali* ('there is no crime without any danger for the society'), perpetrators of pilfering or other minor crimes can avoid punishment if a judge recognizes that the social order did not suffer from such breaking of the law<sup>53</sup>. However, the evaluation of a crime as a minor one and deserving no punishment by the court does not ameliorate the sense of injustice suffered by its victim. The material value of a lost object is, in fact, insignificant, however, even the cheapest thing, some travel souvenir, a picture or a post card, a small gift from a friend or loved one can possess great emotional value for a given person. Therefore, its loss can result in a deep trauma that impacts and changes the whole life of a victim of a 'minor crime'. In other words, a criminal act which from the social point of view is minor and deserves no punishment, for a given individual can be a psychologically devastating event with serious, albeit difficult to quantify consequences.

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<sup>53</sup> See, for instance: The German Code of Criminal Procedure. StPO (Code of Criminal Procedure in the version published on 7 April 1987 (Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] Part I p. 1074, 1319), as most recently amended by Article 5 subsection (4) of the Act of 10 October 2013 (Federal Law Gazette Part I p. 3799), §153, in [http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch\\_stpo/englisch\\_stpo.html](http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html) [retrieved on April 7, 2014].

However, the fact that a minor crime remains legally unpunished does not necessarily free its perpetrator from the moral consequence of the act, although the lack of official punishment may act to blur the perpetrator's sense of moral responsibility. And although, theft is theft regardless of the material value of a stolen object, the leniency of the court may also belie the public perception of the thief. It is also worth remembering that the judge does not recognize that a given case of the minor crime simply does not exist, on the contrary, he exonerates the perpetrator. The saddest consequence is that a victim of such a minor crime is left without compensation, sympathy or support unless granted as a result of separate civil action undertaken on the victim's own initiative and expense.

Therefore, in the case of a minor crime that unlikely is to be unpunished, would it not be best for it not to be pursued through the courts? Would it be better to forget the incident rather than keep unnecessary wounds open?

## Historical background

More than 1,200 forced labour camps and POW camps existed in Berlin during the Second World War (Kubatzki 2001: Koschnik 2003: 7). Nevertheless, only one of these was organised, built, owned and operated by the special organization (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft*) created by Christian churches (Oehm 2003: 95-100). For more than 50 years the Evangelical and Catholic churches have remained silent on the issue (Schuppan/Wilkens 2003: 16).

The existence of the camp was initiated by a group of Evangelical and Catholic communities. Eventually, increasing to 39 Evangelical communities and three Catholic parishes (i.e. more than 50% of all church parishes in Berlin) being involved in the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft*<sup>54</sup>. According to available documentary evidence, the initiative for the employment of foreign labourers by Christian churches began at the beginning of 1942 (Oehm 2003: 95-96). However, the birth of idea was more likely originates from soon after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, or, at the latest, in December 1941, after the defeat near Moscow. At that time, it was apparent that the tactics of Blitzkrieg would not give Germany any quick victory and the lack of manpower on the domestic front became more and more severe. Parishes needed workers for everyday cemetery work but also for burials of victims of allied bombing raids. They wanted to provide their members with an orderly and dignified funeral, but for many

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<sup>54</sup> „Zwangsarbeiterlager Hermannstraße. Ausstellungstafeln,” <http://www.ev-kirchenkreis-neukoelln.de/1036068/alias.html?id=1036101> (the link: „Die Ausstellung“), 2 [retrieved on April 10, 2014].

congregations burial fees were also an important source of income (ibid: 95-100, 114).

Initially, at the beginning of 1942, churches employed 23 voluntary workers from Bulgaria and Croatia, but this labour appeared to be too expensive (ibid: 114). Therefore, church officials developed an idea of employing forced labourers, whose overall maintenance (including symbolic payment) was three times cheaper than salaries paid to the Bulgarians or Croatians. As a result, the camp of forced labourers owned by the church *Arbeitsgemeinschaft* became operational in late summer of 1942, though its construction was fully completed only in autumn of 1943 (ibid: 107-112, 115). Its creation coincided, definitely not accidentally, with decisions made in May of 1942 by Hitler regarding the mass employment of forced labourers from occupied territories of the Soviet Union everywhere in the German economic system: from big companies down to villages farms; thus in 1942 the structure of the German national employment market changed rapidly from “normal” to “slave” industry (ibid: 100-103, 108-110; Spoerer 2001: 36-37, 90-144; Küppers/Banier 1942). The camp was located in the district of Neukölln, at the junction of Netzestrasse and GrünerWeg, in the rear, fenced part of a local cemetery (Oehm 2003: 103-113). Obviously the initiators of its existence (principally Karl Themel, the councillor of the Evangelical consistory, and his main supporter Dr Walter Kinkel, the financial plenipotentiary of two Catholic parishes) (ibid: 95-96; “*Geschichte erforschen...*” 2010: 33), animated by personal greed and willingness to provide Evangelical and Catholic parishes with cheap manpower, did not want to show the existence of the institution made public.

The camp consisted of two barracks, which provided space for approximately 100 labourers. These labourers were exclusively males dragged to Berlin from occupied territories of the Soviet Ukraine and Russia (therefore, they were called ‘workers from the East’ or „Ostarbeiter“). They were forced to work in Berlin church cemeteries and in the communal cemetery in Neukölln (Oehm 2003: 115-118; Schepel 2003: 340). They were not aware that they were employed by Evangelical and Catholic parishes and that their camp was operated by the church organization. They were convinced that they worked for communal entrepreneurs (Schepel 2003: 308). In August 1942, Gestapo designated the camp ‘important for the war effort’ (“kriegswichtig”), which meant that its prisoners were there to work and not to die (Oehm 2003: 106-108; “*Das Kirchliche...*”). On the other hand, this only included those workers that were able to work, i.e. those who were healthy and strong. Workers who were ill, handicapped, or became too old were sent to a camp for the dying (Sterbelager) or special hospital (Sonderkrankenhaus) (Oehm 2003: 124-126).

Living conditions in the camp were harsh. Though forced labourers were expected to work and not to die (during the whole period of the existence of the camp, only one person died and it was because of natural reasons), they constantly suffered from the low quality and miserable quantity of food provided by the

administration as well as lack of fuel during cold winter months. The medical care was also poor (ibid: 117-118, 121-126, 140; Schepel 2003: 321, 334, 341-343; "...Den ganzen Tag..."). The work at cemeteries was hard but not dangerous as such. Nevertheless, because of the increasing number of allied air raids, life and work in Berlin became increasingly dangerous (Oehm 2003: 137-142; Schepel 2003: 312, 322-324, 329; Davidova 2003: 355, 357, 359, 362; "*Das Kirchliche...*"). In everyday life inhabitants of the camp were treated indifferently. They were not tortured or persecuted (for this would diminish their working ability), in fact camp administrators treated forced labourers pretty well (Oehm 2003: 118-199, 125; Schepel 2003: 322). However, for the German authorities, they were basically inferior humans (*Untermenschen*) from the East, Slavs who could be exploited as slaves (Oehm 2003: 109-111, 134-136; Schepel 2003: 334).

The camp existed to the end of the war and, then, simply vanished without fuss. Nobody said a word and nobody ever mentioned it again until 1995<sup>55</sup>. The process of grieving (*Trauerarbeit*) began at last more than 50 years after the end of the war. Only in July 2000, the Evangelical Church admitted that organization of the camp was a mistake and that the church was guilty: 'The Protestant Church and its social services themselves employed forced labourers. This was participation in a system of compulsion and injustice. We confess to this guilt' ("Church to contribute..." 2000). The Evangelical bishop of Berlin Dr Wolfgang Huber publicly unveiled the Monument of the Forced Labourers Camp on Sunday 1st September, 2002 (Huber 2003). Since then representatives of all the Evangelical parishes that profited from the employment of forced labourers during the war meet every year near the monument on the National Remembrance Day (*Volkstrauertag*), which has always been celebrated on the 3<sup>rd</sup> Sunday of November.

Each nation and each generation possesses its own problems with uncomfortable facts from the past. Quite often such facts are kept in shameful secrecy for decades and it is a duty of the next generation to discover them, explain and, if necessary, mourn properly. It is senseless to persecute or blame the German people again and again for what they did during the Second World War. However, it is still important to put forward some questions relating more to memory than to history. How was it possible that Christian churches profited from the work of enslaved people? How could it happen that such an inhuman act was kept in relative secrecy for 50 years? And, last but not least, is it possible to speak

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<sup>55</sup> See, for instance two 'catalogues' of wartime camps and prisons in Berlin, Germany and also in German occupied territories: *Catalogue of camps and prisons in Germany and German-occupied territories September 1939 – May 1945*, (Arolsen: International Tracing Service, 1949-1950); Kubatzki, *Zwangsarbeiter- und Kriegsgefangenenlager...The church camp in Berlin-Neukölln* is not mentioned at all.

about broader contemporary implications of the fact that problems with memory concerned Evangelical and Catholic churches in Germany?

## The innocence of the guilty ones

On the 19<sup>th</sup> October 1945, slightly more than five months after the end of the Second World War in Europe, the Council of the newly created Evangelical Church in Germany (Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland; EKD) convened in Stuttgart and issued the Declaration of Guilt ("*Stuttgarter Schuldbekentnis*") (Boyens 1971: 374-375). This document was some kind of confession concerning the wartime responsibility of the EKD for its not sufficiently strong opposition against the Nazi regime. Anyhow, according to its authors, the EKD criticized itself only '... for not standing to our beliefs more courageously, not praying more faithfully, for not believing more joyously, and for not loving more ardently... („...wir klagen uns an, daß wir nicht mutiger bekannt, nicht treuer gebet, nicht fröhlicher geglaubt und nicht brennender geliebt haben...“);' (ibid: 575). In other words, authors of the declaration deliberately limited responsibility of the EKD for crimes made, from 1933 to 1945, by the German state and the German people or in their name to deliberately unclearly defined moral guilt. Whatever co-operation of the representatives of the EKD (pastors, bishops, parishes or other organizations operated by the EKD or connected with the Evangelical church) with the Third Reich was not mentioned. Such a 'small detail' like using forced labourers for different kinds of work – not only these 100 from the camp in Berlin-Neukölln co-owned by the EKD, but also many more who were leased from innumerable other camps situated throughout Germany – was not mentioned.

Authors of the Declaration had serious motives for deciding not to mention any concrete reasons which deserved an apology from the EKD. They wanted to re-build the morale of the German nation, totally broken as a result of the lost war and news about horrifying atrocities committed by Germany during the Second World War. They perceived their own church as one of few German institutions which after the war was enjoying a relatively high reputation and relatively intact moral authority (Greschat 2010: 16-21, 24, 52). It was thus needed in Germany as a stable point of reference by a people demoralized by the complete military defeat, occupation, increasing awareness of the German guilt for war crimes, hunger, destruction and other calamities, which they faced in the last phase of hostilities and in the first months after the German surrender.

Naturally, the lenient attitude of the Council of the EKD towards the question of the responsibility of the Evangelical church for her collaboration with the Nazi regime was also an act of self-defence undertaken in the face of probable accusations of involvement in the wicked activities of the totalitarian state. From

this point of view, it was better to apologize for not praying more faithfully or not believing more joyously and promote, at the same time, the self-image of the Evangelical church as one of the victims of the Third Reich than to admit openly that the EKD as an institution co-existed, in principle, with the totalitarian state of Adolf Hitler and even profited from the abuse of its victims. The Catholic Church in Germany maintains this strategy to this day.

It was relatively easy to lead this kind of policy for several reasons. Firstly, some pastors, like Martin Niemöller (who in October 1945 was one of the main authors of the EKD's Declaration of Guilt, which strongly contributed to the increase of controversies concerning his own person and his views<sup>56</sup>) or Dietrich Bonhoeffer, were persecuted or killed for their own, personal opposition against Hitler's dictatorship and its crimes (Metaxas 2013: 197, 539, 545, 619, 628, 649, 661). They became symbols of the German resistance against the Nazis. The sufferings and heroic sacrifice of these brave people helped to create the impression that this kind of steadfast attitude was characteristic for the whole Evangelical church and that it was, generally speaking, one of the Nazis' victims.

Indeed, such an opinion prevailed for many decades after the end of the Second World War. Secondly, the Evangelical church was not involved in serious crimes committed by the Third Reich. It was difficult to compare employing forced labourers with the holocaust or, for example mass killing of Soviet POWs. Therefore, the forced labour for many decades, until the middle of the 1990s, was recognized not as a real crime, but as an act of insignificant social danger, though morally blameworthy (Zumbansen 2002: 9). This was despite the fact, that during the Nuremberg Trial in 1945-1946, one of the most important allegations against Fritz Sauckel, the General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labour (*Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz*) of the Third Reich, was the organization and supervision of a system which converted millions of people into enslaved labourers. Fritz Sauckel was subsequently found guilty and condemned to death (Spoerer 2001: 36; „*Der Prozess...*“ 2001: 29, 30ff, 74ff, 128, 272-277, 361-364, 412-413). Thereafter, former forced labourers began to file lawsuits in US courts against German companies involved in the atrocities. They demanded compensation for years of humiliation, economic, physical and psychological abuse as well as the separation from their families (Zumbansen 2002: 9). Awareness of this forced labour then became increasingly widespread. It was viewed as one of the most universal war crimes that ruthlessly and cruelly affected millions of people.

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<sup>56</sup> Controversies around Pastor Martin Niemöller concerned his conservative-nationalistic and even anti-Semitic views as well as his support for the Nazi regime at the early stage of the Hitler's rule in Germany. See Schmidt 1983: 84-85, 172-173, 184ff).

In this context it should be remembered that, in Germany, in the first years after the war not only the Council of the EKD, but nobody at all was interested in undermining the moral authority of the Evangelical church, for this was one of the last anchors left to the German people in their totally crushed world. Therefore, nobody in the defeated and occupied country, i.e. public and the Evangelical church itself, wanted to dwell on the question of the forced labourers employed by the EKD during the Second World War and nobody wanted to talk about the church-operated camp of forced labourers from Berlin. During that time, some years after the end of the Second World War, nobody was any more aware of the existence of that camp. Nobody asked and nobody answered. As a result nobody tried to publicize any facts concerning this shameful but tiny detail. Silence and oblivion were better suited to matters concerning this 'small crime', one that was prohibited and morally unacceptable, but presented an insignificant social danger.

*Nota bene*, victims, former forced labourers from the Soviet Union, who could have exposed the churches also stayed silent for more than half a century (this problem will be discussed further in the next part of this paper). The wall of silence meant that there was no public outcry and no discussion concerning such questions as compensation or commemoration.

The position of the German Catholic Church towards uncomfortable facts connected with her institutional involvement in the collaboration with the Nazi regime of Hitler or profiting from the work of forced labourers was similar to the attitude adopted by the German Evangelical Church. Motives for hiding discussion from the public were also similar. For many decades, the Catholic Church did not admit her involvement in various forms of collaboration with the Third Reich. The opposition of particular priests against the Nazis and the martyrdom of such people like Bernhard Lichtenberg or Alfred Delp, to mention only two names of many, were broadly publicized as if this was the official standpoint of the German Catholic hierarchy (Ogiermann 1983: 69ff, 132-215, 247ff; Neuhäusler 1946: 162-163; Feldmann 2005; Hochhuth 1975: 20). Any guilt was, in fact, rejected and engulfed by the silence and oblivion. However, there existed one significant difference between the position of the Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church regarding the question of sins committed during the war by these institutions and their collaboration with the Nazis. The German Catholic Church never issued any official document with words of apology, even if expressed as leniently and vaguely as the Declaration of Guilt published by the EKD.

But what was the point of view of victims? Why, for example, did former forced labourers from the Soviet Union, who had to work in Berlin's cemeteries from 1942 to 1945 as cheap physical workers, also stay silent for more than half a century?

## Silence of the victims

It was understandable why both German Christian churches did not want to discuss the employment of forced labourers during the Second World War, which was especially evident in the case of the camp operated by a special association created by Evangelical and Catholic parishes in Berlin in 1942. The necessity of protecting of its own image, and the public perceptions concerning the importance of their moral authority and ordinary shame, provide sufficient explanations for the silence and, later, oblivion which covered this piece of shameful wartime history of the EKD and the German Catholic Church. But there was also a conviction, on the one hand that it was an unimportant fact and on the other hand—even more significant – that it is enough to stay silent with nobody knowing the truth.

Nevertheless, it could seem strange and astonishing, at the first glance at least, that the victims, former forced labourers from the Soviet Ukraine and Belarus enslaved in the camp in Berlin-Neukölln, also did not come to the public with their memories of the traumatic past. A closer study of this problem reveals that they had serious reasons which forced them to maintain silence for a long time. First of all, it must be remembered that all citizens of the Soviet Union who spent some time in foreign camps or prisons were treated as traitors or, in the best case, as persons suspected of treason. The worst was the fate of the Soviet POWs who, according to the Soviet law, as soldiers of the Red Army should rather commit suicide than submit to the enemy in the battlefield (“Soviet reprisals...”). Soviet authorities regarded them as criminals and after the liberation, regardless of their horrifying experience in German camps many were imprisoned again and exiled in GULAG camps (Oehm 2003: 142). Furthermore, Soviet civil prisoners and forced labourers who after the war came home from Germany or territories occupied by Germany, perceived the fact that they spent some time beyond the borders of the Soviet Union not as a reason of glory, but rather as a potential source of trouble in a country obsessed with foreign spies and other enemies of the Socialist society (Krogel 2005: 139, 142-143; Oehm 2003: 142; Schepel 2003: 324-325, 331, 336; Lachenicht 2003: 43-44).

Besides that, it worked again, though *à rebours*, the mechanism of the recognition of forced labour as a minor crime. In comparison with the fate of inhabitants of Soviet POWs, Jews executed en mass by the Germans, prisoners of concentration camps or, for example, inhabitants of hundreds of villages who were killed as retaliation for activities of the Soviet guerrillas (partisans), the fate of forced labourers seemed to be quite bearable. True, they were dragged from their homes far away, to Germany, but that which happened to them could be perceived almost as a gift from God. Being in Germany, they avoided the horrors of the Nazi



occupation, guerrilla warfare and regular war during Soviet offensives in 1943 and 1944.

It could even be said that for simple peasants, whose life in the Soviet Union resembled the hard existence of the serfs in earlier centuries for example, Soviet peasants possessed no identification documents and they were not allowed to leave their villages without special permission from the authorities (Hildermeier 1998: 422-423, 495, 520, 533, 537), the forced or semi forced relocation to Germany held some kind of attraction. They were able to see a piece of the external world which for the citizens of the Soviet Union was totally impossible and live a relatively safe life for some time at least, despite hard work, 'usual' malnutrition, poor medical care and other deficits suffered in their everyday life. In this context, such 'minor inconvenience' like being taken away from home and family, regardless of its real psychological result, could not be treated seriously. Wartime experience of former forced Soviet labourers was not comparable with the heroism of the Red Army's soldiers or the martyrdom of other victims of German Nazi cruelty. Therefore, they did not try to complain in public knowing that things which happened to them reflected an unwanted, even shameful and suspected element of the otherwise heroic wartime image of the Soviet Union. It was the reason why their pain and trauma was covered by the silence not only in Germany, but also in their home country. Only immediate members of their own families were aware of their wartime experience. Finally, from the point of view of the society which during the Second World War lost about 27 million people or, maybe even more, their nightmares did not deserve any special attention. They survived the war and returned to their homes and families (if their relatives survived). It was a happy ending to a not-too-bad story. There was nothing that needed to be discussed. Several millions of former Soviet forced labourers and labourers from many other countries employed in the Third Reich had to come to terms with their traumatic experience in the silence of their own minds. The 100 forced labourers from the church-operated camp of forced labourers in Berlin-Neukölln, liberated on the 24<sup>th</sup> April, 1945 (Krogel 2005: 129-130), were not exceptions in this regard.

What had to happen to break this silence and oblivion both in Germany and in the Ukraine or Belarus, both of which after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 became independent countries? Why should it happen just around the year 2000?

## The late breakthrough of 2000

Despite the long lasting silence and oblivion, the memory about the church-operated camp of forced labourers which existed during the war years in the capital of the Third Reich did not vanish totally. Information about it survived, for

example, in the form of documents stored in archives of particular Evangelical communities in Berlin and in Brandenburg. Nobody was looking for them, but these documents existed and waited for somebody to discover them and bring them to the public. Also, former forced labourers from the camp in Berlin-Neukölln still lived. Their personal memoirs (shared, if at all, only with members of their own families), like documents from the archive in Berlin, waited for the discovery and the interest of public opinion in the Ukraine, Belarus or wherever else.

It seems that the breaking of the silence which directly after the Second World War covered the question of the existence of the church-operated camp of forced labourers, was possible thanks to a lucky coincidence. Documents concerning the existence of the camp were accidentally discovered during research made in Berlin, in the archive of the Evangelical community of Sankt Jacob by a historian Marlis Kaltenbacher in 1995 (Kaltenbacher 1995: 35-39). However, it was interesting that for 5 years after that nothing happened. Firstly, the church reacted officially in 2000, when Kaltenbacher (2000:7) published a short paper describing archival materials discovered 5 years earlier. Further research, led in various Evangelical communities in Germany, provided evidence that the Evangelical Church in Berlin and in Brandenburg probably also employed forced labourers from camps, which were not administrated by ecclesiastical institutions (Schuppan/Wilkens 2003: 15). According to the testimony of Pastor Jürgen Quandt, the President of the Evangelical Cemetery Association City Centre Berlin (Evangelischer Friedhofsverband Berlin Stadtmitte; EFBS), this event, brought to the attention of the authorities of the EKD, ignited the process of remembering uncomfortable facts from the past (Slaska 2013). This process, created a chain reaction, that allowed for publication of the new declaration of guilt, incomparably more honest than the one from 1945, the creation of a limited program of the moral and material compensation and commemoration for people used by the Evangelical Church as forced labourers (not only in Berlin), and finally provided them or their descendants with the possibility of public discussion about this traumatic wartime experience.

As already mentioned, in 2000, the EKD officially admitted that the German Evangelical Church was involved in the system of forced labour established by the Third Reich ("Church to contribute..."). Bishop Wolfgang Huber, the head of the Evangelical Church in Berlin also publicly stated that it was the highest time to compensate victims of the forced labour employed and used during the Second World War by Evangelical communities ("Schuldbekentniss"; Huber 2002: 5-7). At the same time, the EKD donated 10 million German Marks to the Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility, Future (*Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung, Zukunft; EVZ*) established by the German Government and German companies which employed slave labourers during the wartime period ("Church to contribute..."; "Geschichte der Stiftung EVZ..."; Rötting 2002: 151). This

foundation was entrusted with the task of giving some, albeit not too extensive, financial compensation to former forced labourers. The program of payments was completed in 2006 (*Geschichte der Stiftung EVZ*”).

Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that documents stored in the archive of St. Jacob Evangelical community in Berlin were discovered more or less in the same period as when the general image of the forced labour had changed. As already mentioned, in the middle of the 1990s, former forced labourers living in the USA began to demand financial compensation from German companies for years of enslavement. Thereafter, their suffering stopped being perceived as unimportant. Therefore, it is possible to put forward the question of whether the compensatory and commemorative activities of the EKD (the same as the activities of the German government and companies involved in the Nazi system of forced labour) for forced labourers employed by the Evangelical Church during the Second World War resulted solely from the noble conviction that it was necessary to fulfil still-unfulfilled moral obligations and for redemption of guilt. There is no evidence that the motives of the EKD’s activities were insincere. Pastor Quandt stated that the discovery of the existence of the camp was the main motive for the Evangelic Church to join the Foundation EVZ. However, even in Germany some voices were raised questioning the honesty of EKD’s intentions. According to them, for the Evangelical Church most important was not the redemption of war guilt, but rather its willingness to maintain its positive image and avoid more substantial demands from the particular former forced labourers who could follow an example given by those suing perpetrators and their legal successors in the United States (Zumbansen 2002: 9).

It is necessary to remember, that in the second half of 2000, after the EKD joined the EVZ and archival studies proved that Catholic institutions also used slave labour during the Second World War, the Catholic Church, which denied having been involved in such activities until July 2000, changed its stance. The Catholic Church’s Bishop Conference officially admitted that Catholic institutions in the Third Reich used forced workers (Rötting 2002: 150). German bishops decided to begin their own research and start a program of compensation for the victims of forced labour in Catholic institutions (Hummel/Kösters 2008: 535). However, the Catholic Church did not join the EVZ, but created a separate fund of 10 million German marks to compensate their own former slave labourers (Rötting 2002: 151). Payments were made through the German Caritas Association (Deutsche Caritasverband) (Hummel/Kösters 2008: 521). According to Michael Rötting, a researcher who studied the problem of the compensation of the former forced labourers by German, but also Austrian institutions, thanks to the adoption of this specific procedure, the Catholic Church kept complete control over who would receive her money and which archival documents would be published (Rötting 2002: 151). It could become only the matter of unconfirmed speculations whether the Catholic Church wanted to hide some uncomfortable facts and

distribute financial compensation to the former forced labourers only according to some general principles which she did not want to reveal<sup>57</sup>. Definitely, at least some doubts remained. Will there ever be anybody willing to explain them publicly?

## The commemoration: the current state of affairs

Regardless of the existence of some doubts concerning the intentions of the Evangelical Church, it cannot be neglected that, from 2000, several projects aimed at the commemoration of forced labourers from the cemetery camp (*Friedhofslager*) in Berlin-Neukölln were realized on the initiative of the EKD. Firstly, in 2002, a small place of commemoration – the commemoration stone designed by the sculptor Rainer Fest – was erected more or less on the site of the camp of forced labourers (but now moved to another cemetery diagonally opposite) (Lachenicht 2003: 44-45). The surface of the stone is divided into rectangles bearing names of all Evangelical communities and Catholic parishes involved in the organization of the church-operated camp of forced labourers during the Second World War. Their representatives (Catholic parishes are represented only unofficially) gather at the commemoration stone on each Volkstrauertag, celebrated in Germany from 1952 as a public holiday two Sundays before the first day of Advent to commemorate all those who died in armed conflict or as the victims of violent oppression. Each representative brings with them a small rectangular stone from their own community or parish, and places it on the respective rectangle on the surface of the commemoration stone.

Later, in 2003 and 2005, the EKD provided money for a research project which resulted in the publication of two edited books. One of them, edited by Erich Schuppan, was a collection of scholarly papers discussing the active involvement of the Evangelical Church in Berlin and Brandenburg in the system

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<sup>57</sup> It is noteworthy that according to an official standpoint of the German Bishops' Conference presented in Hummel, Kösters 2008 (535), the German Catholic Church did not join the EVZ, because she wanted to promote, in the possibly most empathic way, her own research projects concerning history of forced labourers used by German Catholic institutions during the Second World War. Besides that, it was stated in this book that the Catholic Church wanted to make her own and separate effort (i.e. not connected with activities undertaken in this regard by the German government and industry) to study and consider the wartime responsibility for her involvement in the Nazi system of forced labour. Finally, German Catholic Bishops maintained that creation of the separate Catholic project of compensation influenced the way the EVZ compensated victims of forced labour in Germany. It was also striking that the publication edited by Hummel and Kösters, besides one unclear remark, did not mention any earlier research made by scholars connected with the German Evangelical Church in 1995-2000 (197).

of forced labour created by the Nazi regime in Germany during the Second World War (including the creation of the church-operated camp of forced labourers in Berlin-Neukölln) (Schuppan 2003). The other one was the diary of Vasylyl T. Kudrenko, the former forced labourer examined by German researchers in the Ukraine early in this century (Krogel 2005): As one of the forced labourers used by Evangelical and Catholic communities for hard physical work in the cemeteries of Berlin, the diary was written during the sojourn of Kudrenko in the capital of the Third Reich. In 2005, the EKD also organized a visit of one of the former forced labourers to Berlin. In 2008, a group of German secondary school pupils from the Evangelical school in Berlin-Neukölln visited one of the former forced labourers in the Ukraine<sup>58</sup>. Their visit was documented by a DVD film *Eine Reise durch die Ukraine (A Travel through the Ukraine)* by Daniel Devecioglu (“Medien über das „Friedhofslager””). Finally, in 2010, near the commemoration stone in Berlin-Neukölln, the EKD constructed a small temporary pavilion where it was possible to see a small exhibition and to learn facts from the history of the church-owned camp of forced labourers and people who had to live there as slave workers. A respective information brochure was also published (“Geschichte erforschen...” (2010).

It should not be forgotten that already in 2001, Peter Wingert made a short, 30 minute long documentary film for the *Senders Freie Berlin* television channel entitled *Von Gnade keine Spur (No trace of Grace)* which discussed the first reactions of the Evangelical church after the publication of documents which proved the existence of the church-operated camp of forced labourers and documented the first meetings with former slave workers in the Ukraine (Medien über das „Friedhofslager”). One of several people speaking in this film was aforementioned Pastor Jürgen Quandt, the President of the EFVB. 12 years later, he was to play a crucial role in activities aimed at the creation of a genuine memorial dedicated to the former Soviet forced labourers from the camp in Berlin-Neukölln. This will be touched upon in a further part of this paper.

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<sup>58</sup> „Medien über das „Friedhofslager” der Evang. Kirche in Berlin auf dem Friedhof an der Neuköllner Hermannstraße 84-90,” <http://www.google.com.my/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CEEQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.landeskirchenarchivberlin.de%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2009%2F12%2Fmedienliste.pdf&ei=qF5GU8niBc6Xrgez-YHgDA&usq=AFQjCNFhYMnK-fnjGFZJQMOWmO-MywA AIA&sig2=FtHLyvBN2fkbgoHEZz4oDg&bvm=bv.64507335,d.bmk> [retrieved on April 10, 2014]. It is also worth mentioning that, in 2006, a group of youth from the Evangelical school in Berlin-Neukölln made their own documentary film. See: „Totengräber wider Willen Das Zwangsarbeiterlager auf dem Friedhof Hermannstraße: Über den Umgang der Kirche mit ihrer Verstrickung ins NS-Gewaltsystem,” <http://www.1-einwand.de/projekt06a.html> [retrieved on April 10, 2014].

On the other hand, the average visitor to the site where the church led camp of forced labourers was situated had to be negatively impressed by the fact that the commemoration stone (the same as many other places of commemoration of the victims of the Nazi regime in Berlin and throughout Germany) was abandoned and forgotten for 364 days in the year. Only on the Volkstrauertag, a group of people gathered there to perform the annual ritual, some kind of rite of late autumn, and the memory about the slaves used by Christian churches in 1942-1945 appeared in the public sphere for a while. But even that was symbolic only for that small group of visitors.

It was also sad that particular inscribed small stones stored in particular Evangelical communities and Catholic parishes which should be displayed on respective rectangles of the commemorative stone during the celebration on the Volkstrauertag usually waited for their annual big day, otherwise remaining forgotten and dusty. In several cases, employees in the offices of particular Evangelical communities were not sure where the stones were stored, though they were usually helpful and ready to discuss the matter (Slaska 2012a). The situation was much worse in the case of the Catholic parish of Sankt Hedwig. Its officials did not want to talk about the use of forced labourers by this Catholic community during the Second World War, as if they were ashamed or still neglecting history (ibid). In this context, it was especially meaningful that no official representative from any of the 3 Catholic parishes involved in the ownership of the camp in Berlin-Neukölln was present during Volkstrauertag celebrations at the commemoration stone from its erection till today (ibid).

In 2012 and 2013, the authors of this paper faced difficulties overcoming the resistance, not to say unwillingness, of the employees of the Evangelisches Landeskirchliches Archiv in Berlin (the Evangelical State Church Archive in Berlin; ELAB) when they were trying to collect information about the camp of forced labourers operated by both Christian churches. Though they were not interested in historical research as such (historical facts were already known), but only in questions concerning the social memory about slave workers owned by the Evangelical-Catholic association of 42 communities and parishes from Berlin in 1942-1945, they were deliberately kept away from original archival documents needed. The employee of the ELAB and leader of the Working Group Cemetery Camp (Arbeitsgruppe Friedhofslager) involved in the correspondence was not co-operative and only advised to read two books published in 2003 and 2005. For almost half a year the exchange of emails with the ELAB resulted in nothing substantial (Slaska/Suchoples 2012-2013). It was true that, indirectly, information about existing archival resources could be found in the book from 2003, but researchers should expect more from the employees of the archive than providing them with the titles of two books. Any possible suppositions concerning reasons behind the mysterious behaviour of the ELAB's archivist remain in the realm of conjecture. Nevertheless, researcher's curiosity, which probably cannot be

satisfied in this case, leads us to ask: why for several months it was impossible to establish any working co-operation with the Evangelisches Landeskirchliches Archiv in Berlin?

## The Sunday stroll or side effects of inquisitiveness

In autumn 2012, Ewa Maria Slaska wrote an essay about a strange place of commemoration situated in a shadowy corner in Berlin-Neukölln, near the old and already unused Tempelhof airport. Fenced and surrounded by old parochial cemeteries, it was hardly accessible for anybody who wanted to visit. Only an information board provided the explanation that the closed area behind the fence belonged to the *Zwangsarbeiterlager* led by Christian parishes in 1942-1945. Slaska's Sunday stroll led to the discovery of the abandoned area of the former camp of forced labourers and this ignited her interest. First she found an information table on the front gate of an abandoned cemetery and then the commemoration stone with a small pillar showing two information caskets. She started her research and step by step started to ask questions and to uncover the nature of the commemoration of church-owned slave labourers. She wanted to know the everyday practice of commemoration, the current attitude of particular Evangelical and Catholic parishes towards the problem of commemoration (how they treated their own small stones and the position of parochial officials towards the commemoration and shameful past) and what place(s) occupied memories about the camp in the public space of Berlin. The essay, entitled *Niedzielny spacer* (*The Sunday stroll*), recollected its author's experience with the aforementioned questions (through meetings, conversations and her own observations) and summarized her not always positive conclusions (Slaska 2012a).

Initially, the essay was to be published in *Tygodnik Powszechny* (*General Weekly*), one of the most renowned Polish Catholic journals. Nevertheless, after an initially positive response to the author its editors demanded the extension of the original text to include the description of the celebrations of the Volkstrauertag in 2013 (Slaska 2012b; 2012c). It is worth mentioning that, in this section added on demand from editors of *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Slaska mentioned that no official representative from any of the 3 Catholic parishes involved in the ownership of the camp of forced labourers had attended the celebrations at the commemoration stone in Berlin-Neukölln. The essay, extended according to the wishes of the editors of *Tygodnik Powszechny* was submitted to them, but the author obtained no reply regarding the publication of her text. After some time, when it became clear that *Niedzielny spacer* would not be printed in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Slaska submitted the same essay to the social-cultural weekly *Odra* (*The Oder*). After a long time waiting for a reaction, a short reply from the editorial board came which

stated that the text could not be published, because it was ‘too personal’ (Slaska 2012d).

There are two hypotheses as to why editors of Polish Catholic and social-cultural journals did not want to publish an essay about the involvement of Christian churches in the Nazi system of forced labour during the Second World War and the indifference of the Catholic Church in Berlin towards the commemoration of slave workers. Hypothesis no. 1 was the most self-critical, but it could not be excluded: the essay was badly written and serious journals could not publish it. Though its author was a professional writer with a long record of publications, even professional writers are not always successful and, sometimes, they write bad texts. However, on the other hand, if a given text does not fulfil standards making its publication possible, the author is usually informed about it quite openly and the editors or reviewers enumerate weaknesses of the submitted article. But in this case, this did not happen. Here, the best solution would be for readers to become familiar with *Niedzielny spacer* and make up their own opinion about it.

Nevertheless, a much more complicated hypothesis no. 2 was also possible: the essay was not accepted because it presented some shameful details belonging to the history of Christian churches and its author wrote also about their ambivalent, not to say indifferent attitude (which was especially striking in the case of the Catholic Church) towards the commemoration of forced labourers they had utilised in the Nazi times. Indirect clues seem to indicate that the second hypothesis could be true. First of all, initially, editors of *Tygodnik Powszechny* did not refuse to print the essay of Slaska. On the contrary, they showed clear interest in it, but they demanded its extension. Only when they realized that the description of the celebrations of the Volkstrauertag in 2013 added on their demand also contained some critical remarks concerning the position of the Catholic Church, they decided to stop further correspondence with the author of *Niedzielny spacer* and give her no reply regarding the ultimate fate of the essay.

If this hypothesis was correct, the matter would concern not only the attitude of particular editors of particular journals towards Slaska’s text, but it would possess some broader context. It should be considered in two, more general dimensions. The first one related to the special, historically justified position which the Catholic Church enjoys in Poland. The Catholic Church, a strong factor in the current social and, *de facto*, political life of the country, was perceived not only as the important moral authority and as a guardian of Christian values. Many saw it as the conservative, anti-liberal power which strained the society in the field of social and personal liberties. Besides that, such questions like the attitude taken by the Catholic Church towards abortion, *in vitro* fertilisation or homosexuals, paedophile scandals, and the controversially lavish lifestyle of many priests and bishops contradictory to principles they preach, divided Polish public opinion. Therefore, it was probable that the editors of journals who refused to publish



*Niedzielny spacer*, especially the editors of the Catholic weekly, did not want to provide ideological opponents of the Catholic Church with any anti-ecclesiastical historical arguments. It was also possible that the publication of the essay would be badly received by the influential Catholic hierarchy and, subsequently, editors of both aforementioned journals would be in trouble (the situation of editors of *Tygodnik Powszechny* would become especially uncomfortable). In other words, because of the fact that the Catholic Church became one of the most important participants of the current socio-political disputes in Poland, it was probably decided that it would be better not to publicize affairs discussed in the essay written by Slaska. Such considerations would make its social validity as well as its literary value negligible.

However, the rejection of the essay by Polish journals could also be seen as an indirect manifestation of the historical policy of the Catholic Church perceived as a global, supranational organization. *Niedzielny spacer* discussed the question of the commemoration of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians enslaved in the camp of forced labourers operated by the association of Evangelical communities and Catholic parishes in the capital of Nazi Germany. The topic did not concern Poland in any regard, but it was discarded by editors of Polish journals. Why? If it was possible to skip the hypothesis about the bad quality of this text, the only remaining answer for this question seemed to be the following observation: the Catholic Church is a supranational organization which promotes its own historical policy aimed at the strengthening of its image and avoiding responsibility for its own sins wherever and whenever committed. The truth about uncomfortable facts from its history represented an obstacle in pursuing this general strategy. Instead, the silence and oblivion were tools which made its implementation possible.

Obviously, a failure with the publication of a journalistic text criticizing the Catholic Church in the country where she enjoys special position, respect and privileges could not be solid evidence for the existence of this kind of deliberately adopted policy. Nevertheless, for the authors of this paper the question why it happened marked the beginning of thinking about the broader significance and context of several indisputable facts concerning exclusively the attitude of the German Catholic Church towards the problem of its involvement in the Nazi system of forced labour and their mutual connection. The supposition that several indisputable, but seemingly unrelated facts (the lack of any declaration of guilt or official expression of remorse, semi-secret procedures adopted by the Catholic fund created in order to compensate former slave workers used by Catholic institutions, the unwilling attitude of officials from parishes in Berlin which during the Second World War profited from the work of Soviet forced labourers towards discussions about this question and their permanent absence during the celebrations of the Volkstrauertag at the commemoration stone in Berlin-Neukölln) were elements of the same puzzle made sense and should not be easily neglected or ignored.

Both supposed dimensions of the wider context of the essay that was rejected by editors of *Tygodnik Powszechny* and *Odra*, which probably influenced their decision, would unexpectedly connect the remembrance about the wartime camp of forced labourers and the question of commemoration of enslaved Soviet workers with problems going beyond the question of Germany dealing with its Nazi past. If the hypothesis suggested here was correct, then the remembrance and social memory about their fate and perpetrators of their sufferings would become victims of the involvement of the Catholic Church in current political disputes locally as well as worldwide (any country where she is an important factor of the social and political life, for example, in Italy or in Latin America) as a result of her general historical policy. They would be sacrificed on the altar of 'higher needs and values', the same as undoubtedly happened in Germany, from 1945 to 2000. In this period, the strategy of silence and oblivion was adopted by both German Christian churches seeking for the maintenance of their moral authority and trying to bleach their images tarnished by cases of their wartime institutional co-operation with the Nazis.

Here, it would be useful to spend a little time to reflect on an almost philosophical question of the mutual relation of politics (both in domestic and international dimension) and truth. However, this goes too far beyond the scope of this paper.

## People who wanted to remember

Memories about past events and people live as long as those who want to remember them exist. Obviously, it is even better if they are socially engaged and possess the ability to preserve and disseminate the knowledge about facts which should not be forgotten. Memories about the church-operated camp of forced labourers in Berlin reappeared after many decades, because it happened that some Germans, despite the policy of silence and oblivion adopted by both Christian churches, were interested in the fate of workers misused by Evangelical and Catholic institutions as cheap slave workers. Firstly, from 1995, historians, like Marlis Kaltenbacher, discovered the truth about the involvement of both churches recorded by documents stored in church archives. Then, from 2000, the German Evangelical Church, pressed by indisputable facts, involved herself in activities aimed at the commemoration and compensation of all forced labourers used by Evangelical institutions during the war. Even the Catholic Church, albeit silently and without showing any true remorse in public, agreed to bear responsibility for the wartime crimes committed in its name and began to pay some compensation.

However, regardless of the sometimes contested sincerity of these institutional activities and their limited results, the most important aftermath of all this chain of events for the preservation of memories about the camp in Berlin-

Neukölln was the appearance of a group of people (albeit not numerous) who wanted to commemorate the victims of this crime committed by both Christian churches and create something genuine and durable. They were connected both with the Evangelical and Catholic Church. Some of them were not able to do much besides giving moral support to those who could do something more substantial. In this context, it is necessary to remember, for example anonymous Susanne, a volunteer working for the Catholic Parish of Sankt Michael in Berlin, met by Ewa Maria Slaska at the commemoration stone during the celebrations of the Volkstrauertag in 2012 (Slaska 2012a). Despite a restrictive attitude taken by officials from Catholic parishes towards attempts to interview them on the question of their participation in annual commemorative meetings on the site where the church-operated camp of forced labourers was organized, Susanne encouraged Slaska to continue her efforts aimed at the public and possibly full explanation of the involvement of Catholic parishes from Berlin in the Nazi system of forced labour during the Second World War. She expressed her happiness that, finally after decades of silence and oblivion, somebody had come to her church to talk about the shameful past (ibid). Obviously, these warm words did not have the power of any official statement. It was even hard to maintain that what Susanne disclosed during a private conversation with Slaska was proof of her civil courage. It was also hard to state whether her view should be recognized only as an individual case or rather as evidence that, in Germany, the country in which existed dozens of thousands of slave worker camps during the Nazi times, the social consciousness concerning the forced labour had started to change. Authors of this paper did not lead respective broad sociological studies. Nevertheless, further developments proved that she was not the only one who thought in that way. One way or the other, for Susanne it was not a minor offense with minimal or no social significance, but a severe crime, which had moral weight, especially when it was committed by Christian churches, and thus could not be overestimated. She was convinced that this crime should be publicly discussed in the Catholic environment, its victims decently commemorated and perpetrators clearly condemned *pro public bono*, i.e. to satisfy the sense of justice and as a caution for the future.

In May 2013, it surprisingly transpired that other people who wanted to remember also existed. However, this time they possessed the ability to do something more than only to express their private opinions. The initiative came from the Evangelical Church or rather, to be more precise, from the Evangelischer Friedhofsverband Berlin Stadtmitte and its President Pastor Jürgen Quandt. When it was decided that areas of two old and already unused Evangelical cemeteries situated in direct vicinity of the forced labour camp were to be sold to the city of Berlin, he used the occasion to order an archaeological examination of these cemeteries and the ground lot connecting them, i.e. the place during the Second World War where the camp was constructed (Slaska 2013). As a result of Pastor

Quandt's decision, from 2<sup>nd</sup> to 6<sup>th</sup> September 2013, professional excavations ordered by the EFBS were conducted (Slaska "Ausgrabungen..."; Strauss 2013). Besides two professional archaeologists who were paid for their work, about 15-20 volunteers participated in this project (Slaska: "Ausgrabungen..."; Kittan 2013). They were students, people from church associations, residents from neighbouring streets, and so on. They were willing to know the past, wanted to remember and use the opportunity to do something important in order to preserve the memory about the camp. It was also significant that excavations attracted the attention of local media, which at least helped to disseminate information about the history of the place searched by archaeologists and their voluntary assistants in Berlin.

It was even possible to say that as a result of test excavations the significant part of the camp was dug out. The number of discovered artefacts connected with the existence of the camp was overwhelming. It became clear that it would be necessary to make an entire excavation next year and create a real museum or memorial where they could be properly identified, described and displayed. However, excavations and all possible future activities aimed at the commemoration of the slave workers from the camp in Berlin-Neukölln would not be possible without Pastor Quandt's conviction that the preservation of memories about the shameful facts from the wartime history of the Evangelical Church in Berlin was not only just, but also socially indispensable. He summarized the motives which lay behind the activities undertaken during an interview given to Ewa Maria Slaska on the 19<sup>th</sup> August, 2013 (Slaska 2013). Quandt stated that the EFBS and he, personally, had become deeply involved in the idea of the creation of a solid place of commemoration to preserve the memory of the slave workers used by Christian Churches in 1942-1945. Both nearby-situated cemeteries would be sold to the city of Berlin, which is a part of the commercial scheme aimed at the compensation of expropriated owners of some ground lots needed for the construction of a highway. Anyhow, the ground lot where the camp existed would not be sold and the EFBS intended to create a respective museum or memorial there. He also noted that, before excavations could be commenced, it was necessary to clean the whole area of the former forced labour camp because it was totally littered (the EFBS paid 40,000 Euros for its cleaning). Finally, he noticed that it was obvious for him that neither he nor EFBS were guilty of that which happened to Soviet slave workers during the war. Nevertheless, he felt that the moral responsibility of the Evangelical Church was clear and did not expire. Therefore, as a person who believed in this kind of moral obligation, he wanted to do everything possible to preserve the memory both about the victims of the church-operated camp of forced labourers and about the perpetrators of their suffering (*ibid*).

The honesty of Pastor Quandt's testimony and confessions, based mainly on facts, is indisputable. It seems that after decades of silence, oblivion and, initial commemorative activities, the results of which could be questioned, estimated as

temporal or socially meaningless, the time is coming to realize a solid plan allowing for the preservation of memory about slave workers used by Christian churches for future generations. However, it is evident that without the existence of the people who want to remember, this would be not possible.

It is noteworthy, in this context, that Pastor Quandt, the volunteers participating in excavations organized in September 2013, and Susanne from the Catholic parish of Sankt Michael, belong to generations born after the Second World War. Therefore, none of them can be blamed, in any regard, for that which happened in Germany during the Nazi times. However, they felt themselves, to recall once more the words of Pastor Quandt, to be morally obliged to remember the sins of their forefathers and to do what they can to preserve memory about them and about the victims. It is also clear that without the work of earlier historians, who discovered and published documents about the camp in Berlin-Neukölln, it would be impossible to break the veil of silence and oblivion that enveloped that issue. Even the most limited program of commemoration and compensation could not be realized. Only thanks to this and to the increasing international consciousness that forced labour of innocent people is a serious crime, the people who do not want to forget could know what they want to remember and why it is important – for them personally as well as for their society.

Nevertheless, is it necessary to broaden the group of those who want to remember, which at the moment is not a numerous one? Would it make any sense to seek for new ‘believers’? Who could be a potential target of promotional activities aimed at the protection of the social memory about the church-operated camp of forced labourers?

## Commemoration: Is it always necessary? For whose benefit?

The problem of the socially valid commemoration of the victims of the forced labour camp in Berlin-Neukölln still remains. Several projects aimed at their commemoration were realized, but hitherto results seemed to be limited, in the best case. The place of commemoration (the commemoration stone, an information casket and a small temporal pavilion) was erected, but the place itself was usually forgotten behind the fence which surrounded a ground lot where the camp was situated. Two books were published, but they were hardly accessible (until recently, it was possible to find them only in a small library of the Documentation Centre for the Nazi Forced Labour, the Dokumentazionzentrum des NS-Zwangsarbeit, situated at the remote part of Berlin, in the district of Schöneeweide). Educational projects, like the aforementioned visit of a group of

German youth in the Ukraine or the visit of a son of one of the Ukrainian forced labourers in Berlin, possessed only an occasional character or transitional significance. Therefore it was possible to ask who, in fact, the real benefactor of all these initiatives was?

Put cynically, it could be stated that, first of all, the EKD, which did its homework and, thanks to that could maintain or even improve its positive image, was a clear benefactor. Also, people involved in particular activities connected with the commemoration of church-owned slave workers could be mentioned as those who were main benefactors of a limited program of commemoration which brought only some temporal or limited results. They could make the list of their publications longer, satisfy their private or professional curiosity or, simply, earn money for their work. However, such an answer would not only be cynical, but also not correct. Finally, the erection of the commemoration stone has meant that, once a year, representatives of 39 Evangelical communities, as well as several inhabitants of Berlin, voluntarily gather around it. Thanks to them, memories about the guilt of Christian churches and sufferings of enslaved people from the Soviet Union did not vanish and the local society, at least, obtained some chance to reflect on the shameful part of the past of these institutions which for a long time pretended to be moral authorities. The edition of the diary of Vasyl T. Kudrenko allowed him to become the voice, albeit not very loud, of all forced labourers who had to work during the Second World War in Berlin. For him personally, it was probably the only occasion to have his diary published, which reflected important moral compensation for his uneasy and unwanted wartime experience. The book, edited by Erich Schuppan provided a lot of information about the use of forced labourers by church institutions, and about the camp in Berlin-Neukölln itself, during the Second World War. Everybody who wanted to learn more about this painful problem could reach it in the Dokumentationszentrum NS-Zwangsarbeit (now, also in other libraries and available for purchase). Even the Catholic Church, whose official representatives consequently have refused to participate in the celebrations of the Volkstrauertag together with their Evangelical counterparts, or talk about the past, under the pressure resulting from the publicizing of unquestioned facts concerning her involvement in the Nazi system of forced labour, felt obliged to create the fund to compensate her former slave workers. Therefore, the group of the benefactors is relatively numerous, even if hitherto results of commemoration activities have to be, objectively, recognized as limited or, subjectively, as not fully satisfactory to those who were concerned.

As already mentioned, in Berlin, there are hundreds of smaller and larger places of commemoration of the victims of the Nazi regime (Tag des Offenen Denkmals 2013). Many of them are totally abandoned or visited rarely, only on occasions provided by some anniversaries. Others are treated by many, not only the Germans, but also international tourists, moreas monuments of modern

architecture than as places of commemoration (like for instance, the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe situated in the very heart of Berlin, a few steps from the Brandenburg Gate and the seat of the Bundestag (Brody 2012)). However, it is difficult to condemn today's generation of Germans because, en masse, they are not interested in continuously thinking about the horrifying past of their nation. It is even possible to say that the German Federal Republic did so much to commemorate the victims of the Nazis and to imprint the young generation with an impression of disgust towards totalitarianism and war crimes, that it is perverse to expect that almost 70 years after the end of the Second World War people born after 1945 could bother themselves with something like the remembrance of the fate of forced labourers. They could maintain that if they, as a nation of perpetrators, did extensive *Trauerarbeit* (literally, *the grief work*) concerning the holocaust, waging the aggressive war, concentration camps and many other grave war crimes committed in the name of Germany, then there is no need to mourn again because of a recently discovered truth about an offense incomparable with the killing of millions. According to this way of thinking, this story could be treated, in the best case, as a historical curiosity and not as a reason for true reflection.

Nevertheless, it seems that thanks to a small group of people who want to know and remember the truth about the church-operated camp of forced labourers, the social awareness of the importance of this case has slowly increased. First of all, it is realized that it was not the average camp of slaves. It was extraordinary in this sense that the perpetrators of the slaves' sufferings too were extraordinary, i.e. they were Christian churches preaching daily the principles of compassion, brotherhood and charity, and, therefore, the moral weight of their guilt was especially overwhelming. Even those who still perceive the forced labour as a socially insignificant crime, when confronted with this bare fact, lose authority to justify their point of view. Therefore, if the idea concerning the construction of the genuine memorial or museum materializes, it will reflect the general protest against all forms of forced labour and the enslaving of innocent people. A possibility also exists that it will become a school where young and future generations could learn that so-called minor crimes are, in fact, not minor and mass killings and forced labour, for example, have more in common with each other, as 'products' of totalitarian systems, than one could expect. Therefore, if the plans of Pastor Jürgen Quandt are realized, it will be difficult to overestimate their social significance. It remains to wish him perseverance and good luck.

British scholar Timothy Garton Ash, who is a renowned specialist in the modern history of Central Europe from Oxford University, maintains in one of his papers that if a given nation wants to deal successfully with its shameful or traumatic past, it should recall facts, reflect on them and go on (Ash 2002: 265-282). It seems, however, that constant reflecting on the past and 'going on' are not separated, but they are strongly connected to each other and must be considered as

two parts of the never-ending work. Its aims are: the preservation of the remembrance about the past and raising the awareness of subsequent generations to the need to respect human rights. Every generation needs new elaboration of old themes like birth, love, death or guilt, war and punishment. This work if executed over consecutive generations and planned within a long term perspective that constant dripping wears the stone (regardless of how tiresome or even hopeless it seems sometimes), is the best guarantee, if any guarantee can be given, to prevent a repetition of the terrible history of the era, not only the concentration camps, but also, forced labour camps. The war in Yugoslavia proved that the end of the Cold War was not the end of history. The worst atrocities can be repeated even in Europe, so horribly experienced not a long time ago, during both world wars and other international and internal conflicts in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Therefore, even if the moral aspect of the matter was skipped, maintaining the memory about the past and constant reflecting on many, allegedly unimportant historical details or allegedly minor crimes committed many decades ago is the best investment in the future of our continent and the future of all mankind.

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# Official Memory and Legitimization in Kyrgyzstan. The Revolutionary Past in the Public Statements of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev after 2005

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## Introduction

The rise and fall of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the second president in Kyrgyzstan's history, was inextricably linked with revolution. During his tumultuous five-year rule, the myth, idea and methods of the Tulip Revolution of 2005 were instrumental in his maintaining the status quo in which he and his large family maintained power. To the new regime, the symbolic dimension of the revolution was one of its fundamental pillars; new monuments, street names, books and articles, conferences, movies and public staging of historical events were used for its legitimization. This symbolic politics was emphasized by the president's initiative to establish 24th March as the national holiday and the subsequent organization of various national ceremonies. The purpose was to preserve the desired collective memory and push into oblivion anything that was non-functional for the new power.

Despite the growing number of works devoted to the analysis of collective memory, there have been surprisingly few studies focusing on Central Asian countries and the practices of building political legitimacy through discursive constructions of the past. While bearing in mind the importance of the institutional basis of non-democratic regimes and their tendency to resort to brute force, this paper emphasizes the significance of “softer”, but by no means less efficient instruments of controlling the population in authoritarian regimes. The aim of the paper is to analyze the discursive mechanisms President Bakiyev and his proponents used to build the memory of the Kyrgyz revolution of 2005.

## Theoretical and methodological assumptions

The theoretical basis of the paper includes the following assumptions. First, collective memory is one of the social practices through which society transmits and reproduces the interpretation of its past. This means that memory is the outcome of the activity of social groups rather than a passive transmission of the given facts. Obviously, actors are not equal in their ability to disseminate ideas about the past. Official memory is a set of ideas about the past which is diffused by the individuals and groups occupying the most powerful positions in the given society, be they political, economic or cultural ones (Achugar 2008: 10).

Secondly, the past can be transmitted only through the use of language or, in other words, discourse. Following Maarten Hajer (1995: 44), discourse is defined here as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations through which meaning is allocated to social and physical phenomena, and that is produced in and reproduces in turn an identifiable set of practices”. Language functions as a mechanism for a society to access its past. It is impossible to directly access historical facts. Hence the importance of the selection of categories, arguments, and rhetorical strategies. They are tools which inevitably affect the shape of the past. In this article I shall make a detailed analysis of publicly available texts in order to establish certain patterns of thought, narratives about the past, the main characters used in these narratives and lines of argumentation.

Thirdly, the references to the past serve manifold functions. Nevertheless, students of official and collective memory most often point to the relationship between power (Olick and Robbins 1998), memory and the function of legitimization, understood as explanation and justification of the governing incumbents’ decisions and activities (Wertsch 2004). Thus, official memory can be perceived as a set of resources used to justify the execution of power by the authorities.

Fourthly, the progressive appropriation of the state and weakening pluralism facilitated the impact of official memory in Kyrgyzstan. Its content depended mostly on the statements of the president – the dominant player on the political scene, who set the agenda for national and local institutions of power – as well as the politicians, journalists and other players who reproduced the line of the government.

Accordingly, in this paper, the official memory is understood as the images of the past constructed by Bakiyev to shape the collective memory, i.e. how the citizens of Kyrgyzstan remembered the events of March 2005 and the ideas behind them, and how they understood their past and present and hence their future. As collective memory is never static, in Kyrgyzstan, too, it was volatile and dynamic, due to the mutual influence of official, social and individual sources (Szacka 2006: 44; Zerubavel 1995: 5).

The empirical basis of this paper consists of President Bakiyev's statements, interviews, commentaries, and press publications during his term in office from 2005 to 2010, a body of 181 texts in total. The analysis mainly concerned the official memory of the Tulip Revolution of 2005. The methodology was based on two consecutive steps. First, initial reading of the empirical data, and secondly, the formulation of research questions on the basis of existing literature and general knowledge of the data under scrutiny. The questions posed in this phase of analysis were the following. How did Bakiyev define the revolution? Who were the main players of the Tulip Revolution according to the President? What was his evaluation of these events and their aftermath? Is it possible to determine the continuity and recurring themes in the promoted vision of the revolution, or was it ever-changing? How were the events reported in the political discourse? Which elements were emphasized and which were omitted? Did the official memory of the Tulip Revolution have any influence on later protests – the April Revolution of 2010 and the fall of the Bakiyevs? In this paper, I am more interested in the internal structure of discourse developed by Bakiyev than the social reception of his words. Thus, the aim of the analysis is to distinguish the main themes and recurring lines of argumentation referring to the aforementioned questions.

## Historical overview

The events in Kyrgyzstan belonged to the wave of color revolutions triggered by the fall of Milošević's government in Serbia in 2000. Their legitimization was partly based on the myth of social contract and democratic ideas, emphatically promoted in the first years of Kyrgyz independence, when, despite serious economic problems and deepening economic crisis, the republic boasted of itself, before both its citizens and the international community, as an "island of democracy". Lacking any substantial resources for the necessary accumulation of capital, the new republic was to thrive based solely on the free market and civil liberties. Free media and NGOs financed by the West enjoyed a relatively liberal climate, and the language of politics and the legitimization discourse abounded in democratic rhetoric. However, not for long.

Constitutional amendments, introduced almost every other year after 1994, led to the concentration of power in the hands of President Askar Akayev. Civil rights and liberties were limited and promoted values altered; they then started to include a somewhat authoritarian image of Akayev as an enlightened sage, scientist, or a hereditary leader, a descendant of a king. However, the official discourse by no means resembled a well-structured set of legitimizing arguments based on a specific ideology. It was more like a patchwork of haphazardly linked symbols and codes in order to justify their dominant position in the political and economic life of Kyrgyzstan. It is important to underline that not only the

president, but also the presidential family occupied a central position in the legitimizing formula.

In March 2005, social protests triggered by the allegations of rigged elections led to the occupation of government buildings in some parts of the country. On 24th March 2005, protesters in the capital of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, seized control of the government office; President Akayev fled the country and his government resigned. The acting prime minister and president were delegated to the representative of the opposition, former prime minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev. However, the eruption of activism and the mobilization of considerable parts of the society were not followed by a radical and fast transformation of political institutions. The old regime was replaced by a new government without any serious systemic changes; the idea of holding the previous rulers liable for their crimes was quickly forsaken.

The events of 24th March 2005 were explained using the categories of a “revolutionary coup d’état” (Lane 2009: 131), “electoral revolution” (Bunce and Wolchik 2006), or “revolutionary collective action against the corrupted government” (Fuhrmann 2006: 16-29). The last of these interpretations gradually became the official one, although in practice the introduction of immediate systemic reforms – the main revolutionary slogan – was replaced by a new theme of maintaining stability and legalization of the revolutionary power. As the reforms were postponed again and again, vociferous protests of the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition finally managed to force a constitutional amendment on 9th November 2006. However, that achievement was to be short-lived, as only two months later President Bakiyev managed to introduce a counter-amendment (which again was quickly replaced by another one). The subsequent decisions on constitutional and economic reforms, as well as the personnel policy, showed the increasing concentration of power and resources in the hands of the large Bakiyev clan.

In 2007, the president initiated and organized a referendum on the new constitution and electoral law, dissolved the Kyrgyz parliament (Jogorku Kenesh), and then triumphantly won the elections with his newly formed party of power Ak Jol. The legislature, so far the only relatively independent power, was transformed into a passive entity.

In spring 2008 the parliament proclaimed 24th March the Day of Revolution and a national holiday<sup>59</sup>. The preparations for the fifth anniversary two years later,

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<sup>59</sup> According to the decree of President Bakiyev dated 6 March 2006, 24th March became a national holiday. The Parliament, Jogorku Kenesh, was given authority to develop and pass an act that would commemorate 24th March as a national holiday. However, it did not back the initiative, even though it was the parliamentary elections in 2005 that directly caused the social protests against Akayev. The initiative was eventually passed by the parliament three years later, during its



in 2010 were carried out in the context of increasing social tensions and protests. On 7th April, two weeks after the anniversary, about 90 people were shot and 1500 wounded after the use of weapons by the government forces during a protest before the government offices. The use of force did not help the Bakiyevs avoid the fate of their predecessors; five years after the Tulip Revolution, the memory of which was so painstakingly nurtured by the Bakiyevs, a new April Revolution erupted. The new temporary government took power, and Kurmanbek Bakiyev left Kyrgyzstan.

## Memory of the revolution, the president's family and the legitimization of the system

The March events which resulted in Bakiyev's seizure of power required an ideological justification, if only a weak one, especially in a situation when Kyrgyz legal institutions were rapidly losing their validity. Although on the institutional level the new regime was reluctant to break with the past, the symbolic sphere was filled with the rhetoric of rejuvenation and a new beginning. The memory of revolution was used for the cognitive, emotional, normative, legal, moral and institutional justification of the authoritarian claims of the Bakiyev family. What really happened in 2005 was not important. The lack of typical traits of revolution was not an obstacle for those that wanted to commemorate the glorious revolutionary past. As is common in the political sphere, memory is important only when it can be politically exploited – in this sense, the past is foremost the creation of the present (Ziółkowski 2000: 92, 105).

In their appropriation of the state, the ruling elite attempted to stabilize their position through the manipulation of symbols, values and frames of reference (Szacka 2006: 55). In their attempts to shape history in order to control the present, they also tried to set the future and determine the interpretations of the past. The communist past and the time of independence were used to influence the discussions and political conflicts present at the time. The Akayev period was demonized in order to justify his surprising escape, and the Tulip Revolution was described as a new beginning in Kyrgyz history. In this way, the present situation and interests of the new rulers greatly affected the shape of memory. The past became an integral part of the present (Florescano 1985: 71-72, 78).

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subsequent fourth term. In this way, Jogorku Kenesh backed the presidential policy of shaping the memory of the revolution.

Kurmanbek Bakiyev had a privileged position in the construction and distribution of the memory of the revolution, due to his supremacy over the parliament, government and judiciary (a clear violation of the principle of the separation of powers). This centralization of power and wide presidential prerogatives without institutional accountability made him the main creator of the official memory. Presidential decrees, interviews, public statements, speeches and publications set the standards for public officials, pro-government journalists and politicians who reproduced the official line in interviews and other public statements.

The official politics of memory also involved the presidential family, quite numerous even by Kyrgyz standards. The president's seven brothers and two adult sons worked in high state posts and dominated the sphere of informal arrangements. Their actions and high position were justified not only with traditional and revolutionary rhetoric but also by presenting the special traits of the Bakiyevs, e.g. honesty, reliability, diligence and general uniqueness. The image of a family who had sacrificed their lives in the fight against injustice and who helped Kurmanbek to lead the nation to victory<sup>60</sup> had a dual effect on the president's position. On the one hand, it strengthened his efforts and intensified legitimization; on the other hand, it introduced an element of family pluralism which was significant for the interpretation of the March events. The presidential brothers and sons created a complex system of projections of the past resulting from their specific political interests – and their image was not always consistent with the presidential version. In this way, the family pluralism was the only pluralism of interpretations of the latest history of Kyrgyzstan.

Jusupbek Bakiyev, the president's brother, who died from heart disease a year after the March events, became a martyr of the revolution. The figure of Jusupbek was raised almost to the level of state worship, which was obviously accompanied by concealing many inconvenient aspects of his biography. The inscription on his tombstone praises him as a man who “devoted his heart for the nation, gave his life for the Fatherland”<sup>61</sup>, a phrase that was consistently replicated in public and

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<sup>60</sup> Omurzak Tolobekov during his interview with President Bakiyev: “Jusup [the President's brother], in spite of his terrible health problems, completely devoted himself to the national revolution and sacrificed his life for the better future of the nation. [...] When you, Mr. President, became the leader of the opposition movement..., you lost your brother..., and all your brothers, sisters, and kin, who fought with passion, got hurt and received injuries... Your political victory did not come easy”. The layout of the interview is non-typical. Usually, the questions of the interviewer are in bold and/or in italics. Here, it is the other way round – it is Bakiyev's answers that are in bold. This interesting layout and the unusual construction of the interview may suggest to the reader that Tolobekov's questions are of minor importance; they serve only to induce and enhance the words of the president. See Kurmanbek Bakiyev, *El uchun kujgon ishmer ele...*[He was an activist fighting for the nation], interview by Omurzak Tolobekov (2007, pp. 8, 12).

<sup>61</sup> Inscription on Jusupbek Bakiyev's grave (Jalalabat 18.09.1951-21.02.2006).

private sphere. To the public, Jusupbek became “one of the organizers and leaders of the nation against the injustices of the previous regime”<sup>62</sup>. The relationship between the death of the president’s brother and the revolutionary memory was also built by referring to the traditional Kyrgyz worship of ancestors and the dead (Le Goff 1992: 72). A school, park and street received Jusupbek’s name; the president also erected a monument to him and built a special museum. The Jusupbek Bakiyev Foundation was established by another influential brother of the president, Janybek. This operation exemplifies the typical personalization of the Kyrgyz revolutionary events – one person (always associated with the Bakiyev family) was to epitomize the will and effort of the entire community that stood behind the events. The sacralization of Jusupbek was a crucial argument for the ruling family; similar to presidential public statements, it was supposed to convince the society that the current state of affairs was self-evident. The attempts to construct and impose the Bakiyev version of events can also be interpreted as the efforts to create a loyal imagined community. The usurpation of power was to be perceived as a natural implementation of the demands of the people (Szacka 2006: 54-58; Anderson 2002: 155-162).

## Representation of revolution in the statements of Kurmanbek Bakiyev

The democratic and authoritarian themes used in the official interpretation of the revolution could be observed even at the level of general definitions. Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s memory of the revolution in its democratic version was not a product of a refined approach with a complicated and coherent structure. He did not go beyond typical rhetorical clichés, and was closer to popular conceptions of democracy, characteristic of the populist form of politics, as he stressed the sovereignty and will of the people. The revolution was supposed to be a unique moment of history in which power was restored to the people, therefore the question of the beginning and the myth of the social contract was becoming increasingly significant (Arendt 1990: 34). This myth, highlighting the perennial Kyrgyz passion for freedom, included a story of centuries of vicissitudes when the nation fought against aggressors and tyrannies. The idea of the free Kyrgyz state was finally realized when the people themselves established the sovereign state. This founding myth of a democratic Kyrgyzstan had previously been a permanent element of Askar Akayev's rhetoric. It changed only slightly in Bakiyev’s

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<sup>62</sup> Quoted in “Vyshla v svet kniga ‘24 marta 2005 goda – Narodnaja revoliutsia’” (Published book: “March 24, 2005 – National Revolution”) *Kabar Kyrgyz National News Agency*, March 22, 2006.

revolutionary discourses – the time of the breakthrough and renewal became the March events and Bakiyev’s rise to power. Under this interpretation, the people regained their lost power and freedom, and the job of the president was to serve the people. Moreover, this discourse acknowledged the right of the people to resist power. In the case of usurpation of power, the sovereign could rise again and restore the legitimacy of the government<sup>63</sup>.

The authoritarian interpretation of the revolution negated its democratic nature and even the revolution itself. This is manifested by blurring the memories of the March events or in attempts to background or even silence specific topics. The term “March events” was preferred to “revolution”, Kurmanbek Bakiyev became the main character and the people were deprived of subjectivity. In the authoritarian variant of this description, the people were not the sovereign, but rather a raging crowd or passive mass at best. There was no mention of a social contract – the moment of the beginning became the presidential election and manipulated constitutional amendments.

The following section examines how these two entangled and contradictory narratives were developed to achieve political effects. It poses questions about the processes preceding the social protests, their main characters and events. The reconstruction of the two narratives also includes representation of the moment of breakthrough and its aftermath. These issues organized the structure of the empirical part of the text.

## What preceded the revolution?

Every revolutionary act is always the result of an existing balance of power in society and the political elite, the properties and characteristics of the immediate context of social and political structures. What preceded the moment of explosion plays an important role in explaining the very phenomenon of revolution; not only does it relate to analytical statements of a scientific discourse, but it also has its application in political discourse through which actors construct their interpretations of the past. Hence discussing a revolution always involves pre-

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<sup>63</sup> The tools of legitimization used by Akayev’s government were also used by the new power. In an interview for the newspaper *Kyrgyz tuusuin* 2009, the Minister of Economic Development and Trade Akylbek Japarov reproduced Bakiyev’s line: “*we should take a political lesson from the people’s revolution. It determined what democracy is, and the views and position of the Kyrgyz nation [...] According to our constitution, the people are the source of power. The power [Akayev – NS] forgot about it, showed disrespect to the people and ignored their needs. If you do not think about the nation, then one day the nation, despite your power, is going to throw you out of Kyrgyzstan*”. This vision of the sovereign people was still valid in April 2010, when social protests forced President Bakiyev to resign and leave Kyrgyzstan (Japarov 2009, p. 9).

conditions and actors. In Bakiyev's discourses, the representation of the pre-revolutionary era in Kyrgyzstan could not do without the presentation of Akayev and his actions. The former president was of course shown in a negative light, but the causes of the revolution were not arranged into a coherent narrative with an explicitly negative evaluation; Bakiyev's vision included a certain ambivalence in the evaluation of the previous period.

According to Bakiyev, the fundamental cause of social protests was the departure of President Akayev from democratic standards. Although the first president considerably contributed to the establishment of an independent Kyrgyzstan and the introduction of a free market economy and democratic development, the last period of his presidency was characterized by detachment from the people. He betrayed the principles of democracy and allowed the enrichment of his family at the expense of the people. In the words of Bakiyev (2005c), the rule of his predecessor proved to be disastrous for the most important of issues, the Kyrgyz civil identity: "The people stood at the threshold of losing their traditional, cultural and moral values, losing their identity". The authoritarian system was presented as something harmful and identified as the cause of all problems, not only those associated with power and economic exclusion, but at the levels of symbols and identity (e.g. 2005f; 2005g).

This vision of democratic social and political order, which ceases to be functional only after the violation of democratic rules, and only then subject to heavy criticism, was juxtaposed with a vision of order that from its very beginning in 1991 deserved only a negative evaluation. The political terms in which the reality was discursively constructed was replaced by the economic one. The narrative contained no mention of a fight for freedom and democratic values. Instead, it was dominated by the issue of social and human welfare problems. According to Bakiyev, the collapse of communism in Kyrgyzstan resulted in great sorrow. The change of regime was decided by others, strangers, not the citizens of the republic. "They tried to live according to foreign designs. Foreign examples were used, with poor results" (September 28, 2007). The national wealth, accumulated in Soviet times, was plundered and destroyed; regions were neglected; corruption and criminal behavior was widespread – according to Bakiyev the reasons for their growth were the transition to a market economy, the introduction of private ownership and the weakened position of the state. In his view, the introduction of elements of direct and representative democracy did not bring any good. "Fifteen years without interruption, we announced the elections for the authorities of villages, regions, districts and Jogorku Kenesh, and we were voting for one another. Every two to three years we conducted referendums. Did they bring us prosperity? Did they improve our lives? Eventually, the February parliamentary elections swallowed the head of the old power" (2005f). That time of great degradation was contrasted with the glorified time of the Soviet Union, referred to as the best, positive system of reference (e.g. 2007d).

## The main actors of the revolution

In Kurmanbek Bakiyev's rhetoric, the most important hero of the revolution was the sovereign people. The people, despite internal differences, are described as a single community, fighting for freedom and implementation of democratic ideals. On the one hand, they constituted an immortal, collective body, a specific combination of past, present and future; an entity that intervened in politics and took action (Canovan 2005: 91-94): "Since ancient times, democratic values were part of our blood and soul" (Bakiyev 2005e). The Kyrgyz had spent two or three centuries fighting for freedom; they were a nation bravely fighting lawlessness and authoritarianism.

On the other hand, the people were presented as the collective of mortal individuals, a simple sum of the citizens of Kyrgyzstan, including those who died in the protests against the government in 2002, those who were injured and those who triumphed in 2005. The representation of the actors of the revolution was full of pathos, emphasized by the number of participants, the depth of commitment and the breakthrough effects. The revolution included tens of thousands of people who on the fateful March 24 "went in ranks", or "shoulder to shoulder". These people "endured under the pressure of provocateurs and removed the rotten power" (Bakiyev 2007a).

These two images portrayed the nation as a homogeneous and indivisible whole. Altogether and individually, the people were presented as victors. The statements of Bakiyev cannot be reduced to a mere glorification of the people. The very same events, participants and their behavior were also portrayed with quite an opposite evaluation. The revolt of the people in this other version was not so much a final protest against oppression, but a force undermining the authority and the law. In this sense, the community was not only the mainstay of wisdom and justice – the people were a threat: "a pillaging crowd, thousands of people destroying [...] shopping centers, pavilions and shops" (2005j). It was something full of brute strength and danger that without a proper leader could transform into an uncontrollable, destructive power that might sweep away order and authority. Such a metaphorical approach inevitably discounted the possibility of the bottom-up pressure on power. It contradicted the idea that in this unique moment a nation had renewed its founding contract. The vision of the raging crowd which had to be calmed down and pacified implied a paternalistic policy. It justified the marginalization of the people as the main hero of the revolution.

In the aforementioned interpretation, the glow of flashes is reserved only for the most important actor – Kurmanbek Bakiyev. In his public statements, the theme of leadership of the revolution was carefully constructed, saturated with detail and full of nuances. In one version, the anointing of a future leader of the nation took place even before the March events. Interestingly, in the structure of

his own leadership, he avoided a frontal assault on the former president. It was not a conflict and open opposition to his predecessor that set the scene for the new leader, but an unexpected turn of events. “Even in a nightmare I could not imagine that the president would not begin negotiations with his people but run away. When I saw that I could not stop the people, that their indignation knew no boundaries, I could not stand aside” (2005b). In this way, Bakiyev builds a vision in which the orphaned and abandoned people needed a leader; the people’s confidence in him endowed him the attribute of a natural contender for power. Importantly, that interpretation made him a savior not only from unjust rule and authoritarianism, but also from the untrammled power of collective actions.

Bakiyev was accompanied by other actors used to reinforce his position. The presentation of his leadership in the opposition party was supposed to indicate that he already had his own shadow cabinet and was the leader of a “real political force” (2005h), with which he could aspire for power. An important actor of the revolution was the Bakiyev family, placed at the opposite pole to the widely criticized family of Akayev. While denouncing the nepotism of his predecessor, Bakiyev presented his family as victims with a special relationship with the people, or even as martyrs of the revolution. In contrast to Askar Akayev, the Bakiyev family “never interfered with the affairs of state, with the employment policy” (2005j); family members were independent, and their high positions were natural in their biographies. Not only did they not need any support from the president, but also “none of them could affect his (presidential) actions” (2005j). Another line of argument assumed that family ties with the president could not be a sufficient reason to give up one’s career. On the contrary, giving the Bakiyevs the highest offices was represented as entirely consistent with the national interest. The personal qualities of the family members, e.g. honesty, diligence and professionalism, guaranteed that their work was always dedicated to the people and to the state.

## The moment of breakthrough

It seems quite obvious that in President Bakiyev’s public appearances the revolution was a turning point, and thus the beginning of new principles, or restoration of the original ones. It is an open question what the relationship was between the key categories used to define this reality, i.e. a breakthrough, a revolution, and March events.

The first of the versions presented by Bakiyev assumed that 24 March was the day of the national revolution. This time was saturated with symbolic meanings, and the modern and universal phenomenon of revolution was attributed a purely national character. According to the president, the people, armed only with faith and belief, peacefully prevailed over lawlessness and injustice. This

victory was described as a historic, unique and groundbreaking moment of deep significance, which would always remain part of the centuries-long history of Kyrgyzstan. Theses on an external cause of the revolution were strongly rejected. According to Bakiyev, the revolution did not depend on foreign financial assistance; it was not an imported product, but the sole result of the nation's actions. It was not a continuation or imitation of the Rose Revolution in Georgia or the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Actually, during his five years in power, Bakiyev (e.g. 2005a) never used the popular term "Tulip Revolution", preferring "March Revolution" instead. This kind of "nationalization" of the revolution, however, did not prevent him from rhetorical connections with democratization in post-communist countries.

The second vision pushed the revolution into the background. Here, the foreground was occupied by another event – the presidential election. The revolution was reduced to a subsidiary role, not an autonomous event but rather a complementation of a chain of events. The point was that the "the fruit of the revolution" was not the introduction of systemic reforms, but Bakiyev's triumph in the 2005 presidential elections. The importance of the elections as a crucial moment was only temporary. Later on, the requirements of the current political situation attributed the "breakthrough value" to other, usually later events, e.g. the constitutional reforms initiated by the president or elections (e.g. 2010).

President Bakiyev's public statements also included a third interpretation, in which he avoided the word "revolution", replacing it with the phrases "March events" or "change of power" (2006a). Even if he used the category of "revolution", it was not understood as an act of opposition by the sovereign people. It was framed not as a time of hope, but rather one of crisis and uncertainty. According to Bakiyev, nobody had expected that President Akayev would forsake his country and the nation at such a difficult moment and resign with his government. In the resultant vacuum of power and chaos, "the parliament as the only legitimate authority" endorsed Bakiyev (2005j) as the acting prime minister and president. Importantly, "he himself did not propose his candidacy" (2005b), but was elected by others. He was not the initiator of change, but an advocate of preservation. He did not speak on behalf of the people, but represented power.

## The aftermath of the revolution

In Bakiyev's statements on the consequences of the revolution, the actions and decisions of the new government were described with the dichotomy of change and preservation. On the one hand, the government tried to capture the democratic imagination awakened by the March events; it attempted to use the collective memory, emotions and passions to its advantage. While declaring allegiance to



revolutionary demands, it sought to replace the authoritarian reality with the illusions of democratization, and actually preserve the institutions of the previous regime. On a rhetorical level, it introduced the idea of the total and immediate change of the political system; the illusion was supported by the presentation of the revolution as a great historical victory, a source of pride and optimism. In Bakiyev's statements (e.g. 2007b), the new government broke with the past almost from the first days of its tenure – and used this unique opportunity to establish a new order.

On the other hand, Kurmanbek Bakiyev also posed as a continuator of the policies of the former government. He abandoned the rhetoric of change, and replaced the revolutionary legitimacy with legal legitimacy and a compilation of various conservative arguments. He described Askar Akayev as a traitor, but not as a usurper; the problem lay not in the institutional and legal aspects, but in Akayev's personality. The main charges related to his inability to conduct a dialogue with the people and his decision to escape and leave the country in a serious condition. The system that allowed the accumulation of political power in the hands of the head of state did not raise any major reservations for Bakiyev. Furthermore, the new president saw certain advantages in this system, as he openly admitted, "I like this constitution" (2005i). The wide-ranging powers of the president could ensure economic growth and reduce the level of corruption. From this perspective, Bakiyev (e.g. 2006d) presented himself as a defender – he had to protect the people from chaos and uncertainty, a state of decay, and save the system from changes.

According to Bakiyev, the nation was tired of political shocks – it had had enough of experiments based on copying and imitating Western democratic systems. It was tired of the elections and constitutional changes repeatedly introduced during the Akayev times, and which had apparently led nowhere. Now, progress was to be achieved on the basis of the nation's own vision of the future, and any modernization would have to allow for local traditions and needs. This vision was based on the specific diagnosis of the state of society, where general demands and problems in society were reduced to social issues. The priority for the authorities was to solve the economic ills – after the victory of the revolution, the people did not need the new constitution, just good jobs, stable incomes, opportunities to study, decent pensions and solutions to many other basic problems. For Bakiyev (e.g. 2006b), it was contempt for these needs that was the main cause of social protests in the spring of 2005. In his view, the economic difficulties were not the effects of systemic problems. In order to prove this thesis, social political and legal spheres were separate from one another; their mutual interactions and connections were denied.

## Completion of the revolution

The completion of the revolution is probably one of the most important dilemmas of any revolutionary collective action. Issues related to mass mobilization, terror, or the legalization of the new order require not only political solutions but also appropriate interpretation. One of the key issues of each revolution is its completion – in a way that does not foster another revolution. In Kyrgyzstan, this issue was crucial considering the permanent social mobilization and the failed counter-revolutionary attempts up to 2010. The interpretation of the final moment, developed by Kurmanbek Bakiyev, can be divided into three narratives.

The first narrative denied the very fact of the revolution. Its absence meant the absence of its symbolic end. This version suggested the legal transfer of power – the president became the guardian of law and order, responsible for securing their continuity. In such an approach, the revolution was a dangerous event. “You have to avoid various types of shocks and disruptions in the system of governance, which would inevitably affect the political and therefore economic stability” (2007c). Revolution was a phenomenon full of violence, when “brother stood against brother, the people against the government, and power was the enemy of its people” (2006c). It was a destructive force that could bury the country. This line of argument deprived people of the right to resist; the acceptance of the regime was rewarded with stability, certainty and social gratification.

In the second narrative, the end of the revolution was equated with Bakiyev’s coming to power. This interpretation did not deal with the issue of the expected transfer law from the president to the constitution. “I would especially like to emphasize that henceforth any violation of law, attempts to seize buildings, land, and road closures have nothing to do with the revolution” (2005f). Such an interpretation of the end of revolution limited the revolution to the time of a short carnival connected with political involvement of citizens, social initiatives, debates and other various actions (Matynia 2009: 6-10). But according to Bakiyev, this performative dimension of democracy had aimed only to overthrow Akayev’s regime. After the completion of that task, the people had to put power back in the hands of their representative – the new president.

In the third version, based on the rhetoric of democratic revolution, the question of the end was left open. The revolution was not completed and the authorities were to implement its demands, i.e. changes in the political system. The changes were to be introduced gradually, without haste and not immediately; the ultimate goal for which the people fought was a law-abiding, democratic system respecting the demands of the people expressed during the revolution. Bakiyev often said that 24 March should be a lesson for the authorities: “In order for the revolution not to repeat in this way, this government should draw conclusions and not repeat the mistakes [...] The authorities should not violate the

law. It is not the nation that should serve the authorities, but authorities should serve their people. In a country where authorities serve the people, from a local official to president, such revolutions do not happen” (2005d). The people were to watch over the course of evolutionary transformation and carefully supervise the actions of the new government. The people had the right and even obligation to resist if the government deviated from the slogans it preached and forgot about the nation.

All the three narratives legitimized the position of the president. The first one reduced the revolution to an uncontrolled illegal outbreak, and thus emphasized his position as the guarantor of legality. The second version recognized the value of the revolutionary mobilization of the sovereign (the nation), but its role was limited to a narrowly defined time – the revolutionary carnival. The third narrative equated the revolution with a gradual process of change, in which the subservience of the people was to be obtained with a promise of slow changes aiming at complete transformation of the system.

## Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to reconstruct the ways in which the “Tulip Revolution” was commemorated in the discourses of the former president of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. An important issue was to show how the mechanisms of commemoration contributed to the legitimacy of his power. The article suggests a tension produced by the narrative of the revolution used as a legitimizing formula by the authoritarian regime. On the one hand, it justified the seizure of power and Bakiyev’s decisions, while on the other it opened the way for criticism of authoritarianism, thanks to the myth of the sovereign people and the right of resistance in the event of usurpation of power. Democratic-revolutionary rhetoric with populist slogans accompanied increasingly limited pluralism, and paradoxically became an anti-system slogan. Reproduced and developed by supporters and opponents of the regime, it solidified the sense of the people as an agent and also their right to protest. Under favorable conditions (such as an accumulation of social and economic problems, corruption, impunity of the ruling family), it inevitably facilitated the symbolic and actual defeat of the regime during the April Revolution of 2010.

Bakiyev’s rhetoric was thus not an expression of more or less systematic and intellectually mature ideology. It was rather a patchwork of random and sometimes conflicting values. On the one hand, the revolution was commemorated as the culmination of a social contract; the moment of democratic re-determination of the role of the people, authority and the state. On the other hand, the memory of the revolution was used to achieve authoritarian ambitions and maintain the status

quo. This analysis is a complex and multilayered image of the March events. This democratic-authoritarian politics antinomy was the result of ongoing maneuvering in changing circumstances. The conflicting contents, ambivalence and lack of definite ideology were functional with respect to the requirements of the current policy. These features of Bakiyev's statements must therefore be seen in the context of a more flexible response to internal and international stimuli, rather than as a long-term strategy and state ideology.

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# Lviv and Chernivtsi – Two Memory Cultures in the Western Ukrainian Borderland<sup>64</sup>

*Eleonora Narvselius & Niklas Bernsand*

Lviv and Chernivtsi are located not far from one another in what is now Western Ukraine and have been subjected to similar political-historical processes, cultural influences and transnational ideational trends. Besides, their present architectural environment and the vicissitudes of their demographic composition bear much resemblance. What has puzzled us was that since the fall of the Soviet system these two cities expose significantly different patterns of commemoration and practices of approaching the past. These differences may be observed, in particular, in the built environment and tangible markers of heritage and ‘usable pasts’ in the public spaces. Arguably, this may indicate a presence of different contemporary memory cultures in Western Ukraine which is far too often envisioned as a quite homogeneous space whose population exposes identical political preferences and cultural patterns. Particular features of these memory cultures, on the one hand, might have been traced to earlier historical processes, but, on the other hand, have been formed by the post-1989 political-cultural agendas. Hence, the main challenge of our research has been both pointing out possible causes of this difference and analyzing how memory cultures of these cities, far from being confined to a robust national (Ukrainian) frame of reference, are presently shaped by different cultural-political and performative contexts.

Throughout our project<sup>65</sup>, we have tried to make sense of the complex interplay between the palimpsest-like built environments of Lviv and Chernivtsi as Eastern European urban milieus marked by ‘dismembered multiethnicity’ (Follis

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2012: 181), and popular knowledge of contemporary urbanites about the pre-war urban populations who created these milieus, but perished during and in the aftermath of WWII. We suggest that essentially the story incessantly transmitted within and through the contemporary cultures of remembrance in Lviv and Chernivtsi is about pendulum movements between diversity and homogeneity, between various types of acknowledgement and denial of ethno-cultural and religious diversity in the course of history. After presenting examples of varying public expressions of collective memories relating to the ‘others’ in Lviv and Chernivtsi, we will shift the perspective from mnemonic performances to construction of heritage in the two cities. This will allow us not only to point out differences, but also to adequately address resemblances of the urban memory cultures.

## Similarities of the urban memory cultures in Lviv and Chernivtsi

Built environments, memory cultures and historical narratives of the two western Ukrainian cities expose many similar features, which may be attributed to the periods of common history in the same states, imbeddedness into the same types of political structures, and openness to similar transcultural ideological trends. Due to this several common ‘points of crystallization’ (Assmann 2011: 24) of collective memory emerged that supposedly pre-conditioned a similar path-dependent logic of the local memory cultures in Lviv and Chernivtsi. Our impression is that, using sociological terms, one may analytically distinguish the same variables significant for the cultures of remembrance in the two cities, although the values of these variables are different. The story incessantly transmitted within and through the urban cultures of remembrance is about pendulum movements between diversity and homogeneity, between various types of acknowledgement and denial of ethno-cultural and religious diversity in the course of history.

Throughout their history, Lviv and Chernivtsi have been incessantly *borderland* urban centers, as they have been on the frontline of both eastward, westward, southward and northward expansion of several power centers operating in Europe (Austria, Poland, Germany, Ottoman Empire, Russia, USSR and, in a sense, the EU). Historical and socio-political transformations (not seldom drastic and catastrophic) have been reflected not only in constantly shifting borders of several empires, nation states and regions, but also in a changing demography of their urban settings. Both Lviv and Czernivtsi date back to the medieval times and initially belonged to the Principality of Halych-Volynia and the Principality of Moldavia, although Chernivtsi remained small and saw significant urban



development mostly from the 19th century during Habsburg rule. Although ethnic composition of the city changed in different historical periods, specific pre-modern pattern of ethnic and religious groups populating Lviv (characterized, among other things, by visibility of population groups with developed transnational connections, such as Jews, Armenians and German-speaking groups) was still discernable in the era of national states and the accompanying cultural homogenization (Czaplicka 2002; Ther 2000; Hrytsak 2005). The population of pre-modern Chernivtsi, emerging as a toll-station and market place, was mainly comprised of Romance- and Eastern Slavic-speaking Orthodox Christians (ancestors of modern Ukrainians and Romanians) and Orthodox Jews.

Conflation of these medieval patterns of diversity with more modern forms of ethno-cultural self-organization became a hallmark of the *multiethnic Habsburg Empire*. As the capitals of the Habsburg provinces Galicia and Bukovina, both Lviv and Chernivtsi gained prominence as cultural centers—although in the second half of the 19th century cultural transfers from Lemberg to Czernowitz become evident in literature, music and theatre (Lihaciu 2012). The cities also became subjected to massive re-building and modernization, and their present-day historic city centers maintain much of the stylistically distinct architecture typical of the Habsburg period. After being partially silenced and partially distorted by the Soviet historical narratives, the story of the Dual Monarchy emerged in the post-Soviet period as an embodiment of a perceived golden age in public spaces of Lviv and Chernivtsi. The enthusiastic response of both the cultivated public and consumers of the massculture to the ‘Habsburg myth’ became evident in Western Ukraine in the end of the 1990s (Zayarniuk 2001). The imagining of Habsburg rule as a golden age in the history of Northern Bukovina and Galicia indicates, on the one hand, a strong post-1991 reaction against the Soviet ideological constructions in historiography and mass culture and, on the other hand, a rehabilitation of the polyethnic heritage of the region, that in both cities occurred in parallel with an ethnocultural Ukrainian revival in independent Ukraine. Despite generally positive connotations of the Habsburg myth and its potential to boost political, economic and cultural connections with cities and regions of Central Europe, the attitude to this period in the two cities is nuanced and in some respects dissimilar, which is especially evident in commemorative initiatives and public discussions. Hence, being a uniting ‘point of crystallization’, references to the Habsburg period expose differences in the present-day cultures of remembrance and public imagery of Lvivites and dwellers of Chernivtsi (see more about this below).

During the Habsburg period and also at the interwar decades, Lviv and Chernivtsi retained their multicultural ambience. Nevertheless, this atmosphere began to slowly erode already in the 1930s as a result of strong assimilatory policies of the Polish and the Romanian states respectively. In Chernivtsi, the Polish group diminished profoundly already in the Romanian period as a result of out-migration to Poland. However, the older patterns of ethnic diversity changed

most drastically and irrevocably as a result of WWII. In Chernivtsi, in connection with the war most of the Germans were evacuated to Germany, while a large number of local Jews were murdered and majority of the survivors were expelled from the city in the aftermath of the war (Frunchak 2010: 442–443). Many Romanians fled or were deported to the east by the Soviets, which is true also for urban Ukrainians who identified with a Ukrainian nationalist political orientation, as well as for many local Armenians. The population of the city was thus radically transformed. Lviv faced catastrophic changes of the urban demography in the wake of brutal Sovietization in 1939–1941, the exterminatory policies of the Nazis in 1941–1944 and the wide-scale postwar repressions, expulsions and population exchanges. According to different estimates, immediately after WWII only 10 to 20 percent of its prewar population remained Lviv (Hrytsak 2002: 58–59). Of 160,000 Jews who had been registered in Lviv before the Wehrmacht occupation and made up around one third of the city's population, only about 2000 survived the Holocaust (Ther 2000, 271). The great majority of Poles who made up more than a half of the Lwów population in 1939 disappeared from the city with the war and the several waves of subsequent expulsions organized by the Soviet authorities after eastern territories of Poland had been re-annexed by the USSR in 1944.

As a result, in both cities considerable parts of the post-war populations, coming either from the surrounding ethnically Ukrainian (and in the case of Chernivtsi also Romanian) countryside or from different parts of the USSR, had no urban cultural roots in their new place of settlement, while ethnic groups that earlier had key positions in the political, cultural and economic development of the towns were now absent or present only fragmentarily. The new population structure was, however, by no means monoethnically Ukrainian, and especially during the first post-war decades the demographic weight of ethnic Russian as well as, most importantly in the case of Chernivtsi, mainly Russian-speaking Jewish migrants from other parts of the USSR, was significant.

With *Ukraine's independence* in 1991 begins a new 'point of crystallization' marked by growing interest in issues of pre-war ethno-cultural diversity, cultural heterogeneity and transcultural connections in the history of Lviv and Chernivtsi. Envisioning a multicultural heritage in line with contemporary (primarily 'Western') models became a part of post-Soviet 'normalization'. The Soviet legacy of silencing the historical presence of a range of nationalities (Jews, Poles, Romanians, Austrians, Germans) and negligence of their cultural heritage undoubtedly left its traces (Bartov 2007; Risch 2011). The imperative of forming a new national narrative from the Ukrainian perspective has also contributed to ambivalent attitudes to the memories about the 'others'. Nevertheless, the new European and global strategies of addressing the difficult pasts, acknowledging 'otherness' and promoting cultural contacts across the borders have also had significant impact on politics of memory as well as popular attitudes in the two cities. Due to efforts of the local elites, parts of the historical centers of Lviv and

Chernivtsi have been included to the UNESCO Heritage List in 1998 and 2013 respectively. Ethnic diversity and rich architectural heritage of several nations have been especially emphasized as the main reason behind the selection of the two cities to the List. While memory landscapes remain divided and segregated in many respects, nevertheless cultural diversity and legacy of the pre-war urbanites have been acknowledged locally and, furthermore, turned into a resource for various political, commercial and cultural initiatives.

## Different treatment of similar mnemonic references in Lviv and Chernivtsi

By and large, with Ukraine's independence collective memories of the present-day dwellers of Lviv and Chernivtsi about the 20th century became informed by 'three C:s': *canonization* of the national order of things, *commercialization* of the cityscape, and efforts to get rid of vestiges of the *colonial* condition. When comparing how basically the same historical periods have been recently envisaged in the two cities, one observes however that the significance of the 'three C:s' vary. Bearing this in mind and also referring to the theoretical frame of the article that was outlined earlier, we will suggest several examples of present-day performing (i.e., active choosing, presenting, enacting, and transforming) of memories about several historical periods characterized by different attitudes to diversity.

Using the metaphor of pendulum movement between various types of acknowledgement and denial of cultural diversity in the course of history, the period of Soviet rule kept quite close to the denial/homogenization pole. Nationality policies in the USSR after WWII, however, were full of contradictions as, despite the ultimate ideological task of forming the a-national Soviet man, they still left sufficient room to expressions of ethnic and national difference (Slezkine 1994; Martin 2001). Hence, despite a popular contemporary opinion, not only ideological imperatives, but also faulty expert estimations and lack of funding for renovation projects resulted in negligence, erasing and drastic transformations of the remnants of the pre-war 'otherness' that were still visible in the postwar cityscapes.

In Lviv, after superficial adjustments to the new order (e.g., dismantling a range of the pre-war monuments, plaques, decorations), in 1975–1991 the well-preserved medieval downtown was taken under state protection in form of historical-architectural reservation. Elevation of the medieval period was instrumental in highlighting the historical architecture that could be classified as the early Ukrainian and, hence, would support the officially promoted narrative on Lviv as an ancient Ukrainian city. Meanwhile, an array of valuable landmarks of

historical presence (and dominance) of other peoples were left outside the zone of protection. Among them were, for instance, the 19th-century buildings which followed broader Austrian and European architectural trends and could be attributed as parts of Polish, Austrian, Jewish, and Ukrainian cultural legacies (Prokopovych 2008). The most important symbols of the Soviet memory politics became the new street names, the Lenin monument and several memorial places devoted to the Great Patriotic War (Hill of Glory, the Soviet tank monument, Glory Monument in the Stryiska street). Similar processes in the spheres of urban planning, urban toponomy and the symbolic landscape occurred also in Soviet Chernivtsi.

With Ukraine's independence, re-coding of the urban space in Lviv proceeded in several waves. The beginning of the new period was marked by dismantling the Lenin monument in 1990, which was the first action of this kind in Ukraine. The next step was to emphasize the city's Ukrainian identity by re-naming the streets and unveiling the monument to Taras Shevchenko in 1992 on the spot where the monument to the Polish king Jan Sobieski stood until 1950. While the most ideologically loaded Soviet monuments were removed in the 1990s (among them, the monument to the communist publicist Yaroslav Halan and the Soviet tank monument in the Lychakivska street), some monuments referring to the Soviet historical narrative remained intact. Among them are the pietà composition on the Hill of Glory erected in memory of the fallen Soviet soldiers, and the monumental memorial of the Great Patriotic War in the Stryiska street. The subsequent wave of radicalization of memory politics in the 2000s resulted in erecting the Bandera monument and other commemorative initiatives aiming to contest the Soviet narrative on the Ukrainian national movement, especially its wartime history. However, despite widespread views about the absolute dominance of the radical nationalist myth as a hallmark of symbolic politics in Lviv, elements of the Soviet symbolic still co-exist in the built environment of the city with the references to the anti-Soviet narrative.

In Chernivtsi, the break with the Soviet past was less quick and thorough than in Lviv, and the symbolic landscape comes forward as more ambivalent and characterized by compromise and avoidance of conflicts. While the city's Ukrainian identity has been recognized and emphasized and the most controversial Soviet symbolic markers in the cityscape (e.g. the Lenin statue) were removed early, street names inherited from the Soviet period and monuments dedicated to the Great Patriotic War (e.g. 'Nikitin's tank' on Haharyn street) until now coexist with markers inspired by Ukrainian national-liberationist narratives, such as a street and a memory plate dedicated to the Greek-Catholic Metropolitan Sheptytskyi. However, even here efforts of local memory actors to commemorate in the cityscape the most controversial symbolic figures, like the leaders of the OUN-UPA Bandera and Shukhevych, have so far been avoided (although there is a small street named after the latter far from the city centre). Writers and poets like

Taras Shevchenko (monument erected in 1999) and Olha Kobylianska, who were also included in Soviet literary pantheon, are preferred to the integral nationalist tradition, which also points to continuity and reinterpretation rather than sharp break.

Recent efforts to commemorate the dramatic events of the Eurorevolution of 2013–2014 have caused a new wave of de-Sovietisation of the urban toponymy in Lviv and Chernivtsi. The decision of the Lviv municipality to change the name of the Soviet-associated *Hvardiyska* street to Mайдan Heroes' (*Heroiv Maidanu*) street raised practically no objections. Meanwhile, in Chernivtsi the affairs were more complicated. To begin, the decision to rename not one, but three smaller streets was taken without much debate. Hence Stasiuk street, named after a Soviet WWII hero was renamed Heavenly Hundred street (*Nebesnoi Sotni*, after the protestors killed by the Yanukovych regime's police in February 2014 in Kyiv), and Soviet-derived Chapaev and Frunze streets were named after local men killed in the protests. However, the long central Red Army street (*Chervonoarmiiska*) was renamed Mайдan Heroes' street only after debates in which some voices advocated historical significance of the existing name. Furthermore, another radical project was presented in Chernivtsi on the current wave of Mайдan commemorations. Greek-Catholic CARITAS, transforming an older idea and tying it to a nationalist vision<sup>66</sup>, announced a competition for the best project for the resurrection of the Austrian Pietà monument on the Central Square destroyed by the Romanian authorities in the 1920s. In this initiative, which is supported by the city authorities, the Pietà is intended to commemorate the Heavenly Hundred.

Symbolic de-Sovietization, to varying degrees thorough and effective in Lviv and Chernivtsi, did not, however, forefront only a Ukrainian national-liberationist narrative. In the collective memories of the present-day population of the two cities the period of the Habsburg monarchy often emerges as 'the good old days of grandma Austria'. On the first glance, such an attitude to the multinational European empire where Ukrainians have been loyal second-line subjects contradicts the present-day focus on nation-building and a national 'order of things'. However, the Austrian-Hungarian Empire is also given credit for encouraging cultural institutions of its subject peoples and creating opportunity for the political structures of future nation-states to take root. The emperor Franz Joseph I, whose rule extended from the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century until his death in 1916, is nowadays a respected symbol embodying the stability of a civilized state and an effective German-styled bureaucracy (Hrytsak 2004: 271). After 1991, the positive attitude to (and even nostalgia for) the Danube monarchy has taken a variety of

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<sup>66</sup> <http://www.khrest-pieta.com>, <http://chernivtsy.eu/portal/4/pro-pam-yatnyk-piyeta-u-chernivtsyah-53240.html>

cultural expressions, particularly in mass culture. Yet, paradoxically, despite a wealth of restaurants referring to the Habsburg period, no street has been named after Franz Joseph and no monument has been erected in his honor in Lviv.

Instead, an unpretentious monument to Franz Joseph was unveiled in 2009 in Chernivtsi. The emperor was commemorated as a symbol of Chernivtsi's place in Europe and as a statesman under whose rule the city became an important economic and cultural center<sup>67</sup>. Notably, the preparations for erecting the statue were made during the city's 600<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 2008 in the presence of Karl von Habsburg, a grandson of the last emperor. The monument was funded by Arseniy Yatseniuk, a major Ukrainian national-level politician originating from Chernivtsi, and projected a clearly pro-European political message for the city and for Ukraine through the city.

A similar official commemoration of the ruler of a multicultural European empire proved to be problematic in Lviv, where local political elites rather support the image of Lviv as the center of the Ukrainian political revival. Curiously, although the political elites in Lviv often have been stubbornly focused on more narrow Ukrainian projects, cultural and creative elites have no difficulties exploiting the multicultural ambience of the city in their commemorative initiatives. For example, the highbrow magazine *İ* issued in Lviv published a special volume titled *Franz Joseph I. Privately* and confirmed by this the current trend of de-centering the last Habsburg as a prominent political figure. However, the most original initiative based on the idea of commemorating Franz Joseph I came recently from the milieu gathering around the incubator of artistic initiatives *Museum of Ideas* founded by the Lviv artist Oles' Dzyndra. To commemorate the last emperor of Austria-Hungary, the artists participating in the project titled *Monument to memory* created a three-dimensional drawing of the young emperor's bust to mold it in bronze. However, in order to see the bust materialized, Lvivites first had to purchase special coins with the emperor's image, and then, at a fixed date, to bring them to the museum for melting and molding. Thus, according to the initial idea, the emperor's bust will adorn one of the streets only if Lvivites will make concrete efforts—even sacrifices—to forefront a multicultural and at the same time European dimension of the city's past. According to the project's website, so far only 32 people, mostly intelligentsia, have bought the coins, which is obviously not enough to start preparations for the casting ceremony<sup>68</sup>.

In Chernivtsi we find similar commemorations of the Habsburg period initiated by cultural and intellectual circles, such as the sculptural composition dedicated to the already proverbial roses that in the words of a contemporary

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<sup>67</sup> [http://sd.net.ua/2009/10/04/jacenjuk\\_zbuduvav\\_pamjatnik\\_imperatoru\\_francujjosi.html](http://sd.net.ua/2009/10/04/jacenjuk_zbuduvav_pamjatnik_imperatoru_francujjosi.html)

<sup>68</sup> <http://idem.org.ua/fy/index.html>

German poet once swept the streets of old Czernowitz, inaugurated during the 600<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebrations in 2008 on the wall outside the *Literatur-Café* at the Central Square. During the celebrations ‘pop-cultural’ monuments referring to material progress, individual prosperity and ‘European’ life-style of the Habsburg era were also unveiled, e.g. portraying the city’s first bicycle on the Turkish square, and a bronze carriage in fashionable Kobylanska street. Like in Lviv, several commercial enterprises such as hotels, restaurants and cafés in Chernivtsi also celebrate the Habsburg period and the Kaiser himself.

Another post-Soviet trend that came in the wake of the interest to the Habsburg period and unfolds in tandem with the symbolic Ukrainization of the cityscape in the two cities, is the interest of the wider public in recovering memory of the ethnically and culturally different ‘others’. This trend is, however, not fully coterminous with the ‘western-style’ practices of acknowledgement and celebration of difference. According to a survey conducted in Lviv (Yevreis’ka spadshchyna 2008), contemporary Lvivites appreciate initiatives that enhance popular knowledge about the vanished ethno-cultural diversity, but are much less positive to the permanent re-marking of the public place with references to military glory, suffering and martyrdom of other nations. The initiatives to and funding of the great majority of monuments, plaques, smaller statues and other commemorative signs referring to the Polish, Jewish and Armenian presence still come first and foremost from diaspora and minority communities (Dyak 2012), international organizations, or private persons—in agreement with the municipality. Some statues are installed as tourist magnets in the vicinity of some cafes in the downtown. However, among serious commemorative initiatives one may mention the opening of the restored Polish military Pantheon (known as Lwów Eaglets cemetery, 2005), and the unveiling of the monument to the Polish professors executed by the Nazis in 1941 (2012). The latter project was a partner initiative of the municipal governments and universities of Lviv and Wrocław. The intellectual milieu, academic institutions and museums have also followed the trend. Among the successful academic-intellectual initiatives of the last decade one should mention a series of *Ī* issues devoted to multicultural ‘universes’ of Western Ukraine, including a volume on Chernivtsi, and exhibitions on the multicultural history of Lviv organized by the Center for Urban History of East Central Europe.

In post-Soviet Chernivtsi renewed interest in the city’s pre-war communities has often been articulated in the framework of local and transnational narratives celebrating the city’s ethno-cultural diversity (see e.g. Koziura 2014). The term *Bukovinian tolerance* is often used as a catchphrase in both intellectual and everyday contexts, signifying relatively relaxed inter-ethnic relations between the “traditional” local ethnic communities (Ukrainians, Romanians, Germans, Jews, Poles and Armenians). This discourse of tolerance is widely perceived to have been fostered in the Habsburg era, and is used to claim the status of Chernivtsi as a

European city (Bernsand, forthcoming). Interestingly, several of our interviewees from Chernivtsi favourably compared what they saw as tolerant inter-ethnic relations in Chernivtsi and Bukovina with arguably more tense inter-communitarian relations in Lviv and Galicia.

The local ethnic community organizations (*natsionalno-kulturni tovarystva*), are in various ways integrated into the work of municipal authorities and play an active role in memory initiatives. However, like in Lviv, transnational organizations and private persons are important for initializing, funding and maintaining the memories of the, with the exception of Ukrainians and Romanians, dwindling ethno-cultural communities in public space. Significantly, the pre-war national houses of the ethnic communities, in central locations of the city, have been returned to the use (although only in the case of the Ukrainian House to the ownership) of the re-established community organizations. Other examples of the commemoration of the ‘local others’ in public space are the monuments to German-language Jewish poet Paul Celan (1992) and Romanian poet Eminescu (2000), as well as memory plates to Yiddish writer Steinberg, Jewish singer Sidi Tal, long-time ethnic Polish mayor Kochanowski, Armenian musician Mikuli and Romanian composer Porumbescu. Among other recurring notable initiatives from both local and transnational actors is the yearly *Meridian Czernowitz* festival that gathers mostly Ukrainian and German-language writers, poets and artists in Chernivtsi. It actively connects to the German-language and Jewish pre-war local intellectual culture. The yearly folkloric festival Bukovinian meetings (*Bukovynski zustrychi*), initiated by the Polish community, also has the function of show-casing the presence of now mostly exiled Bukovinian ethno-cultural communities, albeit in stylized and rural versions, to wider audiences. Nevertheless, for the majority of urbanites those manifestations of the largely vanished pre-war ethnic diversity are at best prosthetic memories charged with past potentialities.

Finally, memories about WWII in both Lviv and Chernivtsi have been increasingly influenced by contemporary European narratives which de-center heroization of military activities and focus instead on losses and suffering<sup>69</sup>. After 1991, the tragic fate of the large Jewish community has been acknowledged, as Jews were distinguished from the mass of ‘Soviet citizens’ as a particular group of victims. Nevertheless, the dispute about anti-semitism as an ideological platform of the OUN-UPA and about participation of the Ukrainian nationalist militias collaborating with the Nazis in mass killings of the Jews still continues (Himka 1999; Rudling 2011).

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<sup>69</sup> For more about European commemorative frames and principles underpinning debates on common European memory see, for example, Malksöö 2009, Pakier and Stráth 2010, Leggewie 2011, Sierp 2014.



In Lviv, the first initiative to commemorate the Jewish inhabitants perished in the Holocaust came from the local Sholom Aleikhem Jewish Culture Society already in 1988. Documents pertaining to the monument's construction mostly spoke of the 'Monument in Pelekhatoho Street'. Whether consciously or not, the idea of commemorating the victims of the Jewish ghetto was downplayed in official documents<sup>70</sup>. Disputes of the Jewish activists with the city administration who initially suggested to locate the Holocaust monument far away from the city center, exposed a certain strategy that since then periodically came to light in connection with other memory debates—for example, on Lwów Eaglets Cemetery and the Polish House (Narvselius, forthcoming). This contemporary tendency is not a denial of the symbolical presence of the 'others' and their difficult histories. It is rather a readiness of the local authorities to play the role of gatekeepers defining conditions of the commemoration of the non-Ukrainian components in Lviv. Nevertheless, after fundraising among the diaspora and the urbanites, the monument to the victims of the Lviv ghetto was eventually opened in 1992, in the presence of the survivors, politicians and invited honourable guests from abroad. Not long after this, a sign commemorating victims of the Soviet totalitarianism, with a cross included in the composition, was opened just across the street.

By and large, the history of the post-1991 commemoration of Jewish culture and the Holocaust in Lviv includes a series of successful initiatives in landscape design and architecture (e.g. the recent international competitions *Synagogue Square Site*, *Besojlem Memorial Park Site*, *Yanivski Camp Memorial Site*), education (the first in Ukraine course on Jewish history and culture initiated by the Lviv Franko University), popularization of Jewish culture (annual international festival of Jewish music *LvivKlezFest* initiated in 2008, thematic issues of the cultural magazine *Ĭ* in 2007 and 2008, annual summer schools on Jewish history and culture at the Center for Urban History of East Central Europe), to mention just a few. However, due to legislative complications around items of Jewish heritage and for a banal lack of premises and money<sup>71</sup>, only a fraction of the rich collections of Judaica stored at the History of Religion Museum and the Ethnography Museum has ever been exhibit in the city and abroad. Also, throughout the 2000s, the Jewish memory and heritage has primarily been a concern of local Jewish organizations, their partners from Jewish Diaspora (Dyak 2012) or other international organizations. Both the official discourse and public opinion (see Ievreiska spadshchyna 2008) do not fully recognize the Jewish heritage of the city as an important cultural asset that, even though it needs to be treated with great delicacy, deserves a broader promotion and multifaceted

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<sup>70</sup> [http://www.Lvivcenter.org/en/lia/description/?ci\\_objectid=224](http://www.Lvivcenter.org/en/lia/description/?ci_objectid=224)

<sup>71</sup> <http://galinfo.com.ua/news/51875.html>

presentation free from intentional silences and skewed embellishments. Partly because of this, one may come across examples of insensitive use of the Jewish symbols for commercial purposes (as it seems to be in the Galician Jewish Restaurant *Under Golden Roza*) and painstaking avoidance of the topic of involvement of the Ukrainian nationalist forces into the extermination of Jews during WWII, while the emphasis is laid on rescuing the Jews by the Ukrainians, especially the Greek-Catholic clergy (as this is presently the case in the newly opened Jewish Museum in the Staroievreiska street).

Like in Lviv, while the darker aspects of the history of the ‘others’ in Chernivtsi are not denied and their public commemoration is not discouraged, the forms of such commemoration are the result of negotiations in which the municipal authorities, as in Lviv, often act as gatekeepers. Two monuments to the victims of the Holocaust (one placed at the outskirts of the city in 1990, the other placed in the downtown premises of the transnational Jewish organization *Hesed Shushana* in 2000) came into existence at the initiative of local and transnational Jewish activists<sup>72</sup>. Efforts by local Jewish actors to raise a monument to the Holocaust victims in the former ghetto in the city center have, however, so far been unsuccessful. Apart from disagreements between Jewish and Romanian activists on the proper textual message of the monument, the city council was willing to grant permission only if the Jewish community financed the monument independently, since the monument was regarded first and foremost to be of interest to the Jewish community, and therefore the process has so far come to a halt<sup>73</sup>. Simultaneously, city dignitaries always take part in the official commemoration of the Holocaust. This case points to such a feature of local memory culture existing in both cities as the pillarization of memory, which implies that each community is supposed to initiate, finance and maintain ‘their own’ commemoration. An important role has since its opening as a private initiative in 2008 been played by the Jewish Museum, located on the first floor in the Jewish National House that showcases in its exhibition both the life of the pre-war local Jewish community and its dismemberment during the Holocaust. The museum cooperates with transnational funds and research institutions, in particular, in the project of maintaining the old Jewish cemetery in Zelena street with the help of young volunteers from Western Europe. The museum is an important actor in efforts to conceptualise the Holocaust as relevant not only for one ethnic community but to all inhabitants in the city.

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<sup>72</sup> Bemsand’s interviews with Mykola Kushnir, director of the Chernivtsi Museum of the History and Culture of Bukovinian Jews, 17 April 2013, and Leonid Fuks, director of Chernivtsi *Hesed Shoshana*, 14 June 2013. See also e.g. Osachuk, Zapolovs’kyi and Shevchenko (2009, 50, 71).

<sup>73</sup> Bemsand’s interview with Mykola Kushnir, director of the Chernivtsi Museum of the History and Culture of Bukovinian Jews, 17 April 2013.

Another example of pillarization is the memory plate to Romanian mayor Traian Popovici, who is celebrated for saving the lives of up to 20,000 Jews. It was set out in cooperation of the local Jewish and the Chernivtsi Diaspora Jewish community in New York<sup>74</sup>. Nevertheless, the negative reaction from local Romanian activists to the fact that Romanians are pinpointed as culprits in the extermination of local Jews during German-Romanian occupation in 1941–1944 shows a more complex configuration of memory actors in Chernivtsi as compared with Lviv.

## Discussion and conclusions

Examples of different commemorative practices and attitudes to the recent past in Lviv and Chernivtsi might point out to existence of non-fixed and flexible, but still different cultures of memory formed around the same ‘points of crystallization’ which sustain a basic narrative about acceptance or denial of ethnic diversity. Aside from references to by and large the same historical periods and types of political regimes, cultures of memory in the two cities have another common characteristic, namely, the modes of memory work of the contemporary urban populations. The attitudes to the urban past among the great majority of the urbanites are formed not through personal experience and familial transfer of postmemories, but rather through prosthetic memory relying on hearsay, media, literature, popular culture and arts. As the issue of selection of the past comes to the fore in this case, the work of stitching together various, often contradictory, historical representations within various identity projects is guided not so much by path-dependent logic of collective memory, but rather by present-day expediency and power games of different mnemonic actors. Therefore, we argue, the most observable trend in cultures of memory in present-day Lviv and Chernivtsi is *pillarization*, i.e. basic agreement of both external and internal memory entrepreneurs and marketeers (Huysen 2003, 20) that every population group is a custodian of its ‘own’ heritage.

What are the possible factors and sources of difference in the memory cultures circulating in Lviv and Chernivtsi? At the moment, we can point out several plausible explanations.

*Political positions and hierarchy of minorities are different in the two cities*  
Throughout history, Chernivtsi has been home for a large number of national and cultural-religious groups whose share in the overall structure of the urban

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<sup>74</sup> <http://molbuk.ua/news/19465-meru-jakijj-vrjatuvav-20-tisjach-yevreyiv.html>

population did not allow them to claim a leading position. No single ethnic group has been simultaneously politically, economically and culturally hegemonic. In Lviv, however, rivalry between two large national groups—Poles and Ukrainians—was evident throughout the modern history. This situation has its afterlife, as nowadays the popular view of the local minorities and their cultural claims is more relaxed in Chernivtsi, while in Lviv they meet more ambivalent and questioning attitudes. Furthermore, the contemporary presence of ethnic minorities in Chernivtsi is also comparatively larger than in Lviv, with Romanians in 2001 amounting to 6 percent of the urban population. The surrounding Chernivetska oblast also has a heavy minority presence, with Romanians and Moldavians comprising 20 percent of the population. Romanians are furthermore often found in important political and administrative positions in the city.

*Power relations between post-1991 local political elite groups working with issues of commemoration*

In both Lviv and Chernivtsi the city council and (in some questions) oblast council have a decisive role in formulation of priorities of local memory politics and promotion of commemorative initiatives. If in Lviv national democrats and presently radical right-wing nationalists have had a leading role, in Chernivtsi, the local political scene has de-Sovietized more slowly, and national democrats have not been as consistently dominant in the political sphere.

*Integration of intellectual discussion around multicultural heritage into 'Western' paradigm*

Aside from a number of academic institutions with longer history, there are several newly established independent intellectual milieus and academic arenas in Lviv that are not only massively involved in the international co-operation, but also transmit standards of 'Western' academic work. Intellectual discussions about the difficult past and historical ethno-cultural diversity in Western Ukraine initiated by these milieus have not only increased public knowledge of the topic, but also influenced the political discourse. Nevertheless, it should be admitted that in many cases the bulk of accumulated knowledge remains confined in academic and highbrow cultural milieus, and does not interfere with the established Ukrainian-centered patterns of commemoration. In Chernivtsi so far, there are no influential independent milieus engaging with the multicultural past that have transnational connections comparable to I and the Center for Urban History of East Central Europe in Lviv, although the now defunct *Bukowina Zentrum* had such a function. Presently both *Zentrum Gedankendach* at Yuri Fedkovych University and the annual international poetry festival *Meridian Czernowitz* throw light on the city's German-language past in cooperation mostly with German and Austrian partners.

### *Transnational and transcultural connections on the elite level*

Political and cultural elites in Lviv and Chernivtsi are involved into international/transnational co-operation in different proportions. Contacts of Lviv elites with international investors, foreign NGOs, academic communities, artistic milieus, and municipalities all over the world have grown exponentially throughout the years of Ukraine's independence. Notwithstanding a similar growth in the post-Soviet period, the scale and intensity of such contacts in Chernivtsi are comparatively smaller, probably because of the city's smaller size, weaker economic infrastructure and more peripheral location. In the future studies, the authors will look closer on practices, discourses and attitudes of sections of the local elites engaged in revitalization of the built historic environments and in re-invention of the past as a significant symbolic resource.

### *Different scales of commercialization of the past*

The authors found out that the public imagery on the past in the two cities is strongly influenced by the entrepreneurial activities of local enthusiasts who take a lead not only in popularizing and commercializing, but also in a more radical re-imagining of the available 'memory stuff'. However, because of poor communications and its location off-side of the main tourist routs, but also due to comparably modest branding campaigns and promotion in mass media, tourist business in Chernivtsi is less developed than in Lviv. In view of this, but also because of other reasons (quality of the cultural elites, vicissitudes of local memory politics), the rich cultural heritage of the proverbial Little Vienna has not become an object of commercialization and commodification to the same extent as in Lviv.

One of the conclusions following our analysis is that the perceived differences between the addressed urban memory cultures have much to do with different attitudes (both popular and on the elite level) to the post-1989 political project of Ukrainian nation-building. Different perspectives on the essence of the national predetermine differences in commemorative practices and narratives on diversity/homogeneity. While memory culture of contemporary Lviv projects the image of the Ukrainian Piedmont and is instrumental in establishing a politicized, mobilized and essentially anti-Soviet vision of the national identity, Chernivtsi exposes a more culturally toned outlook which in some respects is a spin-off from well-established Soviet views on nationality as primarily an ethno-cultural phenomenon. Hence, the attitude to and practices of working with different 'pillars' (i.e. memories of different population groups) in Lviv and Chernivtsi vary.

Meanwhile, if the focus is shifted from vibrant commemorative practices and performances, and the perspective of *heritage policies* is appropriated instead, a fundamental similarity between memory cultures of our two cities might become evident. A basic characteristic of heritage is its conditional mood: "...heritage is

envisaged as having moved along a continuum from the preservation of what remains, to the maintenance, replacement, enhancement and facsimile construction of what might, could or should have been” (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge 2007: 26). Much indicates that a condition of heritage promoted and envisioned in the two cities is not a pillar model, but rather an assimilationist ‘incorporation-to-the-core’ model, where the core is presented by various versions of Ukrainian national heritage. It is not difficult to notice that commercialized representations of the urban multicultural past are reckoned to external audiences (tourists, diasporas, descendants of the former inhabitants of Lviv and Chernivtsi) in the first turn, while the local population is expected to identify with another, Ukrainian heritage. Such construction of ‘double heritage’ exemplifies assimilationist logic. As Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge (2007: 75) remind us,

”A not uncommon variant of this [assimilation model—E.N.,N.B.] should be noted, namely the two-dimensional model where two different public heritages are presented in parallel, the one for external and the other for internal consumption. There is no conflict or tension in this bipolarity, which is not an expression of two societies but only of a single society narrated in different ways to different markets. This is especially evident in postcolonial countries engaged simultaneously in local nation-building and attempts to position themselves within global economic and social systems.”

Such assimilationist logic is hardly something unavoidable in Lviv and Chernivtsi, where one may find examples of respectful, sensible and delicate memory work among the present-day urbanites. At the moment, however, this logic dominates memory cultures of Lviv and Chernivtsi.

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# Identity-building in Post-communist Ukraine: Post-imperial vs Post-colonial Discourses<sup>75</sup>

*Oleksii Polegkyi*

## Theoretical assumptions

Due to the variety of social ties and relations in modern society, identity is a highly complex matter that can be analyzed from different perspectives. The process of self-definition that leads to the sense of affiliation with a certain group and society is in many ways the key to national identity. One of the important aspects concerns the fact that identity may be seen in terms of multiplicity, so we should speak of not “one” identity, but rather “identities” which can combine and interrelate.

Benedict Anderson claimed that a nation is an imagined community (Anderson 1983). He argued that identities are constructed through imagining, which enables individuals to see themselves as part of an invisible cultural whole. Imagining becomes a necessary precondition for obtaining national membership; he stressed the importance of myth, belief and self-image in the formation of group identity. Nations are imagined through language, which is why the language issue in the Ukrainian case is so important. Anderson also stressed the power of symbols – they create a strong sense of unity within a given community. Having discussed the importance of symbols, we should also mention the role of the past and the historical narratives of a given ethnic group.

Stuart Hall (Hall 2003) believes that identity is affected by history and culture, which are continually in the process of ongoing production. Rather than seeing political and cultural identities as fixed and objective, I will follow Hall in defining them as collective representations of political, social, and cultural

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boundaries, and thus not simply characteristics of the self, but also aspects of the societal practices of domination and resistance. Collective identity is not static, but influenced by prevailing discursive processes. Historical memories, which can be based on actual historical events or relevant myths, are important for strengthening national identity.

National identity is a type of collective identity that gives allegiance to the nation. Anthony Smith states that “national identity” and “nation” are complex constructs, signifying a cultural and political link, uniting in a single political community all who share a historic culture and homeland, and “drawn on elements of other kinds of collective identity, which explains how national identity can be combined with other types of identity, such as class, religious or ethnic identity” (Smith 1991). A nation can be defined “as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”(Smith 1991).

There are various definitions of national identity, nation and nationalism, which evidently differ in their conceptualization of their limits, but culture seems to be regularly accentuated. There are at least two different ways of thinking about “*cultural identity*”, according to Hall. One position defines this concept in terms of “one, shared culture, a sort of collective ‘one true self’, hiding inside the many others, more superficial or artificially imposed ‘selves’, which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common” (Hall 1990: 223). Hall (ibid) also believes that our cultural identities “reflect the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide us, as ‘one people’, with stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of our actual history”. According to Hall, a nation is constructed and established in discourse, mainly by the common narratives of national culture and history, and national culture is a “discourse” constructing national identity.

I agree that one of the important elements of national identity is defined by national collective memory. Hall also stresses that “shared past” is crucial for the formation of national identity. This aspect is extremely important for understanding the problematic formation of Ukrainian national identity after gaining independence.

Rogers Brubaker explains the rise of nationalism in the 1990s in post-Soviet countries as caught in a triadic relationship between national minorities, nationalizing, i.e. nation-building states, and the nationalism of a “mother nation” directed towards national minorities in other countries (Brubaker 1996). He suggests that in these regions nationalisms were not merely “ethnic”, that “new” states implement “nationalizing” discourse to homogenize their population under the titular nation defined in ethno-cultural terms and distinct from the state citizenry as a whole.

Brubaker discussed the tensions between the “*nationalizing*” state, *national minorities* and their *external homeland*. In “nationalizing” states, minorities may feel that their identity is under threat and state policy is structured in favor of the ethnic majority. This may lead them to seek outside support from the “homeland” state. (Brubaker 1996: 57).

Brubaker also claimed that the relations between the minorities and the states not only depend on the factors internal to the actors involved, but are also derived from external influences, exercised by the homeland states, third countries, and international players. This notion looks relevant to the situation of Russians in Ukraine.

As Brubaker argues, a state becomes an “external national homeland” when its political or cultural elites decide that their compatriots on the ethnic basis living in other states are members of one and the same nation. They claim that these compatriots “belong” to the state, and assert that their condition must be monitored and their interests protected and promoted abroad by the “homeland” state (Brubaker 1994: 44-78). Further I will explain in detail how the issue of Russian minorities in Ukraine is used by Russia to protect its geopolitical interests.

I rather agree with some authors, for example Taras Kuzio, who criticized Brubaker’s ideas of the sharp distinction between Western “civic” states and Eastern “nationalizing” ones, because, in most cases, it is difficult to differentiate the so-called “nationalizing” practices in Eastern Europe from earlier processes of “nation-building” which occurred in the “civic” states in Western Europe (Smith 2002: 3-16). Following Kuzio (2001: 136-137), I would say that the difference between a civic and an ethnic state does not so much rest on the presence of ethno-cultural components, but rather hinges upon the degree of democratization and of inclusivity: the readiness of the state to allow all residents to integrate into the polity and the societal culture, regardless of origin.

### *Postcolonial perspective*

The idea of applying a postcolonial perspective to the countries of Eastern Europe may seem controversial. Of course, we are not dealing with classical colonies in this case, but an analysis of post-imperial and post-colonial elements in public discourses can be valuable for our understanding of the complex transformation processes in post-communist Ukraine.

A question that might arise is whether we can speak about post-colonial discourse in Ukraine at all. It should be noted that the objective of this paper is not to develop a distinction between the terms “anti-colonial” and “post-colonial”. Mainly “post” means a certain time frame and directs us to a certain way of thinking presented by a section of Ukrainian society.

Ukrainian scholar and publicist M. Riabchuk (2000) followed M. Pavlyshyn (1992) in saying that Ukraine has not yet formed a post-colonial public discourse as a result of deconstruction and reinterpretation of the colonial past.

The applicability of post-colonial analytical apparatus to this region is also discussed – and resolved in various ways<sup>76</sup>. David Moore proposed also applying postcolonial ideas to the region of Central and Eastern Europe: “at least two features of this giant sphere are significant for currently constituted postcolonial studies: first, how extraordinarily postcolonial the societies of the former Soviet regions are, and, second, how extraordinarily little attention is paid to this fact, at least in these terms” (Moore 2001: 111-128).

The broad definition of “colonial discourse” can be formulated on the basis of works by Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha and others. According to Said, (Said 1997) colonial discourse refers to the arrangements of practices and rules which produce social reality and which create certain intellectual content. One of the goals of colonial discourse is to construe an image of the colonized as degenerate or retarded, for this image justifies dominance and violence against them, and facilitates the execution of power. Bhabha argues that “the objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction”. Domination of the “subject nations” history is one aspect whereby the colonizer “appropriates, directs and dominates its various spheres of activity” (Bhabha 1994).

A postcolonial perspective can provide us with a useful analytical framework to discuss the Soviet imperial legacy and nationality policies in such post-Soviet states as Ukraine. We can consider post-coloniality as a social and discursive construct, “a set of subjective judgments bound up with the very constitutive nature and meaning of national identity” (Smith 1998: 8). The notion of discursive practices gives us the possibility to rethink how “empire-building”, “state-building” or “nation-building” are products of relations between different discourses and social groups, as Graham Smith argues.

Irina Sandomirskaia suggested the next fundamental features which allow us to discuss the policy of Soviet Union in postcolonial terms:

- Thinking in terms of global expansion
- Thinking in terms of “the East and the West”, “progress and retardedness”
- Thinking in terms of “majority and minority” (“ethnic minorities”) and “center and periphery”
- Thinking in terms of, and actively inventing and implementing, various unified, universalizing systems of representation (like

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<sup>76</sup> For the application of post-colonial theory to Ukraine, see Kelertas (2006); Pavlyshyn (1992); Yekelchuk (1997).

alphabets and normalized linguistic standards); imagining and constructing universal languages in order to overthrow historical, national, and literary systems of representation

- Thinking in terms of technological dominance, i.e. conceiving of life in the pragmatic terms of social engineering and political management
- Using discriminative discourse, for example, thinking in terms of “urban industrial” (as progressive) and “rural-patriarchal” (as reactionary) etc.<sup>77</sup>.

Kuzio seeks to argue that many of the imperial policies imposed by the imperial core in the Soviet Empire were similar in nature to those imposed by imperial powers in colonial countries. And the nation- and state-building policies of the post-Soviet colonial states are therefore similar to those adopted in many other postcolonial states because they also seek to remove the inherited colonial legacies (Kuzio 2002).

Kuzio supposes that the independent Ukrainian state inherited many of the same legacies of colonialism found earlier within other countries. “Ukraine inherited similar examples of the internal colonialism found within the UK. Internal colonialism required persistent inequalities, economic dependency, a lower standard of living, a cultural division of labour and a reactive nationalism” (Kuzio 2002). Among the results of the subaltern status is a gradual acceptance by the dominated population of the interpretations and main narratives offered by its colonial rulers.

Some scholars have argued that peoples in the colonial culture have been “colonized” not only from the outside, but also from the inside. As Said claims, the non-Western elites internalized the image of themselves supplied by the imperial occupiers and began to perceive themselves according to the precepts of their European conquerors (Said 1994).

Independence provided Ukrainian culture and language possibilities for the development without ideological restrictions and repressive pressure, but does not eliminate the general ambivalence and uncertainty. As Riabchuk wrote, “it did not liberate it from the inertial power of the imperial discourse and did not annihilate its ability of self-preservation and self-recreation with the help of neo-colonist practices and institutions”. In fact, he continued, “we are dealing with deep social deformations caused by long-term colonial domination” (Riabchuk 2013). Graham Smith addresses issues of post-colonialism in relation to what he calls “borderland

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<sup>77</sup> She used this classification mainly for an analysis of hegemony in Soviet art, but it also can be useful for our understanding of national policy and imperial discourses as well. See Sandomirskaja 2008: 12.

identities”. For him, to take the meaning of 'post-colonial' is to assume that the post-Soviet states “were once subjects of a colonial project, part of an empire-driven political formation named the Soviet Union”. “In the post-colonial context, what therefore becomes important is how the borderland states and their peoples envisage the Soviet experience within such discursive worlds in which meaningful action takes place on the basis of perceptions, values and culturally formed expectations. Thus the borderland post-Soviet states can be considered as post-colonial in the sense that they are constructed and labelled as such by their nation-builders”(Smith 1998: 8).

Such “borderland” specifics of Ukraine are stressed by many other scholars, as Oxana Pachlovska argues: “Ukraine clearly finds itself in the center of the global encounter between the West and the East, a place of conflicting, unfinished discourse between them, which continues to the present” (Pachlovska 2009: 48).

According to Hall, the “Other” is fundamental to the constitution of the self, because identity at the individual level is only constituted through the mirror of an Other (Hall 2003: 223). The national identity is inevitably concerned with the demarcation of an Other, because “we” is defined not only by reference to a framework of shared experiences, past and common goals and a collective horizon, but also by negation of the Other.

In post-colonial discourse, the image of the “Empire” is identical to the image of the “Other”, which can be explained by the frequent use of the term “empire” in Ukrainian nationalist discourse. The image of the “empire” as “the other” plays an extremely important role in creating the image of the “self”. The positioning of the “self” in relation to “Russia”/the “Empire” is the key for understanding today’s post-colonial narratives in Ukraine. Through the construction of the “other” as “empire”, we can understand “how the borderland states’ interpretations of their previous and current relations with the Soviet Union help structure the idea of empire as a continuing and uninterrupted Russian project” (Smith 1998).

## Historical background and national identity formation in Ukraine

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian society faced not only the problem of building new state institutions, but also a new type of common national Ukrainian identity within the boundaries of one state. One of the complications in the post-communist development of Ukraine, with its uncertain perception of itself and absence of a common vision of its future, is the results of two factors: Ukraine’s historical lack of a unified society and its very short period of statehood.



Contemporary Ukraine comprises areas that for many centuries historically and culturally belonged to different states. For most of its history Ukraine was divided between different empires, all of which subscribed to different historical narratives and definitions of national identity. Throughout this time, it served as a sort of in-between land, divided between Russia, Poland, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Serhii Plokyh supposes that Ukraine was a borderland over the course of its history, not only of different state formations, but even of different civilizational and cultural zones. As he noted, “Centuries of borderland existence contributed to the fuzziness and fragmentation of Ukrainian identity. Borders were created and policed to divide people, but the borderlands served as contact zones where economic transactions (legal and illegal) took place, loyalties were traded and identities negotiated” (Plokyh 2002: 288).

According to Kataryna Wolczuk, the dynamics and challenges of state formation in post-Soviet Ukraine can only be understood and appreciated in the context of the history of Ukraine. The roots of many of Ukraine’s current political and cultural divisions lie in history, as over the last two centuries the country has been divided and ruled by two empires – Russian and Austro-Hungarian – with significantly different systems (Wolczuk 2001). This is why Ukraine’s society diverged in terms of linguistic, cultural, religious and economic characteristics. Only after the Second World War, argues Wolczuk, were Ukrainian regions for the first time united in a single administrative unit, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. “Ukraine emerged in 1991 as an independent polity with multiple ‘grand narratives’ of its past; this multiplicity was, most of all, reflected in the diverse evaluation, condemnatory and glorifying, of Soviet rule in Ukraine” (Wolczuk 2001: 18).

The process of creating a Ukrainian national identity seems to be far more difficult than in many other post-communist states. Because of different patterns of historical development, the various Ukrainian regions entered independent Ukraine with differing views on its future development and orientation. The Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking ethnic and language groups often have different understandings of history and the nation’s culture. As Ilya Prizel wrote, “Ukraine not only lacked a collective memory of prolonged, unified independence to serve as a legitimating ‘usable past’, but it also had a population divided by language and religion” (Prizel 2004: 110).

When the USSR disintegrated in 1991, Eastern and Western Ukrainians had a divided sense of national consciousness, and most Russians did not view Ukrainians as a separate nation, often calling them “Little Russians” (Hamilton 2007: 5-6). Highly urbanized Eastern Ukraine had strong cultural and economic links with Russia; while Western Ukraine has old links with Central Europe and saw Russia as a threat and negative factor for development of the Ukrainian state.

The legacies of stateless existence and the large-scale linguistic and cultural “Russification” and “Sovietization” have strongly influenced post-Soviet Ukrainian nation-building. The Soviet national policy of internal “multiculturalism” was in fact a policy of “Sovietizations”. Ukrainians suffered the most from Russification and de-nationalization because they were targeted for full assimilation into the imperial Soviet structure. It is therefore not surprising that the search for national Ukrainian identity in the post-communist era represents a conflict between different cultural traditions within Ukrainian society. As Liudmyla Pavlyuk argues, “the cultural profile of the eastern part of Ukraine is determined by its high degree of integration into the institutional and mental space of the Russian empire in both its tsarist and Soviet forms. The western part of the country, meanwhile, served as a moving frontier between different civilizations for many centuries” (Pavlyuk 2007). The main criteria of these divisions were language and culture: Eastern Ukraine being mainly Russian-speaking with dominant Russian or Soviet identity, and Western Ukraine being predominantly Ukrainian-speaking with strong Austro-Hungarian and Polish influence. Such regional and linguistic divisions of Ukraine slow down national integration and the emergence of a civil society encompassing the entire country.

Discussing the different identities of those residing on the territory of Ukraine, Paul S. Pirie proposes as a minimum four possible routes of self-identification, which are: 1) identification with only one ethnic group, either Russian or Ukrainian, 2) strong identification with two groups simultaneously, 3) marginal identification with two or more ethnic groups or total rejection of any ethnic identity, 4) “pan-ethnic” identification with a group that encompasses several ethnic groups, i.e. Soviet identity (Pirie 1996: 1084).

A period of deep social and political transformation by definition leads to a crisis of identity in society. The regional differences in the self-identifications of residents of different parts of Ukraine are most demonstrated by the respondent assessments of their proximity to the residents of other regions of Ukraine and neighboring countries. The existence of large Russian (we can call some of them “Soviet” in the sense of mentality) minorities in Ukraine and the pressures of Russification have resulted in nearly one third of the population, especially in the eastern and southern regions, feeling closer culturally and ideologically to Russia. The results of sociological surveys held by the Razumkov Centre in 2005 and 2006<sup>78</sup> show that Ukrainian citizens from the eastern part generally consider the

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<sup>78</sup>The sociological surveys held by Razumkov Centre on December 20-27, 2005 (2,009 respondents aged above 18 years were polled in all regions of Ukraine) and on April 20 - May 12, 2006 (11,216 respondents aged above 18 years were polled in all regions of Ukraine); source: Razumkov Centre “*National Security&Defence*”, Kiev, No.7, 2006:14-17

residents of Russia and Belarus as being closer to them than residents of Western Ukrainian regions.

In the regional dimension, the assessments look as follows:

- residents of Western Ukraine consider the residents of Poland and of Donbas equally kindred with them
- residents of the Centre consider the residents of Russia more kindred with them than the residents of Bukovyna, Galychyna and Transcarpathia
- residents of the South consider residents of Russia more kindred with them than residents of the Western Ukrainian region
- residents of the East consider the residents of Russia more kindred with them than those of the Crimea, the entire South of Ukraine and Kyiv.

The residents of Western Ukraine identify with the residents of the whole of Ukraine, and somewhat less with the residents of Donbas; the residents of the Centre with the residents of the whole of Ukraine, with the exception of the Western regions, whom they consider less kindred than the residents of Russia; the residents of the South and East consider the residents of the rest of Ukraine less close to them than the residents of Russia.

The constant stressing of the difference between the Eastern and Western parts of Ukraine by some political players leads Eastern Ukrainians to seek the realization of their identity outside the boundaries of the nationalizing Ukrainian project, which leads to inner antagonisms, or what Riabchuk calls “the Cold War”, on the level of two cultures within one state (Riabchuk 1999: 14). The ruling elite seem to benefit from the ambivalent situation in Ukrainian society, because it helps them keep in power.

It is already a common view that there two main geopolitical and cultural orientations in Ukraine, two poles: the European or pro-Western one and the pro-Russian, which can also be perceived as pro-Soviet. It symbolizes the two poles of Ukrainian existence and offers us a possibility to distinguish different discourses in Ukraine concerning European integration and relations with Russia. However, such dividing, definitely simplifies a much more complex reality. The main paradox is that nobody can say where one half ends and the other begins.

According to Brubaker, political struggles over nationalizing policies have been articulated along regional and linguistic rather than ethno-national group lines; they have been intertwined with geopolitical and geo-economic questions concerning the relations of Ukraine with Russia on the one hand and the EU on the other (Brubaker 2011). However, I would rather agree with Riabchuk, who stresses that “Ukraine’s main domestic controversy is not about ethnicity, language, or regional issues, as Western reporters and, sometimes, scholars tend to believe. The controversy is primarily about values and about national identity as a value-based attitude toward the past and the future, toward ‘us’ and ‘them’, toward

an entire way of life and thought, symbolic representation and mundane behavior” (Riabchuk 2009: 27).

One of the main elements structuring the relationship between “*pro-Russian*” and “*pro-Ukrainian*” orientation, which is often constitutive to the process of self-identification, is that of their loyalty towards the Ukrainian state. It should be noted that in 2010 about 70% of the residents of Western and Central Ukraine and only 44% of residents of the South and Donbas defined themselves as citizens of Ukraine. Some 38% of residents of the West and 36% of residents of the North of Ukraine, and only 12% of Southerners and 14% of Donbas residents identify themselves by nationality. In addition, 8% of Ukrainians consider themselves to be Soviet citizens, mainly residents of the South (14%)<sup>79</sup>.

According to another survey (held by Razumkov Centre in 2005-2006), Ukrainian citizens “in the first place” associate themselves with the place of residence, i.e. the local identity prevails (44.4% of those polled); almost a third (31.3%) reported a pan-Ukrainian identity, and 14.8% a regional one. Other answers were given by few respondents (2.9% – the Soviet Union, 0.8% – Europe).

Meanwhile, “in second place”, a relative majority of citizens in all regions associate themselves with Ukraine as a whole (from 37.6% in the Centre to 30.5% in the South). Regional identity ranks second (from 27% in the West to 21.1% in the Centre); and local identity third (from 22.6% in the Centre to 17.7% in the South).

Local identity clearly dominates in all regions – but in the West a relative majority (40.4%) of residents identify themselves with Ukraine. In the Centre and East, a pan-Ukrainian identity was reported by roughly 30% of residents; and in the South by 25.9%. Regional identity is found more among Easterners (19.4%), and less among the residents of the central regions of the country (10.1%)<sup>80</sup>.

However, the Sociological Group “Rating” recorded some growth of patriotism in August 2012 compared to 2010 (one of the reason for this could be the 2012 European football championships, which took place in Poland and Ukraine). Thus, the number of respondents who consider themselves patriots of Ukraine increased from 77 to 82%. Some 40% of respondents explicitly characterize themselves as patriots of their country, and a further 42% as rather

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<sup>79</sup> The research was conducted by the *Sociological Group "Rating" (Ukraine)* in September 2010 (2000 interviewed respondents; the error does not exceed 3%). <http://ratinggroup.com.ua/en/products/politic/data/entry/13938/>

<sup>80</sup> The sociological surveys held by Razumkov Centre on December 20-27, 2005 (2,009 respondents aged above 18 years were polled in all regions of Ukraine) and on April 20 - May 12, 2006 (11,216 respondents aged above 18 years were polled in all regions of Ukraine); source: Razumkov Centre “*National Security&Defence*”, Kiev, No.7, 2006:14-17

patriots than not. Only 10% of respondents did not consider themselves patriots. The remaining 8% were unable to decide.

The vast majority (61%) of respondents answered the question “Who am I?” with “a citizen of Ukraine”. Half as many respondents describe themselves primarily as residents of their region, town, village (29%), and 24% of respondents just said “a human being”. Just 19% of respondents, answering this question, mentioned their nationality, and almost every tenth respondent cited their family role or characterized themselves as a Soviet citizen. Only 6% would call themselves Europeans, and these are primarily young people<sup>81</sup>.

## Language issues

Since 1991, language questions in Ukraine have become one of the most hotly contested issues. The specifics of language policy in Ukraine are still defined by the historical legacy of Ukrainian-Russian language relations under imperial conditions (both Tsarists and Soviet), and are closely connected with constructions of national identity and of nation-building processes. Despite the fact that the law on languages naming Ukrainian as the only official state language was passed as early as 1989, its usage, as well as issues regarding the status of Russian, still divide Ukrainian society. “The language issue still stirs passions and seems to be a divisive tool in the hands of neighbors, as well as politicians who want to manipulate the electorate in the hope of winning extra votes in elections” (Zaleska 2009).

In fact, Ukraine is a bilingual country. In 1989, a total of 64.7 per cent of the population claimed to be native Ukrainian speakers, while 32.8 per cent gave Russian as their mother tongue. According to census data, in 2001 Ukrainian ethnics were mainly Ukrainian speakers (but 14.8% declared Russian as their mother tongue), while 95.9 percent of Russian ethnics declared Russian as their first or exclusive language (3 percent less than in the 1989 census). The share of those whose mother tongue is Ukrainian in 2001 totaled 67.5% of the population of Ukraine, 2.8 percentage points more than in 1989. The percentage of those whose mother tongue is Russian totals 29.6% of the population. Compared with the data from the previous census, this index decreased by 3.2 percentage points. During the period since the previous census, the proportion of other languages

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<sup>81</sup> The research was conducted by the *Sociological Group "Rating" (Ukraine)* in August 2012 (2000 interviewed respondents; the error does not exceed 3%).  
<http://ratinggroup.com.ua/en/products/politic/data/entry/14017/>

specified as the mother tongue increased by 0.4 percentage points, accounting for 2.9%<sup>82</sup>.

Apart from the fact that 85% of ethnic Ukrainians indicated Ukrainian as their native language, if we look at the language of preference rather than “native language”, Ukraine would appear as more or less equally divided between those preferring to speak Russian and those preferring Ukrainian. At the same time, though, the linguistic identity of Ukrainian citizens does not always correlate with their cultural identity. Furthermore, a Ukrainian cultural identity was reported by many Russian-speaking citizens.

**Adult population of Ukraine on the basis of language use in 2003 (Khmelko 2004)**

<b>Language</b>	<b>Western Region</b>	<b>Western-Central Region</b>	<b>Eastern-Central Region</b>	<b>Southern Region</b>	<b>Eastern Region</b>	<b>Population %</b>
<b>Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians</b>	91,7	59,3	30,8	5,3	3,6	38,5
<b>Mixed speaking Ukrainians (surzhyk)</b>	1,5	13,0	20,6	11,3	8,3	10,7
<b>Russian speaking Ukrainians</b>	1,3	17,2	33,5	40,0	48,6	28,0
<b>Russian speaking Russians</b>	1,5	5,8	11,1	31,3	34,1	16,9
<b>Others</b>	4,0	4,7	4,0	12,2	5,4	6,0
<b>Total</b>	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

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<sup>82</sup> State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/>

Although most attention in Ukrainian debates on language and national identity is directed towards the relations between the two standard languages, “*surzhyk*” might be considered a “third” language in Ukraine.<sup>83</sup> Resulting from language contact between the high-status Russian and low-status Ukrainian language, *surzhyk* is regarded as a consequence of Russian and Soviet political and cultural dominance. If *surzhyk* was previously associated with urbanizing Ukrainian peasants, the state language status of Ukrainian sometimes results in educated Russian-speakers mixing languages in their attempts to speak or write a Ukrainian language many of them do not master to perfection (Bernsand 2001: 38-47).

Most people in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine use Russian as their first language. As the Ukrainian scholar Volodymyr Kulyk (2002: 11) claims, “The rapid urbanization of the Ukrainian population, a massive influx of Russians into cities and the higher social prestige of the Russian (“all-Union”) language, including its dominance in the specifically urban spheres of life, made millions of ethnic Ukrainians subject to forced Russification”.

The Russian-speaking population is predominantly concentrated in big cities, which automatically provides better access to education, a professional career, and other social advantages (Riabchuk 2013). According to Riabchuk, these deformations have both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. As reported census (2001), 18% of Russians and only 11% of Ukrainians had higher education. The percentage of educated people among Ukrainian speakers is even less (9%) than among ethnic Ukrainians, while among Russian speakers it is even greater (19%) than among ethnic Russians. However, as Riabchuk again argues, the qualitative superiority of the Russian-speaking group by more powerful symbolic capital is more important. Partially, it is based on social advantages, but even more “on the traditional cultural domination that was created and to some extent supported by the former empire with the help of various discursive means” (ibid). The Russian-speaking group often perceives itself as a representative of the “higher”, “universal” language and culture that a priori stands higher than the ‘provincial’ Ukrainian language and culture.

In Eastern and Southern Ukraine (both historically Russian-speaking), “Ukrainization” faced hidden resistance, and hence was not very successful and rather superficial. The state tried to promote the Ukrainian language mainly through bureaucratic measures, which were effective only to some extent (Zhurzhenko 2002: 12).

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<sup>83</sup> ‘Surzhyk’ is a label for non-standard language varieties as the mixed Ukrainian-Russian language (or we can say Ukrainian with extremely large number of Russian words), that dissolve the language boundary between the Ukrainian and Russian standard languages.

According to a survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating”<sup>84</sup> (in 2012), 41% of respondents support granting Russian the status of the state language. However, more than half of the respondents (51%) are against it. The remaining 8% are undecided. From 2009 to 2010 the level of support for this initiative decreased from 52-54% to 41%, while the number of opponents increased from 40-41% to 51%. Among the biggest supporters of bilingualism are residents of Donbas (75%), the South (72%) and the East (53%). However, almost 70% of the residents of Central and Northern Ukraine and almost 90% of residents of the West do not support the initiative. Granting Russian the status of state language is mostly supported by elderly people, and least of all by young people, in cities more than in villages.

Politicians often play the “language card”, placing the emphasis on the problems of regional confrontation and the status of the Russian language. As Tatiana Zhurzhenko argues, “it is not language differences that create tensions and conflicts, but rather various political forces articulate these differences and formulate the positions of the language groups, and unfortunately they do so very often in terms of mutual hostility, exclusion, and the incompatibility of the groups’ simultaneous free development” (Zhurzhenko 2002: 13).

## Conclusion

The legacies of stateless existence and Russian domination have strongly influenced the post-Soviet Ukrainian nation and identity building. The problem in such countries as Ukraine is that during its existence the Soviet regime suppressed the expression of Ukrainian identity and imposed a generalized “Soviet” identity. This is why Taras Kuzio stressed that such a task of nation-building will be more difficult than state-building in post-Soviet Ukraine, because Soviet nationality policies deliberately fostered internal disunity between Eastern and Western Ukrainians (Kuzio 2007: 7). Highly urbanized and industrialized Eastern Ukraine had strong cultural and economic links with Russia; while Western Ukraine has old links with Central Europe and still looks at Russia as a threat or negative factor, claiming stronger ties with Europe.

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<sup>84</sup>The research was conducted by the *Sociological Group "Rating" (Ukraine)* in September - October 2012 (1200 interviewed respondents), source: *Sociological Group "Rating"*: <http://www.ratinggroup.com.ua/en/products/politic/data/entry/14046/>



We can distinguish four specific features of national identity formation in post-communist Ukraine<sup>85</sup>:

- The first aspect of the difficulties of identity building is Ukraine's historical lack of a unified society and its very short period of statehood.
- This is directly connected with the second element – an uncertain perception of itself and the absence of a common national idea after gaining independence.
- This leads to the third element – the absence of a common vision of the future, and of a main direction or final outcome of political and social development.
- Last, but not least – the lack of critical assessment of the Soviet past.

The development of a new national identity should rest on critical rethinking and assessment of Ukrainian history, but the Soviet heritage has become a major source of conflict. In this sense, the changes in Ukrainian elite's perception and behavior seem to be a fundamental element for successful development of Ukraine.

The modern Ukrainian public discourse on identity can be divided into two main discourses. Conventionally, they can be regarded as a *post-colonial* and *post-imperial*.

The first is characterized by victimization of the past and demonization of the image of Russia (USSR), and the second by nostalgia for the lost glory of a great country until 1991, and by hopes for the revival of unity with Russia. In post-colonial discourses, Russia is characterized as an inherently despotic and expansionist imperial state, in contrast to the European Ukraine with democratic traditions. Ukraine was considered as a Russian cultural colony where Russian myths, symbols and historical narratives were largely internalized by the Ukrainian population. In this discourse, "empire" is therefore characterized by myths of oppression, forcible "Russification" and concerns for this weakness of the Ukrainian project. "The experience of 'empire', because it led to the abolition of institutions, the assimilation of elites and the suppression of all markers of separate identity, is used to explain the weakness of national identity in the present"(Smith 1998: 40). The post-colonial discourses reject the myth of voluntary Ukrainian absorption into the Russian cultural sphere, and tend to portray the entire history of Ukraine as one long defensive struggle (*rukh oporu*)

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<sup>85</sup> Similarly K. Korostelina distinct five specific features of national identity formation in post-communist Ukraine, see: Korostelina K.V. Identity and power in Ukraine. *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 4, 2013:40.

for national liberation. The long-lasting dependency on the imperial discourse lead to cultural and historic fantasizing, mythologization and activation of research of the European component of Ukrainian identity and distancing from the Russian and Soviet legacy.

On the contrary, narratives using post-imperial discourse aim to present the experience of Ukraine as one of ‘fraternal union’ with the ‘brothers’ of Russia instead of the discourse of “empire” and ‘colony’. Nostalgia is borne out of idealized memories of a simpler past that stands in opposition to a confusing or uncertain present. The Soviet past being offered today is an incomplete one, even a romanticized version. Several generations of citizens grew up with part of their cultural identity being the notion that their nation helped to shape the world. These narratives are a result of differing understandings of historical past, sovereignty, and the construction of identities, thus influencing the ability to construct the common ‘Ukrainian identity’.

The countries of the former Soviet Union still have contradictory relations to the past, and their approaches to it are constantly changing. As a result, history is becoming an instrument for achieving momentary political goals and a weapon in the hands of people who in essence have no interest in the national memories of other peoples, the tragedies that befell their own peoples, or the past in general.

The main feature of the Soviet legacies in memory politics is a monistic view on history that promotes only one “proper” view on history. The post-Soviet model of politics of history is now being actively exploited by the political regimes in Russia. It comes down to the nationalization of the myth of the Great Patriotic War, with very little space for acknowledgment of the Stalinist crimes, and it highlights imperial values. Memories of the war are required above all to legitimate the centralized and repressive social order. This is why the Russian authorities constantly have to return to those traumatic circumstances of the country’s past that reproduce key moments of national mobilization. The victory of the Soviet Union in 1945 is not simply the central junction of meaning of Soviet history; it is in fact the only positive point for post-Soviet society’s national consciousness. As Lev Gudkov wrote, “Victory does not only crown the war, but as it were purifies and justifies it, at the same time withdrawing its negative side from any attempt at rational analysis, tabooing the topic”.

Post-colonial discourse has an important function in modern Ukrainian politics. The negative image of Russia plays a crucial role in the formation of Ukrainian national identity, serving as a unifying threat. For Ukrainian nationalists, Russia as a former imperial center has become a primary source of “negative identity”. Since the image of Russia is perceived differently in different regions of Ukraine, it has been used successfully by different political forces for the manipulation of the electorate.

In the post-colonial discourse, the image of the “Empire” is identical to that of the “Other”, which can be explained by the frequent use of the term “empire” in

Ukrainian nationalist discourse. The image of the “empire” as “the other” plays an extremely important role in creating the image of the “self”. The positioning of the “self” in relation to “Russia”/“the Empire” is the key to understanding today’s post-colonial narratives in Ukraine.

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# Returning to Eurasia from the heart of Europe? Geographical metanarratives in Hungary and beyond

*Péter Balogh*

## Introduction

Hungary is in political, legal, social, and moral (Bozóki 2011, Palonen 2012, Sólyom 2013) crisis. The economic situation is not very good either and worse than in comparable countries (Richter 2011). Emigration is high (HVG 2012) and the number of would be-emigrants has never been higher during the last twenty years (Sík 2012). At the same time as the far right is strong, the country more and more finds itself at unease with the EU (Index 2013) and is more and more turning towards non-democracies in Asia for assistance and to break out of diplomatic isolation – sometimes with difficult outcomes and at the cost of others (DW 2012). These developments make it important to improve understanding on what kind of ideas and ideologies this nation is guided by nowadays.

One way of studying such ideologies and orientations is through national metanarratives, which can be defined as “visions of national solidarity and identification” (Bassin 2012: 553). While globalisation has been impacting national identities across the world, the transformations of the late 1980s and early 1990s—Eastern Europe and the former USSR—are affected by it with a particular intensity. Across these regions, old structures of political and economic organization were largely destroyed, and some of the most important ideological foundations of social cohesion were rejected. In all of the regions affected, this served to initiate a difficult and painful quest for what might be called new “metanarratives” of nationhood that are meaningful and effective in the conditions of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. (Bassin 2012: 553)

Thus changing national self-perceptions are sometimes coupled with altering spatial relations and understandings. In parts of northern Europe, a Scandinavian identity has been constructed during the mid-19th century to emphasise the links

between Sweden, Denmark, and Norway (Larguèche 2010). In Central and Eastern Europe, after 1989 new spatial concepts became necessary to overcome the East-West divide (Götz et al. 2006: 11-12). While the latter image lingers on (ibid: 10), supposedly static spatial perceptions have become much more dynamic (ibid: 12). But the significance of these imaginations lies not just in how they are performatively and discursively constructed, but also what they are achieving (ibid: 16). I focus here on geographical metanarratives in Hungary, not least due to the topicality of such ideas there. The paper is guided by the following questions:

- What kind of geographical metanarratives are circulating in Hungary today?
- Which metanarratives are gaining influence, which ones are in decline, and why?
- How do they affect the country's (geo) political, cultural, and economic orientations?
- Do these metanarratives find a receptive audience in other countries; do they overlap with metanarratives elsewhere?
- Can they affect the country's political culture, and perhaps even democratic norms?

The limited scope of the paper combined with my geographic location during its compilation did not allow for fieldwork, interviews, or public opinion surveys (cf. O'Loughlin et al. 2006) to collect primary data on the extent to which these narratives are impacting society at large – hence my restriction to secondary sources. In order to learn about the extent to which the metanarratives are instrumentalised in Hungarian politics and economics, developments in Hungary and its relations to other countries were followed through different news agencies, expert reports, scholarly work as well as own earlier observations. This introductory section is followed by a short general overview of metanarratives. Section 3 briefly summarises the geographic metanarratives that have been the most important in Hungary over the past years. Section 4 provides empirical evidence to and an analysis of how and why some of these metanarratives are reshaping contemporary Hungary. The last section shortly sums up the conclusions.

## Metanarratives and geographical metanarratives

‘Geographical narratives’ (252 Google Scholar hits<sup>86</sup>) as such are thus far understudied. Even if we add the hits for ‘spatial narratives’ (1,580), these numbers pale into insignificance compared to ‘national narratives’ (10,700), let alone to ‘historical narratives’ (45,300). The number of hits is even lower if we add the prefix ‘meta’ in front of ‘narratives’. Yet I chose to use ‘geographical metanarratives’ for several reasons. One, unlike ‘national’, ‘geographical’ includes supra- and sub-national levels such as regionalisms or pan-nationalisms. Secondly, it indicates that focus is on metanarratives where space is of primary importance. Finally, the prefix ‘meta’ signals that we are dealing with grand narratives that a large number of people (are expected to) subscribe to, rather than individual stories or accounts.

In critical theory and in postmodernist approaches a metanarrative refers to a comprehensive explanation, a narrative *about* narratives of historical meaning, experience or knowledge, which offers a society legitimation through the anticipated completion of an often yet unrealised master idea (cf. Appignanesi & Garratt 1995: 102-103; Childers & Hentzi 1995: 186). For literary scholars Stephens and McCallum (1998: 6), a metanarrative “is a global or totalizing cultural narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge and experience”; a story about a story, encompassing and explaining other “little stories” within conceptual models that make the stories into a whole. In communication and strategic communication, a master narrative or metanarrative is a “trans-historical narrative that is deeply embedded in a particular culture” (Halverson et al. 2011: 14). A master narrative is therefore a particular type of narrative, defined as a “coherent *system* of interrelated and sequentially organized *stories* that share a common rhetorical desire to resolve a conflict by establishing audience expectations according to the known trajectories of its literary and rhetorical form” (ibid; Stephen & McCallum 1995: 8).

On the general level, there are at least two problems with metanarratives. On the one hand, such grand theories tend to unduly dismiss the naturally existing chaos and disorder of the universe, and the power of the individual event (Nouvet et al. 2007: xii-iv). On the other hand, metanarratives are created and reinforced by power structures and are therefore untrustworthy. Rather than creating grand, all-encompassing theories, postmodernism therefore attempts to replace metanarratives by focusing on specific local contexts as well as the diversity of human experience (Peters 2001: 7). Thus postmodern narratives will often deliberately disturb the formulaic expectations such cultural codes provide

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<sup>86</sup> The searches referred to in this paragraph were undertaken on February 25, 2014.

(D’Haen 1997: 186), pointing thereby to a possible revision of the social code (Ermarth 1992: 156).

*Geographical* metanarratives can then be seen as imaginations containing “distinctive and competing geopolitical orientations toward certain states and regions of the world” (O’Loughlin et al. 2006: 130). In her study on Russia, Laruelle (2012: 558) defines geographical metanarratives as grand narratives consisting of sets of more specific, narrowly focused narratives. They advance a supposedly comprehensive and teleological explanation of Russia through a master idea—territorial size and location in space are the drivers of Russia’s mission in the world, and of the nature of Russia’s state and culture. Going beyond data or maps, they have as their main function to develop a theoretical assumption and transform it into a legitimate ideological tool. These metanarratives are flags that are waved mostly by nationalist-minded intellectual circles, but they also have a much wider audience—although it is difficult to measure and analyze—in parts of the elite, the educated middle classes whose professions have suffered from loss of prestige, some student circles, and members of the general public. Whether in radical or moderate, extreme or subtle, forms, these metanarratives constitute a *doxa*—a non-homogenous set of opinions, popular prejudices, and general presuppositions that shape contemporary Russian culture and politics.

Thus a metanarrative “gives sense, purpose, and coherence to discourses of history and geography” (Suslov 2012: 577). My definition of geographical metanarratives here is that of *ideas and visions of communal solidarity and identification that have a geopolitical agenda*. Community here refers mainly to national, but also sub-, supra- or pan-national levels.

## Geographical metanarratives in Hungary and beyond

Hungary is a particularly complex case, with a culture based on an unquestionably unique language but one that has been shaped by many different peoples including Tatars, Turks, Austrians, Germans, Soviets and others (Cartledge 2011). Moreover, while all political entities legitimise their existence on a narrative of some sort, a number of such – sometimes conflicting – ideologies are circulating in Hungary today that are intensively debated across wide segments of the society, including the political elite. Given this plethora of geographic metanarratives it is impossible to present a full account, but the following imaginations appear to have been the most influential over the past few years. Of these, due to its gaining importance neo-Turanism will be dealt with at particular length.

### *The ‘return to Europe’ and the return of ‘Central Europe’*

While the notion of ‘Mitteleuropa’ has long traditions in the German-speaking and former Habsburg lands, it was largely buried with the East-West division of

Europe during the Cold War. The idea received a new boost through Milan Kundera's famous essay *The tragedy of Central Europe* (1984). Kundera famously argued that the historic lands of Bohemia, Poland, Hungary etc naturally belong to Europe, from where they were artificially divided but to where they shall one day return. Building on the region's distinctiveness from Eastern Europe in general and from Russia in particular, the concept was useful in legitimising several countries' NATO and EU accessions: "[b]y framing Central Europe as an Eastern outpost of Europe, it provides a platform from which to make appeals to Western assistance" (Kuus 2004: 480, cf. Pridham 2005: 84). Thus its success after 1989 also depended on a positive reception not just in the countries concerned but also among powerful western decision-makers. In Hungary, while the focus on the country's Europeanness has declined somewhat in the last years, the notion of 'Central Europe' is still important (hirado.hu 2013) but has received different associations. One, it may serve to distance the country from the (even more) crisis-struck southern Europe. Secondly, it signifies a region devoted to nation-building as opposed to the "empire-building" Eurocrats and cosmopolitan elites that are perceived by the right to dominate Western Europe.

### *The 'Carpathian Basin'*

A dominant geographic metanarrative in Hungary today is that Hungarians across the Carpathian Basin belong together (Kárpátalja 2012). This narrative was a taboo during the socialist period. Even if the country has not made formal territorial claims since World War II, public institutions including the government are today openly supporting the Székely Land's aspirations to territorial autonomy within Romania (MNO 2013a). While offering citizenship to co-ethnics beyond the mother-state's borders is also practised elsewhere, in Hungary it is coupled with a rhetoric of "reuniting the nation" ninety years after the Treaty of Trianon (Fidesz 2011), by offering not just citizenship but also for instance the right to vote in the country's national elections (MNO 2012). Pan-Hungarian institutions are being set up throughout the region for various groups such as entrepreneurs (Kormányportál 2012), artists (MNO 2013b), and so on. Rather than just governmental organisations, such initiatives are also taken by NGOs (TKMM 2012, KMJA 2013). Importantly, these actions are also popular among Hungarians and their political representatives in the neighbouring countries (Fidesz-EU 2013, MNO 2013c). Last but not least, the Carpathian Basin as a "unitary geographic space" (Dövényi 2012) also enjoys revived attention by a number of Hungarian scholars across the region (Gyuris 2014), not least based on its ethnic composition (Kocsis et al. 2006, Kocsis & Tátrai 2013).

### *Neo-Turanism and other Eurasian metanarratives*

Another type of metanarratives with significant geographic relevance is winning terrain in Hungary. In practice this includes a number of more or less well-

established ideas that share an emphasis on the ancient Hungarians' historical, cultural and even some linguistic links with various peoples in Asia. Neo-Turanism appears as the most influential among these narratives. The ideology of pan-Turanism has been a political movement for the union of the Uralo-Altaic peoples and languages (Murinson 2006: 945). It has historically been most influential in Turkey (overlapping with pan-Turkism) and Hungary, though during somewhat different periods. In Turkey, it was mostly popular in the years preceding World War I (ibid) and then in the 1950s and '60s. While gradually gaining influence from the late nineteenth century on, in Hungary the heydays of Turanism were rather in the interwar period (Hanebrink 2009, Vardy 1983: 37-39). Still, during that time pan-Turanism did serve as some common ground for collaboration between the two countries to stem the Russian threat (Murinson 2006: 945). But while it was more and more replaced by Kemalism in Turkey, in Hungary Turanism was gradually merging with Fascism<sup>87</sup> (Hanebrink 2009: 118). Partly as a consequence, the ideology was fully discredited in the socialist era. During that time, the official version of history adopted the Finno-Ugric link – to the extent that questions of ethno-genesis enjoyed any attention at all. With the change of system a plethora of new-old ideas saw light, supported by more or less scientific literature. While several ideas still promote a Finno-Ugric kinship of some sort, others explicitly reject such a link. Many new-old theories in fact trace the Hungarians' roots in the Turan (a historical region north of Iran), Sumer, or elsewhere in Central Asia. The area south of the Urals has long been a strong suspect of the location of ancient Magyars, with a recent shift towards what is today western Kazakhstan (Bíró et al. 2009).

As we will see in the next section, what makes the study of these narratives particularly topical is that they enjoy growing popularity among sizable segments of the Hungarian population at a time when the country's leadership is increasing efforts to strengthen connections with more and more states in Asia. At the same time, some of these imaginations find an audience and even have their equivalents in several Eurasian societies. For instance, neo-Ottomanism is gaining influence in Turkey (Murinson 2006) and neo-Eurasianism is increasingly popular in Russia (Laruelle 2012).

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<sup>87</sup> It only proves the malleability of such metanarratives (*cf.* Bassin 2012: 555) that while Turanism for some served to emphasise Hungary's Eurasian links, for others it served to strengthen what they believed were shared (geopolitical) interests with Germany.

## Towards an“Eurasianisation” of Hungary?

The strengthening of Eurasian connections in Hungary can today be traced in genealogic interest, popular culture, political ideology and foreign policy alike.

### *Genealogy and national self-images*

It should be noted that the origin of the Hungarians has often been and continues to be a subject of intensive popular, scientific and pseudoscientific debate (Marinov 2009). Most researchers today agree that the tribes that at some point called them selves Magyars have their origin in central Asia, but there is disagreement over issues as their more precise “original” location or when the migration process began westwards. Similarly, the relation of Hungarian to other Finno-Ugric languages is quite debated. Representations of these relations have also followed political orientations: when Hungary was relatively well-off around the fin-de-siècle, kinship with the then so-called “fish-stinking Finns” was rather neglected; at the dawn of the Cold War it was the Finns who ignored their unfortunately positioned “relatives”. All the while few Hungarians reject the reality of their nation today being composed of people of various origins. While a recent genetic study (Bíró et al. 2009) in fact found overlaps between the Kazakhstani Madjar tribes and the dominant Magyar (i.e. Hungarian) population in Hungary, another study from the same year concluded that three fourths of Hungary’s current male population has a genetic pool proving at least a 30,000-year-presence in Europe (HVG2009).

It is of course not the goal here to find out the “real” origins of Hungarians and their kin. Instead, focus is on various ideas, imaginations and self-perceptions that have the potential to link this society to others. Of particular importance here is the question which images emphasise Asian, Eurasian, or European connections. While the majority of Hungarians probably still see their nation as a primarily European one, certain ideas and studies on its ethno-genesis can “disturb” such a picture. Discourses around an Asian origin are particularly delicate given the importance of Christianity in Hungary’s history, as the country has seen itself as an outpost of western civilization and its defender against “Oriental barbarism” (Vardy 1983: 37) since the first king and founding father of the state Stephen I adopted Christianity around the year 1000. This self-perception was especially accentuated during the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century and during Turkish rule (1541-1686), with both events featuring high in the nation’s historical conscience. Illustrative here is a popular novel on the initially successful protection of the Castle of Eger against Ottoman troops in 1552 by the extensively outnumbered Hungarian forces (Gárdonyi 1901/1991), which is part of the national curriculum. Anti-Turkish feelings are also represented in folk songs, poems, and nursery rhymes (Akçalı 2013: 44). This self-image only started to

weaken with the Habsburg rule, at a time when Hungary was increasingly distancing itself from Austria in the nineteenth century.

### *Popular culture*

There is today a growing interest in what was or could have been the ancient culture of the Turanian, Hun, and Magyar tribes. This includes their everyday-practices (including archery, horse-riding, handcraft, building and dwelling in yurts) but also pre-Christian beliefs such as Shamanism and various forms of Paganism (Kolozsi 2012). While festivals and different gatherings and associations devoted to such activities and cultural practices have now been around for some years, these earlier rather amateur events seem to be gradually becoming more professional, and growing in size. Importantly, Kurultáj (Figure 1), a major one among these festivals – organised by the Magyar-Turán Foundation (Kurultáj 2012) four times so far – in 2012 became for the first time a semi-official event by benefitting from a public support of approximately 310,000 USD by the Hungarian government (Ehl 2012). The event attracted up to a quarter million visitors (ibid), including high-ranking officials from countries considered to belong to the Turanian family of nations (i.e. Turkey, the Central Asian republics and a number of ethnic groups from Russia). In November 2012, a smaller but similar event with Kazakh riders called ‘Vostochniye Skachki’ (Eastern Gallop) was organised in Eger (HEOL 2012), a city paradoxically associated with a heroic battle against the Turks in Hungarian historiography (see above). In the recent past, the area around Szigetvár (another Hungarian town famous for fierce battles against Ottoman forces) has increasingly been transforming into a region attracting Turkish tourists (Kálnoky 2013).



**Figure 1: Searching for Turan at the Kurultáj festival.**



*Source:* Kurultaj.hu

### *Politics and foreign policy*

Among the parliamentary parties neo-Turanism is openly embraced by the far-right Jobbik (Akcali&Korkut 2012), and to some extent by the governing party Fidesz (Ehl 2012). In April 2013 Jobbik even proposed to create a national day for the Turanian kin peoples; even if the majority of MPs abstained from votes this time (NOL 2013), the proposition itself is telling. While Fidesz may be divided on the embrace of Turanism, one of its MPs – Sándor Lezsák – is the Kurultáj festival's patron. Moreover, it was another Fidesz MP –László Kövér, the Speaker of the National Assembly – who proposed to support the event. Most recently, while condemning some of the EU's criticism towards Hungary Kövér said that if this is the direction the EU takes, then Hungary should consider leaving the union (EurActiv 2014).

The notion of an “Eurasianisation of Hungary” (I have not seen it being laid forward elsewhere) is to some extent inspired by the idea of a “Putinisation of Hungary”, a label that several journalists (TWP 2010, Rauscher 2012, Kirchick 2012, Lindberg 2013) described the country’s development with since current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán took power in spring 2010. While a comparison of Hungary with Russia is probably far-fetched (The Economist 2010), it is meant to criticise the leadership style and a number of policies of the Hungarian government. Illustratively, in early 2014 it was suddenly announced that Hungary agreed with Russia on co-financing the construction of new units of the country’s only nuclear power plant: despite being the largest investment in Hungary since 1989, the content of the intergovernmental agreement has not been made public (Sadecki&Kardaś 2014) and was strongly criticised for not having been preceded by consulting experts, let alone NGOs and other interest groups. Criticism is more generally targeted at the creation of enemy images (Koenen 2011), but more importantly, at constitutional reforms that may serve to weaken democratic institutions (Halmai 2011, Küpper 2011, Sólyom 2013) and at laws endangering the freedom of press (Vásárhelyi 2011).

In a wider context, some (e.g. Haraszti 2012) see a trend of Hungary moving towards a “Eurasian” style of governance characteristic of so-called ‘managed democracies’ such as Ukraine, Russia (Demdigest 2012), and a number of East Asian countries. According to Haraszti, such a model is based on an often unclear division between public and private ownership and management, and a strong state influence in matters traditionally treated as belonging to the private sphere in liberal democracies. Accordingly, explicit criticism – if not dismissal – of a liberal democratic order are clearly present for instance in the Hungarian Prime Minister’s recent utterance: “I don’t think that our European Union membership precludes us from building an illiberal new state based on national foundations”, going on to cite Russia, Turkey and China as successful models to emulate, “none of which is liberal and some of which aren’t even democracies” (WSJ 2014). According to some experts (Demdigest 2012), the stake is high as other young democracies in Europe may be following suit. Russia has in fact offered Hungary (Barabás 2011), Bulgaria (novinite.com 2011), and Serbia (SNP Nashi 2011) to join its Eurasian Union.

Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs has been emphasising the importance of an on-going ‘race for the East’ –that is entering new alliances with for instance China in light of the economic crisis (Máté 2012, cf. Kálnoky 2013). A number of concrete measures were recently taken that signal a Hungarian (re)orientation eastwards. Through the foreign policy of ‘Opening to the East’ (*Keletinyitás*), particular attention is directed towards regions like Turkey (Kálnoky 2013), China,

Russia<sup>88</sup> and Central Asia, not least Kazakhstan (Fidesz Eger 2012). Educational exchange programs have been started with countries like Azerbaijan (Index 2012) and Jordan (MHO 2013). Chambers of commerce are being set up in for instance Azerbaijan to attract Hungarian enterprises (Index 2012). Most recently, Hungary closed its embassy in Estonia while it is opening a new one in Mongolia (NOL 2014). While trading with non-democracies is nothing unique to Hungary, what is distinctive is the nexus between such policies and ideology and culture.

Hungary's difficulties with dealing with non-democracies were illustrated by a severe incident in autumn 2012 when it sent home an Azerbaijani officer who murdered an Armenian colleague in Budapest. While Baku promised his sentence would continue in his home country, in reality he was treated as a national hero and was even promoted upon return in Azerbaijan. Hungarian media and opposition scented a dirty deal behind the scenes, saying that Azerbaijan had promised to buy bonds for 3 billion euros from the cash-strapped Hungarian government in exchange for the officer's release (DW 2012). Developing contacts with different countries is of course not negative in itself, but with exactly whom, how, and at what price?

## Conclusion

Geographical metanarratives can be a powerful force and, not least when instrumentalised in politics, often serve to legitimise a society's geopolitical and cultural (re)orientations. Therefore such metanarratives tend exactly to emerge as mobilising tools at times when new such orientations are desired by power elites and/or important segments of the society more generally. As I tried to show, Hungary is both an illustrative and a topical case of a country undergoing a partial but significant reorientation. While it clearly saw its place in Europe as well as within the country's current borders up until recently, considerable efforts havenewly been undertaken to approach certain Eurasian societies; not least Turkey, Russia, and in Central Asia. Such orientations are not just based on pure geopolitical and geo-economic rationales (as in a number of western countries), but are also supported by new-old metanarratives such as neo-Turanism and other forms of "Eurasianisms". By complementing the purely commerce-based activities with cooperation in fields such as education, cultural exchange and politics, Hungary is more and more linked to hybrid or non-democracies also politically, at

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<sup>88</sup> When it was in opposition during 2002-2010, Fidesz explicitly objected for example to the South Stream gas pipeline on the grounds of avoiding increased energy dependence on Russia; but it has recently agreed with Gazprom to welcome this project (Presseurop 2013).

a time when the government has been criticised of semi-authoritarian tendencies and democratic deficits. At the same time, a number of Eurasian countries – notably Turkey and Russia – appear to welcome such a reorientation of Hungary, as well as of other countries in (south) eastern Europe. This can be explained by the fact that Turkey’s rising neo-Ottomanism and Russia’s growing neo-Eurasianism are promoting geopolitical agendas that are in line with Hungary’s ‘Opening to the East’ and neo-Turanism.

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# BEYOND TRANSITION?

## MEMORY AND IDENTITY NARRATIVES IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

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This volume collects selected contributions to the international conference **Beyond Transition? New Directions in Eastern and Central European Studies**, held in Lund on 2-4 October 2013. The conference emerged in cooperation between the Centre for European Studies at Lund University, the Uppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies and the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEEES) at Södertörn University (Stockholm), with generous financial support from the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The event served as a follow-up conference to the 8th ICCEES World Congress, held in Stockholm in 2010.

The conference encouraged participants from various academic fields and with different subregional focuses to go beyond the study of the post-Soviet states and the former socialist countries in Eastern and Central Europe in relation to their trajectory from the old system. It suggested that it might be more rewarding to take into account patterns of convergence and divergence between European countries on both sides of the former Iron Curtain facing the pressures and possibilities of globalisation. Consequently, all the papers in this volume in their own way deal with cases where problems of change and continuity transgress the old East-West border under the impact of larger political, socio-cultural and intellectual trends.



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